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The present PhD thesis develops and applies an evaluative methodology suited to 
the evaluation of policy and governance in complex policy areas. While extensive 
literatures exist on the topic of policy evaluation, governance evaluation has 
received less attention. At the level of governance, policymakers confront choices 
between different policy tools and governance arrangements in their attempts to 
solve policy problems, including variants of hierarchy, networks and markets. There 
is a need for theoretically-informed empirical research to inform decision-making at 
this level. 
 
To that end, the PhD develops an approach to evaluation by combining 
postpositivist policy analysis with heterodox political economy. Postpositivist policy 
analysis recognises that policy problems are often contested, that choices between 
policy options can involve significant trade-offs and that knowledge of policy 
options is itself dispersed and fragmented. Similarly, heterodox economics 
combines a concept of incommensurable values with an appreciation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of different institutional arrangements to realise them. A 
central concept of the field is coordination, which orientates policy analysis to the 
interactions of stakeholders in policy processes. The challenge of governance is to 
select the appropriate policy tools and arrangements which facilitate coordination. 
Via a postpositivist exploration of stakeholder ‘frames’, it is possible to ascertain 
whether coordination is occurring and to identify problems if it is not. Evaluative 
claims of governance can be made where arrangements can be shown to frustrate 
the realisation of shared values and objectives.  
 
The research makes a contribution to knowledge in a number of ways a) a 
distinctive evaluative approach that could be applied to other areas of health and 
public policy b) greater appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of different 
forms of evidence in public policy and in particular health policy and c) concrete 
policy proposals for the governance and organisation of diabetes services, with 
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In recent years there has been much interest in new forms of governance, whereby 
central government adopts a ‘steering’ role in what is an increasingly ‘differentiated 
polity’ (Rhodes, 1997). The shift to ‘networked governance’ has been accompanied 
with increased awareness of the different policy tools available to policymakers in 
their attempts to solve complex economic and social problems, whether 
hierarchical, market or networked arrangements (Thompson et al, 1991). However, 
the literature on governance is typically descriptive, identifying, explaining and 
conceptualising the shift from government to governance (Sorensen and Torfing, 
2007: 14). There is a lack of research on the evaluation of governance which 
specifically addresses choices between forms of governance (Sorensen and Torfing, 
2007: 311; see also Torfing et al., 2012)1. 
 
My aim in this PhD is to develop and apply a methodology suitable for addressing 
evaluative questions of policy and governance in complex policy areas. I do this 
through a focus on the National Health Service (NHS), where the challenges posed 
by NHS reform bear all the hallmarks of a complex, or ‘wicked’, policy problem 
(Keasey et al, 2011). 
 
1.1 NHS Reform and the Problem of Evaluation 
 
When I began my PhD in September 2011, the NHS was in the news on a daily basis: 
the changes to the health service initiated by the Conservative/Coalition 
Government’s Health and Social Care Act (2011) represented one of the biggest 
reorganisations of the health service since it was created in 1948. The 
Government’s White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’ argued that 
reforms were necessary to end “excessive bureaucracy and top-down control”. The 
reforms would create a “social market” that would provide patients with choice, 
enhance accountability and stimulate innovation by “liberating” local actors, all the 
while safeguarding traditional values associated with the health service such as 
equality and universalism (DoH, 2010). However, the reforms were greeted with 
unprecedented public and professional protest. The Government’s critics claimed 
its reforms entailed the privatisation of the health service and would compromise 
core values associated with it. The public nature of the pre-reform NHS purportedly 
made it uniquely capable of realising equity, quality of care and efficiency (Pollock 
et al., 2011a).  
 
At the same time, an additional debate on the nature of care was taking place, 
which was no less significant and occurred sometimes alongside and sometimes 
apart from the debate on the use of markets in the health service. The decision of 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to lower the risk 
threshold for heart disease at which patients are offered cholesterol-lowering 
                                                           
1 Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing call for research which focuses on the “political choice between 
different combinations of hierarchy, market and networks in relation to particular policy problems” 
(Sorensen and Torfing, 2007: 311). 
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drugs, or ‘statins’, prompted the concern of some patient groups and health 
professionals “about the ‘medicalisation’ of the population” (Boseley, 2014a). 
These concerns resonate with longstanding criticisms of “industrialised medicine” 
voiced by the likes of Aldous Huxley and Ivan Illich (Illich, 1976).  
 
These debates raise questions which the present project seeks to address: 
 
 What governance arrangements are appropriate in the health service?  
 Is there a role for markets and the private sector in the provision of health 
services?  
 What interventions and forms of care should the health service provide? 
 And what research methodologies are appropriate to address such 
evaluative questions?   
 
I argue that dominant forms of evaluation are inadequate to address such 
questions. A sign of this inadequacy is the contested nature of the evidence in 
health policy debates. During the passage of the Health and Social Care Act, the 
Government and its supporters claimed the reforms were evidence-based (Le 
Grand, 2013; Le Grand and Cooper, 2013), but the critics claimed they were 
anything but (Pollock et al., 2011a). Likewise, the evidence underpinning NICE’s 
decision was just as contested. The British Medical Journal (BMJ) sparked 
controversy when it published two articles – one by Professor John Abramson, of 
Harvard medical school – that were critical of statins, prompting calls for the 
articles to be retracted and the resignation of the journal’s editor. An independent 
panel eventually agreed that revisions were required, but disagreed with the calls 
for the editor to resign. Nevertheless, the controversy continues, with critics 
continuing to dispute the benefits of statins at a lower risk threshold, amid 
concerns that trial data has been withheld by pharmaceutical companies 
(Abramson et al., 2013; Godlee, 2014a; Godlee, 2014b). 
 
These debates reflect a fundamental problem of evaluation that is inadequately 
addressed by dominant forms of evaluative research: that effectiveness and 
performance are contested concepts. In what follows, I draw upon literatures in 
policy analysis, public administration, political economy and the philosophy of 
social science to develop a qualitative, postpositivist approach to the evaluation of 
policy and governance. This is applied to NHS reform and in particular diabetes 
policy and governance. Diabetes was selected because the condition touches most 
aspects of the health service and is widely considered to be one of the most 
significant public health challenges of the 21st century (Farooqi, 2012; PHE, 2014). 
Furthermore, NHS diabetes services have attracted considerable criticism in recent 
years. A recent inquiry by Public Accounts Committee reported that the state of 
diabetes care is “depressingly poor” (PAC, 2012: 3). Some stakeholders raise 
concerns which resemble issues discussed above, regarding the market reform of 




1.2 NHS Reform, Postpositivism and Political Economy 
 
Due to its evaluative nature, the present project is rooted within the discipline of 
policy analysis, which first emerged in the 1960s. Policy analysis is a broad discipline 
which includes analytical and descriptive research, where the focus is on the 
explanation of policies, as well as evaluative research. Policy evaluations enable the 
identification of appropriate courses of action, through robust, empirical analysis2. 
Evaluation, here, can be understood as a systematic attempt to determine the 
value or worth of something by judging it against certain criteria. The ultimate aim 
of policy evaluations is to improve the effectiveness of public policy. Policy 
evaluation has increased in prominence in recent years following the rise of 
Evidence-Based Policy, a movement which seeks to spread the practice and use of 
evaluation throughout the public sector and thus ensure that decisions at all levels 
are clearly evidence-based (Matthews, 2012: 244). However, since the inception of 
policy analysis, there has been extensive debate about what constitutes a suitable 
approach to evaluation.  
 
Frank Fischer, a prominent exponent of ‘postpositivism’ in policy evaluation, 
criticises the influence of ‘positivist’3 social science and ‘neoclassical’4 economics 
over the discipline. Under these influences, policy evaluation typically involves the 
quantitative analysis of policy problems and presents choices between different 
options as a technocratic problem of selecting the most efficient ‘means’. Fischer is 
concerned that such an approach fails to recognise the essentially normative and 
contested nature of policy decisions, arguing the discipline has developed along 
“technocratic rather than democratic lines ... geared more to managerial practices 
than to the facilitation of democratic government” (Fischer, 2003: 5). 
 
In this PhD, I draw upon postpositivist policy analysis partly to understand the 
limitations of dominant approaches to policy evaluation and partly to develop an 
alternative approach. Postpositivists are committed to analysing the different and 
potentially contested understandings, values and interests of stakeholders which 
come into play when they analyse and evaluate policy (Dryzek, 1994; Fischer, 2003; 
Stone, 2001; Shapiro and Schroeder, 2008). Yet I go beyond typical applications of 
postpositivist policy analysis to apply the approach to a set of questions it is not 
usually applied: to evaluative questions of governance, where decision-makers have 
options between the different  ‘governing structures’ of hierarchy, markets and 
networks (Rhodes, 1996: 653; see also Thompson et al, 1991).  
 
The debate on NHS reform takes place across these two levels. At the level of 
policy, decision-makers confront choices between different interventions, services 
and forms of care, whether ‘biomedical’ healthcare, mental health, social care, 
                                                           
2 While the literature often used policy analysis and policy evaluation interchangeably (Choudhary, 
2009: 4), the current project differentiates between the two on the basis that policy analysis can be 
used to refer to both descriptive and evaluative research, whereas policy evaluation is always 
evaluative. 
3 Positivism can be usefully defined as ‘scientism’: a general belief that the only genuine knowledge 
is scientific knowledge (Oliga, 1988).  
4 ‘Neoclassical’ refers to the dominant economics framework (see chapter 3).  
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public health or alternative/complementary therapies. It is at this level where some 
stakeholders are concerned about the ‘medicalisation’ of health problems (Boseley, 
2014a). By far the most contentious debate, however, concerns decisions at the 
level of governance, where national policymakers confront choices between 
broader policy tools that aim to enhance performance of the health service. At this 
level, there is significant debate about the use of performance management in the 
health service (a form of hierarchical governance) and the use of markets and the 
private sector (a form of market governance) (Meuleman, 2008: 73). 
 
I propose an approach to evaluation which synthesises postpositivist policy analysis 
with the discipline of political economy. It does this via a focus on coordination, a 
concept that features prominently in literatures on public administration and policy 
economy. A central problem of public sector governance is to facilitate 
coordination, understood as a state where the actions and decisions of relevant 
stakeholders are consistent with and supportive of each other (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973: 233). Coordination is particularly important in the context of 
‘wicked’ policy problems, because actors are dependent upon each other to solve 
them and no one individual or agency has sufficient expertise or resources to solve 
them alone (Jennings, 1996: 2). The concept also features in heterodox political 
economy, where it is a corner stone of Friedrich Hayek’s analysis of the market as a 
coordinative mechanism. Though Hayek is famously pro-market in his views, it is 
possible to extract from his work a concept of coordination which can be used in 
the evaluation of governance (Greenwood, 2010; Greenwood, 2012).  
 
Evaluating public sector governance in terms of coordination entails focusing on the 
interactions between stakeholders at different stages of the policy process. Hayek’s 
concept of coordination is consistent with a postpositivist perspective because he 
recognises the qualitatively distinct and incommensurable values which motivate 
actors, as well as the fragmented and dispersed nature of knowledge. One of the 
challenges of governance, viewed through the lens of coordination, is to acquire the 
knowledge of how to solve policy problems and translate that knowledge into 
concrete policy and governance arrangements. By exploring and comparing 
national policy ‘frames’ with those of other stakeholders, it is possible to ascertain 
whether coordination is taking place and evaluate policy and governance. Of 
course, stakeholders might have very different values to those prioritised by 
national policymakers, suggesting stakeholders have real political differences.  
 
At the same time, however, there may be a degree of common ground which would 
provide a basis for an evaluation. The analysis might identify values and knowledge 
that are suppressed by current policy and governance arrangements. Local 
implementers of policy or recipients of services might highlight issues which arise in 
the delivery of policy which were unanticipated at a national level. Where policy 
and governance can be shown to frustrate the realisation of shared values in this 
way, then policy decisions are resulting in ‘coordination problems’. It might also be 
possible to identify alternative policy options and arrangements which, if 
implemented, would improve the overall effectiveness of governance. In this way, 
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via a comparative assessment of stakeholder frames, it is possible to address 
evaluative questions of public service governance. 
 
The main objectives of the PhD are as follows:  
 
 To gain greater understanding of the interface between politics and markets 
in general and the marketisation of the public sector in particular; 
 To critically examine different frameworks of political economy in order to 
draw out their implications for governance evaluation;  
 To highlight problems with existing evaluative research on policy and 
governance in public services and the NHS; 
 To develop the conceptual tools necessary for the evaluation of policy and 
governance arrangements in public services and the NHS; 
 To identify and understand the nature of “coordination problems” across 
the diabetes pathway; 
 To make concrete policy suggestions for the governance of the diabetes 
pathway. 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter 1 and 2 serve as introductory chapters, providing an introduction to the 
topics of public service reform and evaluation. They provide historical context and a 
survey of the issues. Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 constitute the main body of the text, 
involving theoretical inquiry in the fields of the philosophy of science and political 
economy. Chapter 7, 8 and 9 constitute the case study section: chapter 7 provides 
an introduction to the debate in health policy, chapter 8 examines the evidence and 
chapter 9 involves an empirical investigation of diabetes policy and governance. A 
more detailed overview follows: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic of public service reform. As a central organisation of 
the welfare state, the NHS has been strongly affected by wider intellectual and 
policy developments that relate to the structure of the economy and the 
organisation of public services. The chapter provides some background on these 
developments. I introduce criticisms of the postwar welfare state and the reform 
process, exploring the New Right ‘settlement’ and Third Way approaches to 
governance. The question of the appropriate governance arrangements for public 
services is very much open, with some controversy over the use of markets in 
public services and performance management.  
 
Chapter 2 explores the topic of evaluation in the context of public services. As a 
starting point, it begins by defining policy and governance, which is critical to the 
chapter and the PhD as a whole. It then critically examines the forms of evaluation 




Like the reforms to public service governance themselves, the rise of policy 
evaluation has proved controversial. Some stakeholders claim that Evidence-Based 
Policy, in its current form, may actually distort decision-making. A key issue is the 
use of quantitative metrics to measure performance in policy evaluation, in the 
practice of performance management, the economic and scientific appraisal of 
public services and evaluations of governance, which often rely upon data collected 
through performance management. Ultimately, quantitative evaluation only 
provides a partial account of the quality of public services and the effectiveness of 
governance.  
 
The literature on ‘networked governance’ does recognise failings of dominant 
economic and scientific forms of evaluation to capture the complexities of 
governing processes. However, evaluations of ‘networked governance’ have a 
process-orientation and do not specifically address whether governance is effective 
in improving public sector outcomes. Furthermore, the literature does not address 
evaluative questions of public sector governance such as the appropriateness of 
markets or managerialist policy tools. The question of how to evaluate policy and 
governance is therefore very much open. 
 
Chapter 3 begins the process of developing a methodology suitable for the 
evaluation of policy and governance in complex policy areas. The chapter explores 
in more detail dominant approaches to policy evaluation, most notably the 
Randomised-Control Trial (RCT) and Cost-Benefit Analysis, as well as the 
philosophies and frameworks which underpin these methods, most notably 
‘positivism’ and ‘neoclassical’ economics. After that, the chapter examines a 
number of postpositivist philosophies of sciences and applications of postpositivist 
philosophy to policy evaluation. On the basis of these inquiries, I argue that a 
qualitative, postpositivist approach to evaluation is required, one that provides a 
more detailed account of the effectiveness of different policy options through an 
analysis of stakeholder ‘framings’. Yet, though postpositivist policy analysis provides 
useful insights into evaluative strategies at the level of policy, it is rarely applied to 
evaluative questions of governance.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the field of political economy which provides invaluable 
insight into the strengths and weaknesses of markets and the state to affect 
coordination. Indeed, the debate over public services is in many respects a 
microcosm of this wider debate at the level of the economy. I analyse a number of 
perspectives in political economy, each of which has insights relevant to the topic of 
governance evaluation. Where chapter 4 explores the ‘neoclassical’ framework in 
more detail, along with attempts to develop that framework for the purposes of 
institutional evaluation; chapter 5 explores so-called ‘heterodox’ economics, which 
combines a postpositivist appreciation of value diversity and incomplete knowledge 
with institutional analysis. 
 
The analysis centres upon two key issues which arise in governance contexts: how 
to acquire and disseminate information regarding the most valued use of resources, 
i.e. the ‘knowledge problem’; and how to elicit the motivation of actors to seek out 
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and act upon that information, i.e. the ‘motivational problem’. While recognising 
the need to address these issues, I critique the conclusion reached by pro-market 
commentators that only markets can align incentives and provide signals of valued 
uses of resources. Ultimately, empirical research is required to explore evaluative 
questions of governance and appropriate solutions are likely to differ in different 
policy contexts.  
  
Chapter 6 draws upon the preceding chapters and presents a framework for the 
evaluation of policy and governance in complex policy areas. I highlight the 
importance of focusing on the concept coordination, which is central to both public 
administration and political economy and consistent with a postpositivist 
perspective on values and knowledge. Coordination orientates analysis to the 
interactions between stakeholders involved in the policy process and their views on 
the substantive content of policy and outcomes.  
 
There are two key aspects of stakeholder frames that are important to take into 
account: knowledge of the policy problem at hand and of specific policy solutions 
on the one hand; and knowledge of the impacts of governance on the other. Only 
by considering both levels can the effectiveness of governance be ascertained; for 
the quality of local services in many respects determines the quality of governance. 
By exploring and comparing national policy ‘frames’ with those of stakeholders at a 
local level, it it possible to establish whether coordination is taking place. The 
analysis might reveal examples whether the decisions of national policymakers are 
frustrating the realisation of policy goals and objectives and indeed provide insight 
into more effective options at the level of policy or governance.  
 
Chapter 7 and 8 set the scene for the case study. Chapter 7 begins by presenting 
the Conservative/Coalition Government’s reforms introduced following the passage 
of the Health and Social Care Act (2011). This serves to identify the values and 
objectives which the Government has prioritised, as well as the means that have 
been selected to achieve them. Following that, the chapter identifies and explores 
the dominant frames in debates in health policy and governance, some of which 
have clearly influenced the Government’s reforms and some of which are more 
oppositional. Building upon Kor Grit and Wilfred Dolsfma’s typology of health policy 
‘discourses’ (Grit and Dolfsma, 2002), I identify five main frames at the level of 
governance: a ‘market’ frame, a ‘managerialist’ frame, a ‘medical-professional’ 
frame, a ‘progressive’ frame and a ‘political’ frame. Additionally, I identify two main 
frames at the level of policy: a ‘holistic’ frame and a ‘medical’ frame. These 
framings provide a useful starting point to understand the contours of the debate 
at the two levels and provide a basis for the subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapter 8 examines the evidence on NHS reform, which is important given the level 
of contestation which exists in the debates. The chapter examines the evidence on 
the various policy tools which have been used in attempts to enhance the 
performance of the health service, including Evidence-Based Medicine, 
performance management and marketisation. The analysis draws upon the 
framings set out in chapter 7, which have distinct positions on these policy tools 
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and approaches.  I also reach some tentative conclusions about the effectiveness of 
the different policy tools, based on areas of agreement between frames and the 
strength of the evidence.  
 
There is widespread concern that dominant economic and scientific forms of 
appraisal overstate the benefits of pharmacological therapies relative to the costs. 
Additionally, performance management appears a potentially useful policy tool 
provided that performance indicators have been appropriately defined; but the 
effectiveness of marketisation is more ambiguous. Hierarchically-integrated public 
health systems appear to have a special claim on equity and universalism due to 
significant savings from administrative costs. Yet there is a question mark over the 
capacity of public health systems to realise qualititative criteria such as patient-
centred care. Ultimately, more detailed qualitative and postpositivist research is 
required to address evaluative questions of governance.  
 
Chapter 9 is a case study of diabetes policy and governance. The case study is 
informed by an analysis of in-depth stakeholder interviews with a range of people 
involved in diabetes at different levels of governance. The analysis draws upon the 
frames set out in chapter 7, which are clearly present in diabetes both at the levels 
of policy and governance. Via a detailed comparative assessment of stakeholder 
frames, the case study identies areas of potential and ares of concern arising from 
the Government’s recent reforms. The most promising aspect of the reforms is the 
new role of local authorities in the health service, which has clear potential to 
deliver ‘holistic’ forms of public health that are important in diabetes. However, 
there were some major issues of concern: key targets in public health and primary 
care promote what many stakeholders believe are both inefficient and 
inappropraite forms of care.  
 
Additonally, the research revealed detrimental policy impacts associated with the 
marketisation of the health service. The creation of Clinical-Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs), small and specialised commissioning units that purportedly put GPs at the 
centre of commissioning, frustrates the utilisation of the knowledge and expertise 
of all professional groups in the delivery of healthcare. Furthermore, while offering 
patients greater choice of provider and improvements in responsiveness through 
the development of primary care, the reforms are appear to have compromised 
other patient-centred criteria that are vital in diabetes care, including choices over 
prescriptions, referrals and assess to specialists. Further still, the use of economic 
incentives in primary appears to place significant pressure on the doctor-patient 
relationship.  
 
On the basis of these concerns, I make a case for decentralisation in the case of 
certain targets in public health and primary care, as well as the creation of larger 
organisations which combine aspects of commissioning and provisioning, based on 
previous models of NHS organisation. In this way, via a comparative assessment of 
stakeholder ‘frames’ at different levels of governance, it is possible to identify 
issues which frustrate the realisation of shared goals and propose alternatives 







NB: the project was approved by the University of Westminster SSHL Research 
Ethics Committee and the research has been carried out in compliance with good 
research practice standards5.  
  
                                                           
5 See Appendix  
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Chapter 1: Introducing Public Service Reform 
My purpose in this chapter is to provide some background to the topic of NHS 
reform. As a central organisation of the welfare state, the NHS has been strongly 
affected by wider intellectual and policy developments that relate to the structure 
of the economy and the organisation of public services. Though the focus is the NHS 
throughout the chapter, I situate the topic of NHS reform in wider debates about 
the appropriateness of different forms of public sector governance. I identify and 
analyse the main political ideologies which relate to the topic, some of which have 
remained on the periphery and others that have directly informed policy. In the 
process, I present the arguments for the provision of public services through the 
welfare state and the debate over its reform. I conclude by arguing that the 
question of the appropriate governance arrangements for public services is very 
much open. 
 
The chapter proceeds chronologically, beginning with a discussion of the ‘postwar 
settlement’ and then examining New Left and New Right criticisms of that 
settlement. The second section presents New Right approaches to governance, 
most notably privatisation and New Public Management, introducing two Figures to 
illustrate the reforms introduced during the 1980s and 1990s. The third section 
examines Third Way approaches to governance, considers their relationship to  
New Right approaches and presents some criticisms of these approaches.  
 
1.1 The ‘Postwar Settlement’ and the National Health Service  
 
The history of the National Health Service (NHS) is closely intertwined with 
changing intellectual and political developments that relate to the structure of the 
economy and the organisation of public services. It is useful, to gain an 
understanding of the organisation, to explore the historical context in which it was 
founded and the ideologies and political movements that have informed its reform. 
 
The NHS was founded after the passage of the National Health Service Act of 1946 
and was unique out of all health services, with services paid for and provided by the 
state. The Act nationalised the nation’s hospitals and imposed the duty on the 
Minister of Health to “promote the establishment in England and Wales of a 
comprehensive health service to secure improvement in the physical and mental 
health of the people … The services so provided shall be free of charge” (Klein, 
2006: 1). Widely regarding as the single and most significant achievement of 
Clement Attlee’s Labour government, the health service was the principle 
organisation of a developing welfare state and reflected wider trends to state 
involvement in the economy through the nationalisation of public utilities and 
industries (Leach, 2009: 114).   
 
The settlement which Attlee established would set the intellectual and policy 
framework until the 1970s. The period is often characterised as one of ‘consensus’ 
politics, whereby Labour and Conservative governments pursued broadly the same 
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agenda (Addison, 1994; Dutton, 1990). Yet, while essential characteristics of the 
postwar settlement remained in place until the emergence of the New Right in the 
1970s, support came from a variety of arguments and ideologies, reflecting a range 
of values. 
 
Indeed, on the left, nationalisation stood for greater equality and democracy 
through the transformation of work relationships. Labour Party manifestos 
advocated the nationalisation of industry in order to democratise the “commanding 
heights” of the economy and secure high quality work for workers (Sawyer and 
O’Donnell, 1999). However, nationalisation was also viewed as an answer to 
inefficiency and a lack of investment in key industries. Both Labour and 
Conservative governments nationalised industries on efficiency-based grounds 
(Floud and Johnson, 2004: 93).  
 
Similarly, the welfare state had broad political support, but often for different 
reasons. Socialists and liberals emphasised the importance of welfare services 
because they provide the working population with services they desperately need 
and should be provided as a right. Furthermore, because the rich 
disproportionately pay for services and the poor disproportionately use them, the 
welfare state redistributes resources from rich to poor, creating a more equal 
society in the process (Barr, 2012: 40). Likewise, postwar social democrats such as 
Richard Titmuss emphasised the ‘integrative’ role of the welfare state. For Titmuss, 
paying for, providing and using public services reinforces a sense of community and 
citizenship (Reisman, 1977). 
 
The political right appears to have disagreed over the extent the state should be 
involved in economic life, whether in terms of nationalised industries or the welfare 
state. According to the historian William Manchester, the right fought Labour’s 
“cradle-to-grave” legislations not necessarily because of the substance of the bills 
but the manner in which they were to be provided. Where Labour held that “people 
had an absolute right to these comprehensive benefits”, the right viewed them as 
“gifts from a benign upper class to grateful lower classes” (Manchester, 2015). Yet 
the welfare state still had cross-party support and efficiency based claims were 
made in its favour, just as efficiency based claims were made in favour of 
nationalisation (Greve, 2013).  
 
Certainly, the foundation of the National Health Service was bitterly disputed at the 
time of its creation. Aneurin Bevan, the Welsh Labour Party politician and Minister 
of Health between 1945 and 1950, faced considerable opposition from the medical 
profession and the Conservative Party upon setting up the NHS. Bevan’s speeches 
were littered with references to both the injustices of private medicine and its 
inefficiencies. The health service was nationalised because it placed a duty on the 
Minister of Health to ensure the necessary services are in place and would be 
provided free-at-the-point-of-use, paid for through taxation rather than insurance. 
Furthermore, echoing the left’s advocacy of nationalisation in order to transform 
work relationships, Bevan sought democratic organisation which would put doctors 
at the forefront of decision-making: 
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After all – I need not remind you of this – I am a Socialist, and, being a Socialist, I 
believe in industrial democracy, and because I believe in industrial democracy I 
believe that doctors as a profession must have a greater and greater say in the 
management of their own services. I want for the miners, the railwaymen, the 
engineers, a far greater share in the management of their work and the policies that 
govern it, and I claim no less for the doctors. The doctors themselves must have a 
recognised status in the new service. Therefore I hope they will not come and meet 
me as if I were an antagonist on the other side of the table; on the contrary, I am 
one whose enthusiasm for democratic medicine is as great as their own (SHA, 1980) 
 
As in other areas of welfare policy, the Conservative Party favoured a safety net 
over a comprehensive and free health service (Webster in Oakley and Williams, 
1994: 54). However, there was also widespread acceptance of the waste of the old 
system and cross-party recognition of the need for its reform, in part because of the 
positive economic benefits of providing healthcare to the population. The creation 
of the health service therefore appears to be a combination of pragmatism and 
idealism (Rivett, 1998).  
 
Initial hostilities among the Conservative Party were muted by the 1950s. A pivotal 
movement was the publication of the Guillebaud Report in 1956, the result of an 
official inquiry launched by the Conservative Party into the organisation’s 
performance. This found that concerns over inefficiencies and escalating costs were 
misplaced, which transformed the terms of the debate: 
 
From now on it became impossible for governments to attack the NHS. 
Disagreements in future would be about means, not ends (Rivett, 1998) 
 
Yet the topic of NHS reform remains highly contentious. Since the organisation’s 
creation there have been arguments for and against reform. These reflect wider 
intellectual and political developments.  
 
1.2 Critiquing the ‘Postwar Settlement’: The New Left and the New Right 
 
From the 1960s onwards, a variety of critiques emerged of the postwar settlement. 
The emergence and electoral victory of the New Right in the 1980s had a profound 
effect on the settlement, as is discussed in more detail below. Yet prior arguments 
of the New Left touched upon similar themes and continue to resonate today.  
A core feature of the New Left was a critique of professionalism and positivist social 
science, which had purportedly reduced political discourse to “issues of technical 
and professional expertise” and failed to hold power to account (Holmwood, 1996: 
3). Criticisms of positivism are explored in the third chapter, but it suffices to note 
here the rising scepticism of professionalism which accompanied the emergence of 
the New Left and which had been a core feature of the postwar settlement 
(Wilensky, 1964). Following Talcott Parsons, the ‘standard model’ of 
professionalism held that professionals were required to solve complex policy 
problems and their sense of professionalism was enough to ensure they work in the 
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public interest. This model gave way to a ‘power model’ in the 1970s, with 
professional status and prestige reframed as a project of “self-interested 
monopolists” (Starr, 2009: 27). Professional claims to knowledge and authority 
were viewed as synonymous with the exercise of power over people, in keeping 
with wider postmodern criticisms of Enlightenment notions of reason and progress 
(Leonard, 1997: 97). Professional power had combined with managerial power and 
state power in the development of a modern “military-industrial-welfare complex” 
(Holmwood, 1996: 6).  
 
In health policy, the critique of professional-led medicine had reformist and radical 
variants. Both criticise a so-called ‘biomedical’ model of healthcare, which 
purportedly objectifies the body as if it is a machine (Engel, 1977: 132). The 
reformist critique sought to complement professional medical practice with 
alternative or ‘holistic’ therapies and practices which treat the “whole person” 
rather than just the body and which seek to improve the quality of life rather than 
just its quantity (Bakx, 1991).   
 
Box 1 – Holistic Medicine  
The term ‘holistic’ stems from an influential book by Jan Christiaan Smut in 1926 
entitled “Holism and Evolution”. In 1977 the American Holistic Medical 
Association was established and Evarts Loomis published another influential book 
in 1979, entitled ‘Healing for Everyone: Medicine of the Whole Person’ (Loomis, 
1979).  
 
Holistic care is associated with a number of criticisms of the ‘biomedical’ model. 
The ‘biomedical’ model purportedly has a negative view of health as the absence 
of ill-health, pain and disease. This orientates health services to the treatment of 
ill-health rather than human flourishing, empowerment and well-being. As such, 
interventions are favoured which improve bodily functions and the crucial 
dimensions of psychology and state of mind are not addressed. Additionally, 
because of its focus on the body alone, physicians are not trained to establish 
relationships or communicate with patients. As a result, they often miss out on 
crucial details in the diagnosis and management of conditions. Patients, on their 
behalf, feel disempowered and lack trust in physician decisions, which is 
necessary for compliance and successful treatment: 
 
…the physician’s role is, and always has been, very much that of educator and 
psychotherapist. To know how to induce peace of mind in the patient and 
enhance his faith in the healing powers of his physician requires psychological 
knowledge and skills (Engel, 1977: 132) 
 
For these reasons, advocates of ‘holistic’ care seek to reform health services and 
less hierarchical relationship between doctor and patient. Furthermore, it is 
argued that alternative therapies should be available for people who seek them, 
for they can bring about a broader array of health outcomes beyond purely 
bodily improvements. Examples include psychotherapy, counselling, meditation, 




The radical critique highlighted the power and influence of the medical profession 
over patients. Professionals have the power to determine who is sick and in need of 
treatment, which is often arbitrary (Porter, 1993). The job of the Doctor is to apply 
medical knowledge to any Body that is put before them and cure them of their 
‘illness’, as it is defined by the profession. The centrality of scientific knowledge 
shores up the profession’s position of power because it takes years of training to be 
able to understand and apply it, while patients are disempowered.  Yet it would be 
a mistake to think that patients and citizens are in some way without agency and do 
not have a stake in the system themselves. People, by and large, have colluded in 
the development of the medical model. People like to think that Doctors are all 
knowing and that there is a treatment for any ailment they have. As Ian Kennedy 
writes, “it contributes to an illusion of immortality” (Kennedy, 1981: 32).  
 
One consequence of the model is that health problems are framed as if they are 
only medical issues, when they are often deeply political problems and should 
therefore be confronted in the political domain. In this way, the ‘biomedical’ model 
is biased in favour of the liberal-capitalist status quo because it provides medical 
treatments to people to enhance their ability to cope with objective society rather 
than root out the causes of health problems, such as poverty, inequality, patriarchy 
and exploitative work (Illich, 1976). The result is a medical system characterised by 
excessive medication, specialist treatments, surgical procedures and the overuse of 
drugs (Kennedy, 1981). Some identify  a ‘medical-industrial complex’, involving a 
confluence of corporate, government and professional interests, which results in 
questionable public benefit in much the same way as the ‘military-industrial 
complex’ in defence and war (Relman, 1980; Welter, 1977). 
 
These arguments represent a clear departure from the leftwing thinking of the 
immediate postwar generation. Where that generation had sought to secure basic 
rights through access to welfare services, the New Left sought to improve the 
quality of the services they had access to. The idea of “big state solutions to social 
problems” was undermined in favour of heterogeneity, local and more personalised 
forms of service delivery (Leonard, 1997: xii; Pauli, 2014: 6). In health policy in 
particular, criticisms of ‘professionalised medicine’ represent a significant challenge 
to the models of healthcare developed in industrialised nations. However, as I 
discuss in later chapters, there have been significant academic and professional 
criticisms of New Left accounts and many continue to favour a professional 
approach to health problems (Hart, 2006: 60). Nevertheless, the New Left remained 
on the periphery of policy and the increasingly prominent New Right reframed the 
problem of professionalised services, bureaucracy and standardisation in terms of 
individual freedom, consumer choice and markets (Wainwright, 1994).  
 
Indeed, the New Right gained ascendency in the 1970s and eventually power in 
1979, with the election of Margaret Thatcher. The movement sought to break with 
the ‘postwar’ settlement by breaking with the “collectivism” of the postwar 
settlement that had been supported by some (or even many) socialists, liberals and 
conservatives (Hall, 1979: 16), promoting in its place a “meritocratic and 
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entrepreneurial model of society” (Williams, 2015: 28). New Right discourse 
combined moral themes of individual freedom and responsibility with various 
economic themes that were heavily influenced by prominent economic theories of 
the time, most notably the Austrian school of economics and Public Choice Theory 
(Thompson, 2008). These frameworks provided an explanation for an increasingly 
widespread acceptance that state intervention often results in policy failures 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Lipsky, 1980), which hinged upon two central 
arguments: 
 
 The ‘knowledge problem’: state involvement is likely to result in inefficiency 
because policymakers, public sector workers and professionals do not have 
reliable signals to inform their decisions resulting in the production of the 
wrong type of goods and services. In markets, these signals are provided by 
prices;  
 The ‘motivational problem’: state involvement is likely to result in 
inefficiency because the political sphere and the public sector are rife with 
self-interest groups, lobbyists and corruption. In markets, producers are 
incentivised to work in the interests of consumers (Jackson and Price, 1994: 
5). 
These arguments were central to New Right claims that the postwar settlement had 
been underpinned by “simplistic and romanticized views of how government 
worked and what government could achieve” (Bovaird and Löffler, 2004: 29). The 
New Right’s answer was to withdraw the state from involvement in the economy 
and refashion the welfare state along market lines. 
 
2.1 The New Right ‘Settlement’: Privatisation and New Public Management  
 
The electoral victory of the New Right led to a fundamental restructuring of the 
public sector and indeed the economy as a whole. During the 1980s, significant 
sections of the economy was privatised, serving to alter the state’s role in the 
economy “from provider of services to that of overseer of the market” (HM 
Treasury, 1997: 15). Similarly, though public services were not privatised, a variety 
of managerialist and market reforms were introduced through the 1980s and into 
the 1990s in order to overcome the perceived inadequacies of public bureaucracies.  
 
On the demand-side, consumer choice was promoted within the public sector, 
culminating in the Citizen’s Charter of John Major’s government in 1991 (Robins 
and Jones, 2000: 238). On the supply-side, systems and processes of performance 
management were incorporated across the public sector in an attempt to improve 
the efficiency and accountability of services, providing decision-makers, whether 
consumers, managers or purchasers of services (i.e. ‘commissioners’), with data on 
the performance of public bureaucracies. Additionally, attempts were made to 
restructure public sector organisations in order mimic the operation of the market. 
These reforms included the “disaggregation” of units into smaller organisational 
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units and the introduction of ‘purchaser/provider’ splits across government 
functions in order to inject market competition through the contracting out of 
services and quasi-markets, where public sector organisations compete with other 
organisations (in the public or private sector) to deliver services paid for by the 
government (Dunleavy et al., 2006). 
 
By the 1990s, the term ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) was used to characterise 
this combination of markets and managerialism in public service contexts (Hood, 
1991). Commentators emerged extoling the benefits of the new approach. David 
Osborne and Ted Gaeblar’s book ‘Reinventing Government’, published in 1992, 
provides a prominent rationale for the new reforms. The postwar approach, where 
governments make policy and implement it through public bureaucracies, had 
purportedly resulted in widespread inefficiency. The government’s role, according 
to Osborne and Gaeblar, should be restricted to policymaking, purchasing and 
performance management, i.e. “steering” rather than “rowing”. In place of public 
bureaucracies, ‘consumer’ facing organisations, whether reformed public providers 
or private companies, can more efficiently deliver services specified and paid for by 
governments (Osborne and Gaeblar, 1992; see also Kettl, 2000). By the mid-1990s, 
international organisations such as the OECD were advocating NPM at a global level 
(OECD, 1995).  
 
NPM has had a profound impact on the governance of public services. Figure 1 
presents different forms of governance structure. Point 1 represents public services 
under the postwar settlement, with services financed by and directly provided by 
the government. NPM can be summarised as experiments in points 2 and 3 in the 
figure, amid processes often described as ‘marketisation’. Point 4 represents 
privatisation, where the government withdraws from both the provision and 
funding of services. 
 
 
Source: adapted from Klein, 1984: 14 
 
Though Figure 1 presents important dimensions of NPM, it does not capture all of 
the changes that have taken place. For the emergence of managerialism and 
25 
 
markets in the provision of public service has affected the scale of decision-making 
and nature of the incentives in the system. These dimensions of governance are 
expressed in Figure 2.  
 
 
The centralisation/decentralisation dimensions of the Figure pertain to levels of 
decision-making in public sector contexts, or the freedom (or not) of local actors to 
define objectives: where decisions at points A and C are centralised, decisions at 
points B and D are decentralised. The trust/incentives dimensions pertain to the 
nature of the incentives in the system, ranging from trust in public sector workers 
and professionals to fulfil policy objectives (whether set locally or nationally), or the 
use of managerial or market mechanisms to ensure that they do.  
 
The traditional welfare state operated on the assumption that public sector 
workers and professionals can be trusted to define and deliver good quality goods 
and services, i.e. point B in the Figure. Indeed, as we saw, Bevan himself framed this 
approach as part of wider socialist project of democratising industry. Over the past 
thirty years, the turn to markets and managerialism reflect a rejection of this 
assumption of trust (Le Grand, 2006). The increasing use of markets and 
performance management have shifted contemporary governance to point C in the 
Figure, where decision-making is centralised and economic incentives are deployed 
to elicit the motivation of actors6. Additionally, the reforms have sought to facilitate 
service-user choice, thus decentralising some decisions to point D but with the 
government retaining its role in funding services.  
  
                                                           
6 However, performance management is never total and public sector workers and professionals have 
some autonomy and discretion in the work. In healthcare, though performance management is 
pervasive, clinical guidelines are also used to provide guidance to health professionals but which are 




2.2 New Public Management and the National Health Service  
 
The rise of New Public Management had a profound impact on the health service, 
involving the incorporation of a tier of non-medical general management, 
performance management systems and market mechanisms. A key development in 
the NHS came in 1983, following an inquiry into the performance of the health 
service by Roy Griffiths, deputy chairman and managing director of Sainsbury’s. The 
Griffiths Report highlighted a lack of general management in the service, resulting 
in poor accountability and performance. Griffiths lamented the lack of performance 
evaluation and economic appraisal: 
 
The NHS does not have a profit, but it is, of course, enormously concerned with 
control of expenditure. Surprisingly, however, it still lacks any real continuous 
evaluation of its performance against criteria. Rarely are precise management 
objectives set; there is little measurement of health output; clinical evaluation of 
particular practices is by no means common and economic evaluation of those 
practices extremely rare (Griffiths, 1983) 
 
Following the incorporation of general management into the service, the 1980s saw 
accounting and performance management systems incorporated into the service 
and eventually a purchaser-provider split was introduced into the service in 1989.  
Under the new model, regional planning units no longer directly managed hospitals 
and other provider organisations but become legally separate and financially 
independent units. Forms of market pricing and contracting were introduced in 
order to direct the flow of resources and provider organisations had to compete for 
contracts.    
 
This ‘internal market’ sought to improve the performance of the organisation 
across a range of criteria. By introducing competition on the provider side of the 
market, it would purportedly enhance efficiency. On the purchaser side of the 
market, purchasers – or ‘commissioners’, in New Labour’s favoured terminology – 
could concentrate on securing appropriate services for patients, thus improving 
allocative decisions regarding the appropriate kinds of services that are produced. 
Decision-making would also improve because of the improved information flows 
facilitated by performance management. Furthermore, policymakers sought to 
develop primary care under the GP Fundholding initiative. Under this initiative, 
some GPs became responsible for the commissioning of certain health services. It 
was hoped that these initiatives would facilitate more responsive services by 
bringing decision-making closer to patients and allow the development of patient 
choice, while also embedding a financial incentive in primary care, leading to 
further improvements in efficiency and the quality of care (DoH, 1989). This 
combination of managerialism and markets introduced during the 1980s has largely 
remained in place ever since7. 
 
                                                           
7 Various terms have been used to characterise these combination of managerialism and markets, 




3.1 The Third Way – Towards an Alternative? 
 
The significance of the New Right cannot be overstated for the settlement of the 
1980s sets the overarching policy framework today in much the same way as the 
‘post-war’ settlement before it (Cumbers, 2012). Privatisation and New Public 
Management remain central policy tools of governments worldwide (Sorensen and 
Torfing, 2007). However, both marketisation and managerialism have been 
subjected to some fierce criticism. Throughout the reform process, privatisation has 
been unpopular with the public and critics suggest that the economic potential of 
the approach has been overstated (see chapter 3). Additionally, the capacity of New 
Public Management to enhance the performance of public services has been 
criticised.  
 
A key issue is whether the use of markets in the provision of public services 
compromises core values associated with the public sector. As Figure 1 above 
shows, the marketisation of public services does not necessarily entail privatisation 
because the government remains the funder of services. Yet critics have argued 
that the distinction is not so clear cut. Market reform has often coincided with 
privatisation or has served as a precursor to outright privatisation, while there is a 
question mark over quality of public services which remain free-at-the-point-of-use 
(Ruane, 1997; Whitfield, 2001; Whitfield, 2006). As discussed in subsequent 
chapters, this is a major concern in debates over the use of market mechanisms in 
the health service.  
 
A further set of criticisms of the reform process is associated with the Third Way.  
During the 1990s, Third Way thinkers such as Anthony Giddens argued for a new 
politics that would avoid the pitfalls of statism and markets and repair “damaged 
solidarities” caused by Thatcherism. This would be achieved by embracing a 
“dialogic democracy” that would recover a concept of citizenship and by reforming 
the welfare state into innovative, decentralised organisational forms such as 
cooperatives and employee-owned organisations (Giddens, 1994: 113). At the same 
time, social capital theorists demonstrated the economic importance of common 
social ties, identities and relationships that were purportedly threated by 
bureaucracy and markets (Putnam, 2001). Furthermore, deliberative and 
participatory democratic theory became increasingly influential, bringing to the fore 
the transformative potential of democratic participation (Warren, 1992: 10). 
 
In the field of public administration and management, terms such as ‘partnership’, 
policy networks’ (Cloke et al., 2000), ‘networked governance’ (Torfing et al., 2012), 
‘post-NPM’ (Christensen, 2012), ‘Joined-up Government’ (Pollitt, 2003), ‘interactive 
decision-making’ and ‘citizen involvement’  (Lowndes et al., 2001) drew attention to 
the emergence of innovative, collaborative forms of governance which presented 
new opportunities to deliver public services and solve policy problems. These Third 
Way strategies were premised on a revision of the New Right’s critique of state 
intervention. Where the New Right had identified policy failures as reason to  
withdraw the state from economy activity and refashion the welfare state along 
market lines, Third Way approaches sought to develop new forms of policymaking 
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and implementation which would one again revise the government’s role: from its 
“steering” role in policymaking and performance management to a “network 
manager”, implying a “more process-type role for political actors” (Koppenjan and 
Klijn, 2004: 100). 
 
Advocates of the new approach held an ambivalent attitude toward NPM: New 
Right reformists had been correct to reform public bureaucracies, but the state had 
continued to take on a hierarchical role. On the one hand, theorists of ‘public value’ 
argued that NPM had prioritised values of efficiency and managerial accountability 
over public values such as democratic accountability, transparency, equality and 
professionalism. A ‘public value’ approach entailed orienting public services to the 
realisation of values that are defined by active and engaged citizens in democratic 
forums. In this way, the concept redefines the purpose of public services, creating a 
counterpoint in public value to shareholder value in the private sector (Bozeman, 
2002; Moore, 1995; Meynhardt, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, critics argued that NPM had frustrated efforts to facilitate the 
coordination of policy (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Head and Alford, 2013; O’Toole, 
1997). Centralised decision-making in the form of performance management may 
have result in various “uintended consequences” by reinforcing a “silo mentality” 
across the public sector, whereby organisations focus only on immediate policy 
objectives (Schoubroeck, 2010: 4; see also Guilfoyle, 2012). Likewise, the 
‘disaggregation’ of public sector organisations and increased use of competition 
and markets may have frustrated efforts to improve collaboration between 
different organisations (Pollitt and Sorin, 2011: 22). As Brian Head and John Alford 
argue:  
 
NPM practices have generally been ill-suited to dealing with wicked problems. This 
is so whether we are referring to its initial intraorganizational focus—sometimes 
labeled “managerialism” or “corporate management”—or its more contractualist 
focus entailing purchaser–provider splits, outsourcing and privatization (Head and 
Alford, 2013: 9) 
 
For this reason, more collaborative approaches to governance were advocated, 
including outward looking management strategies and the creation of partnerships 
to actively bring together a variety of organisations (Christensen, 2012: 2).  
 
The forms of governance captured in these accounts undoubtedly present new 
opportunities for the solution of policy problems. At a time where there is 
increasing disillusionment with traditional parliamentary processes, more 
deliberative forms of democracy have the potential to reinvigorate the political 
sphere. Furthermore, the involvement of multiple provider organisations in 
networks has the potential to improve the capacity of policy processes to solve 
complex problems. In theory, networks can overcome collective action problems 
and facilitate “synergistic learning and problem-solving” that might not have 
occurred if only single entities had been involved in service delivery (Agranoff, 




However, there remain issues to consider. Policymaking and implementation 
through networks can involve a variety of individuals and organisations. While this 
has the potential to improve the legitimacy of policy because a greater number of 
stakeholders are involved, it also has the potential of muddying traditional lines of 
accountability (Rhodes, 2000: 77). Furthermore, some question the effectiveness of 
networks suggesting that, like hierarchy and markets, they can fail to improve 
policy outcomes (Jessop, 1998). The potential of networks is attested to by the fact 
many arise spontaneously as participants “fall” into them because market or 
bureaucratic strategies have failed (Roberts, 2001). Yet this is not the case where 
networks are called upon in public sector contexts, where they have a distinct 
purpose and actors are brought together by political actors.  
 
Some claim partnerships have become ‘ends’ in themselves rather ‘means’ to 
improve outcomes for service-users (Dickinson, 2008: 20). Others go further to 
argue they constitute a “new bureaucracy”, prioritising processes of commissioning 
over the actual delivery of services (Blackman, 2013; Travers, 2007): 
 
Commissioning is a bureaucratic activity in the sense that it involves a strong 
emphasis on process: planning, coordination and monitoring compliance with ‘best 
practice’. It entails considerable effort devoted to meetings, plans and paperwork, 
especially if done to excess, which may distract effort from a focus on the outcome 
(Blackman, 2013: 71) 
 
A further issue is the relationship between ‘networked governance’ and the market 
and managerialist policies of the New Right. As discussed above, NPM remains 
central to public sector governance despite significant criticisms of the approach. 
Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing suggest that more collaborative forms of 
governance potentially fill in for the problems attached to markets and 
managerialism: while markets can indeed undermine collaboration, the 
involvement of actors in networks can facilitate trust and collaboration between 
them. Likewise, though centralised decision-making and performance management 
can result in unintended consequences, networks provide channels in which local 
actors can alert policymakers to any issues which arise (Sorensen and Torfing, 
2007).  
 
However, this combination of hierarchy, markets and networks has been criticised 
by others. Guy Peters uses the “Garbage Can” metaphor of policymaking to 
describe contemporary governance, whereby decisions are not “programmed or 
predictable” but “the serendipitous confluence of opportunities, individuals and 
ideas” (Peters, 2002: 7). While this does not necessarily imply that policy failures 
are inevitable, it does provide a more realistic analysis of the potential of 
networked governance to facilitate effective public services. Evaluative research is 
required to explore the effectiveness of the different policy tools and approaches 




3.2 The Third Way and the National Health Service  
 
As with New Public Management, the Third Way had a significant impact on the 
health service. Centre Left think-tanks, such as the New Economics Foundation 
(NEF), the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Demos challenged 
marketisation and managerialism on the one hand but sought reform of the health 
service on the other, through decentralisation and a reformed doctor-patient 
relationship.  
 
In opposition, New Labour had been hostile to the Conservative’s ‘internal market’, 
citing inefficiencies and fragmentation. However, in office, the purchaser-provider 
split remained intact. This was welcomed by Third Way thinkers. Chris Ham, writing 
in Demos, argued that New Labour’s decision to retain the purchaser-provider split 
was justified “in terms of the organisational politics of healthcare” (Ham, 1996: 28). 
The introduction of market contracting had purportedly improved accountability 
and the split would enable purchasers to procure a wider variety of services, which 
was necessary in order to move  beyond the “medical model of healthcare” (Ham, 
1996: 13). However, there would be an emphasis on partnership working between 
organisations to overcome the fragmentation brought on by the market.  
 
Furthermore, various publications outlined proposals for a ‘Mutual Health Service’ 
characterised by small and self-governing mutuals (Mayo and Moore, 2001; 
Leadbeater and Christie, 1998). This would involve reforming the health service 
through the creation of non-profit organisations, cooperatives and social 
enterprises (Mayo and Moore, 2002) and relaxing performance management, 
which had purportedly resulted in various “counting paradoxes” (Lea and Mayo, 
2002; Boyle, 2010). It was argued that creating local, decentralised organisations 
involving democratic forms of governance would improve efficiency because staff 
would have a stake in their work and legitimacy because members of the public 
would be involved in decision-making, ensuring  that organisations would not 
exploit “the fact that the service is a local monopoly, with the whole community 
dependent on it”, as might be the case with the private sector (Mayo and Moore, 
2001: 33). Yet services would continue to be funded from taxation in order to 
safeguard the universal ideals associated with the health service (Lea and Mayo, 
2002: 14). 
 
These arguments would prove influential in policymaking circles. New Labour’s 
reforms to NHS hospitals under the Foundation Trust initiative and the creation of 
Primary Care Trusts, which would take over the purchasing or ‘commissioning’ 
function of the health service, sought to involve staff and members of the public in 
corporate governance. However, some Third Way critics argued that these 
initiatives, while promising, were ultimately undermined by New Labour’s use of 
markets and managerialism in the health service: 
 
These are initiatives modelled on some of the proposals for a more mutual state 
apparatus that have been developed by the New Economics Foundation. The idea 
was to provide hospitals with mutual management and an element of local control 
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— and the ability to raise their own finance — that could set hospitals free to some 
extent of Whitehall control. In reality, however, the mutual element has been 
reduced to limited community membership, with an irrelevant right to elect an 
advisory body, with their exact roles to be determined by each trusts’ constitution. 
Proposals for increasing participation by patients have been set aside by all the 
original foundation trust managers. This a serious omission: handing over financial 
powers to local managers, without passing on accountability to patients, staff and 
local people, is simply creating a new generation of unrepresentative fiefdoms — 
and this is already leading to a general backlash (Boyle et al., 2004: 6) 
 
The question arises over the compatability of markets and managerialism in the 
health service with the values of the Third Way. 
 
4.1 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of reforms to public sector governance. If 
anything can be taken from the analysis, it is that no panacea is available. Decision-
makers confront choices between a range of options in their efforts to design public 
sector governance and lay the basis for the solution of policy problems. Each option 
at the level of governance, whether direct public administration, privatisation, 
marketisation, managerialism or forms of ‘networked governance’, has attracted 
signicicant criticism. Clearly, the question of the appropriate governance 
arrangements for public services and the NHS is very much open. There is a need 
for evaluative research to explore just what governance structure and approaches 
are appropriate for the solution of particular policy problems. However, as I 
demonstrate in the next section, dominant forms of evaluation are not suited to 




Chapter 2: Issues in the Evaluation of Policy and 
Governance 
In recent years, policy evaluation has become an integral feature of the policy 
process (Palfrey et al, 2012). A central aspiration of both New Labour and the 
Coalition/Conservative governments has been for most if not all decisions to be 
clearly evidence-based (Haynes et al., 2012; HM Treasury, 2011a; HM Treasury, 
2011b). It is anticipated that the use of evidence will improve the effectiveness of 
decision-making processes. Policy evaluation is put forward as a solution to the 
‘knowledge problem’ introduced in the previous chapter, which posits that 
decision-makers will struggle to acquire the knowledge they require to solve policy 
problems. This is potentially significant because, as we saw in the previous section, 
there is significant debate over the quality of public services and the 
appropriateness of different forms of public sector governance. Policy evaluation 
may therefore provide answers to these debates. However, as this chapter 
demonstrates, the heightened use of policy evaluation has proved almost as 
controversial as the process of public sector reform itself.  
 
My purpose is the present chapter is to explore issues in policy evaluation as it has 
developed in recent years. I argue that dominant approaches to evaluation are 
problematic as decision-making aids, either at the level of policy regarding choices 
between specific public services or at a level of governance regarding the design of 
institutions.  
 
The chapter is split into three sections: the first section explores literature in public 
administration in order to define terms, focusing on the distinction between policy 
and governance which is necessary for the subsequent analysis. Sections two and 
three then explore issues in the evaluation of policy and governance. Section 2 
explores forms of policy evaluation, including Evidence-Based Policy and 
performance management. Section 3 then explores forms of governance 
evaluation, including evaluations of privatisation, marketisation, performance 
management and ‘networked governance’. 
 
A major problem with all forms of evaluation is a reliance on quantitative metrics in 
evaluation which are unlikely to capture all dimensions of performance. 
Furthermore, while the literature on ‘networked governance’ recognises that 
quantitative approaches to evaluation do not capture the complexity of 
governance, evaluations are typically process-oriented and do not address 
evaluative questions of governance, most notably whether markets are appropriate 
in the delivery of public services or whether centralised forms of decision-making 
are appropriate.  
 
1.1 The Distinction between Policy and Governance 
 
As discussed in the introduction, this PhD is a work of policy analysis and more 
specifically policy evaluation: policy evaluations seek to inform policy decisions by 
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identifying appropriate courses of action through robust empirical research 
(Choudhary, 2009: 4). To critically engage with the literature on policy evaluation 
first requires a definition of policy. Furthermore, because this PhD seeks to go 
beyond policy evaluation to address evaluative questions of governance, the term 
governance and its relationship to policy must also be defined.  
 
The Cambridge Dictionary Online provides a useful definition of policy: “a set of 
ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed to 
officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political 
party”. This definition of policy as involving a plan that has been agreed upon by a 
certain stakeholder group is shared in the academic literature on public policy, 
which emphasises that policy involves both a decision and a course of action. While 
a plan must be the outcome of a decision, the notion of a plan implies action: “it 
embodies the idea of action – indeed rational action” (Hill and Varone, 2014: 14). 
Similarly, Hoshiar Singh and Pardeep Sachdeva define policy as involving a means-
end relationship: the decision to act in a certain way involves making sense of a 
problem, defining policy objectives and choosing between solutions to realise them 
(Singh and Sachdeva, 2011: 336).  
 
These definitions of policy usefully highlight how policy involves a decision to act in 
a certain way. However, policy is surely more complex than this. As Michael Hill 
argues, there is a danger of viewing the policy process “as if it exists on a desert 
island” (Hill and Varone, 2014: 16). Rather than view policy as a result of a single 
decision, it is more accurate to talk of a “decision network” involving a web of 
decisions. Furthermore, if policy embodies rational action and involves identifying a 
solution to some problem, we must also take into account the political processes 
through which policy problems have come to be defined as problems in the first 
place and which influence the range of solutions that are considered for adoption. 
Thus, the process of policy formation is complex. Literatures on policy networks, 
policy communities and issue networks highlight how potentially significant 
numbers of stakeholders can be involved in shaping the process of policy formation 
(Moran et al., 2008: 427).  
 
The definition of policy as involving a decision to act in some way also abstracts 
away from the implementation of policy. Writers on policy implementation 
highlight the role of “street level bureaucrats” who implement policy on the 
ground. They can and often do redefine and change policies that are decided upon 
by politicians and policymakers (Lipsky, 1980). As such, it is necessary to take into 
account the perspectives of local implementers of policy, or adopt a “bottom-up” 
perspective as opposed to a “top-down” perspective. Furthermore, in part because 
of the complexity of policy implementation, it is important to recognise that policies 
can fail. 
 
Christopher Hill and Peter Hupe offer a comprehensive definition of public policy: 
policy involves decisions and actions, as well as inaction; policy arises from a 
process over time; policy can involve both internal and external relationships; and 
policy can result in both intended and unintended effects, or outcomes, upon 
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implementation (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 4). They also argue that, though the 
distinction between policy formation and implementation is simplistic, it remains a 
useful heuristic which captures distinct parts of the policy process: 
 
What can be called ‘public policy’, and thus has to be implemented, is the product of 
what has happened in the earlier stages of the policy process … both 
implementation and policy formation refer to respectively ‘late’ and ‘early’ sub-
processes (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 9) 
 
How does this conception of policy differ from governance? The previous chapter 
introduced the concept of governance, which highlights that the state is just one 
actor among many and that policy is formulated and implemented in an 
increasingly differentiated polity (Rhodes, 1996: 653). In some respects, accounts of 
governance share similarities with expansive conceptions of policy in so far that the 
latter recognise the complexity involved in the formation and implementation of 
policy. Thus, governance can be thought of as coming to terms with increased 
recognition of the complexity of the policy process and the different stages through 
which policy is defined and delivered.  
 
Yet governance literatures do seek to go beyond the level of policy: the concept is 
designed “to incorporate a more complete understanding of the multiple levels of 
action and kinds of variables that can be expected to influence performance” 
(Peters and Pierre, 2006: 21). Governance theorists recognise the layered character 
of any political-administrative system through which specific policies are enacted 
(Hill and Hupe, 2014: 16). The top-bottom distinction is replaced with vertical and 
horizontal institutional relationships.  As Hill and Hupe observe, specific policies can 
be formed and implemented at any one political-administrative layer while some 
will be formulated and implemented across multiple layers. At each level there are 
inevitably legitimate politics, official competencies and legal frameworks that will 
determine whether just implementation or “policy co-formation” is required. 
Furthermore, the “act of management” becomes central in governance: i.e. the 
conscious efforts on behalf of policymakers to direct the flow of resources through 
both the management of implementation and the design of institutions (Hill and 
Hupe, 2014: 16).  
 
This distinction between policy and governance has implications for evaluation. 
While it is important to recognise the complexity of processes of policy formation 
and implementation, the purpose of policy evaluation is to inform decisions by 
assessing solutions to whatever policy problem is at hand. For policy evaluation to 
be comprehensive it must explore stakeholders’ different understandings of policy 
problems and whether adopted solutions fail or succeed upon their 
implementation. As discussed in more detail below, most policy evaluations do 
neither: evaluations typically do not question dominant definitions of policy 
problems and the focus is on whether policy options have the potential to improve 




The purpose of governance evaluation, in contrast, is to inform decisions about the 
design of overall governance environment. This requires an exploration of the 
decisions and actions across multiple layers in order to inform the “act of 
management” described by Hill and Hupe (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 16). Indeed, at this 
level, policymakers confront choices between different governance modes or 
‘governing structures’: markets, hierarchy and networks. Each of these constitute 
distinct mechanisms of exercising control and allocating resources (Rhodes, 1996: 
653). Yet, as discussed in more detail below, there is scope to develop research 
approaches for the evaluation of governance.   
 
2.1 Policy Evaluation: A Survey of the Issues   
 
The reform to the public sector has been accompanied with an increase in the use 
of policy evaluation, in a variety of forms. The emergence of NPM led to an increase 
in audit and performance management throughout the public sector, along with 
appraisal and pay systems, while new quangos such as the Audit Commission and 
Ofsted have been created to evaluate the performance of public sector 
organisations. The development of performance management under New Labour 
further entrenched these forms of audit and evaluation (Clarke et al., 2000: 263). 
Parallel to these developments, Evidence-Base Policy (EBP)8 emerged towards the 
late 1990s and became a central feature of the Third Way, purportedly representing 
a break from the ideological policymaking of the past (Plewis in Pantazis and 
Gordon, 2000: 96). EBP has sought to embed the practice and use of evaluation 
across all levels of the public sector and a number of organisations have been 
created with that purpose in mind, such as the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) in healthcare and the Social Care Institute for Excellence 
(SCIE) in social care. It was – and continues to be – anticipated that EBP will improve 
the effectiveness of public services9.  
 
However, dominant forms of evaluation, like reforms to public sector governance 
more generally, have attracted considerable criticism. Trisha Greenhalgh, a 
prominent commentator on policy evaluation, observes that the “idea that policy 
should be based on best research evidence might appear to be self-evident”, but 
the field has been beset with “problems and paradoxes” which parallel “a long-
standing ‘paradigm war’ in social research” (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009)10. The 
next chapter explores this ‘paradigm war’ in more detail, but for now it suffices to 
note controversies in policy evaluation as it has been developed and applied in 
recent years. A key problem concerns the quantitative measurement of 
performance.   
                                                           
8 The approach is influenced by Evidence-Base Medicine (EBM), which emerged during the early 
1990s. EBM is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
9 The Conservative/Coalition’s governments ‘Magenta’ and ‘Green’ books provide advice to policy 
evaluators, commissioners and policymakers on how to undertake or interpret evidence (HM 
Treasury, 2011a; HM Treasury, 2011b). 
10 Similarly, Peter Griffiths and Ian Norman write that “hostility has not ceased on all fronts and many 
still act as if they are members of opposing armies, eyeing the former enemies with suspicion and all 





2.2 Policy Evaluation as Performance Management  
 
As we saw, performance management emerged as a pivotal part of NPM 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s11. The approach has its proponents and its critics 
(Pollitt and Sorin, 2011). The data collected from performance management has a 
range of potential uses for decision-makers at different levels of the public sector, 
including civil servants, managers, public sector employee and service-users. It can 
potentially improve management by providing a point of focus for organisations in 
the public sector, where sales and profit are not available as benchmarks for their 
success; it can be used in attempts to improve the performance of individuals and 
organisations by linking improvements to remuneration; it can facilitate more 
effective market choices, because commissioners and service-users have more 
information available to them; and, similarly, it can improve democratic 
accountability because citizens have more information available to them (Forsythe, 
2001; Melkers and Willoughby, 2005). 
 
However, the use of performance management in public service contexts has been 
criticised. As discussed in the previous section, theorists of ‘public value’ criticised 
NPM, emphasising the inherently political nature of the process of defining public 
service objectives and selecting appropriate indicators in performance 
management. The aim of the ‘public value’ movement is to ensure that process is 
democratic, with citizens called upon to define objectives and indicators in ways 
which approximate the “common good” (Horner et al., 2006: 49; see also Scott, 
2013)12. This is an important criticism, underlining the value-laden nature of 
selecting appropriate indicators. Yet other critics go further, arguing that the very 
nature of public services complicates the practice of performance management.  
It is useful to note a key distinction in the policy evaluation literature between 
inputs, outputs and outcomes (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 13):  
 
 Inputs refers to the resources that are drawn upon in the delivery of goods 
and services, such as investment, staff, technology and other overheads;  
 Outputs refers to the activities or processes which organisations provide to 
customers or services-users, such as school lessons, home visits in social 
work or a ‘consultant episode’ in hospital;  
 Outcomes refer to the desirable effects which organisations strive for, such 
as more educated pupils or healthier patients.   
                                                           
11 Chapter 3 explores governance evaluation, including performance management. The approach 
receives mixed reviews and there are some major issues in attempts to evaluate it (Pollitt and Sorin, 
2011). The focus in this chapter is on performance management as a practical form of public service 
evaluation, used to inform local decision-making.  
12 Louise Horner and colleagues argue that “(p)ublic value, which is by no means hostile to the idea 
of performance measurement, re-orients public managers to find ways to challenge the idea of what 
constitutes the value of a particular service or policy intervention, to redefine what is socially 
desirable and then determine how this can be best measured” (Horner et al., 2006). 
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To date, performance management has focused on activities and processes, in part 
because outcomes are difficult to measure (Pollitt and Sorin, 2011: 11). For 
example, there is on-going debate about whether the outcomes of education, 
including the cognitive and social development of pupils, can be quantified. Policy 
evaluation in education has typically focused on test results, yet the obvious issue 
with this is that test results may not correspond to more qualitative dimensions of 
performance such as critical thinking or life skills (Hammersley in Pring and Thomas, 
2004; Volante, 2004).  
 
Linked to this problem is the fact that effectiveness is a contested concept: where 
some may emphasise critical thinking, others might emphasise the need to acquire 
qualifications to gain employment. Ultimately, this comes down to the question of 
one’s own values when appraising the performance of public services. As discussed 
in more detail below, these issues affect the evaluation of policy at all levels.  
 
A further reason why activities and processes are used is because performance 
management requires that measures of performance are directly linked to the 
performance of individuals and organisations; for only then would decisions made 
on the basis of the data actually improve the performance of public services. 
However, public service outcomes often arise in the long-term and often have 
multiple possible causes, such as the wider economic factors or the input of service-
users. Indeed, they are to a certain extent “co-produced” between public sector 
workers/professionals and service-users such that either good performance or low 
performance might only partly reflect the quality of public services (Fukuyama, 
2013). In contrast, activities and processes directly relate to the performance of 
individuals and organisations in a way that measures of outcomes do not.  
 
However, the problem with this is that public services are not standardised 
consumer items that can be accurately defined, sorted and tested in advance, but 
are themselves intangible (Lewis and Hartley, 2001: 479). A key issue is the labour-
intensive and relational nature of public services. To ensure effectiveness, public 
services require extensive “face-to-face” contact and significant buy-in from 
service-users in their encounters with public sector workers/professionals (Guy et 
al., 2014: 69). As noted by Michael Lewis and Jean Hartley, unlike consumer items, 
public services are heterogeneous: not every consumer or service-users wants or 
receives the same service, but services come to be defined in the interactions 
between employees and service-users (Lewis and Hartley, 2001: 479). This poses 
challenges to the performance management of processes because it is always 
possible that the wrong kind of public service interventions and practices are 
promoted.  
 
The potential of performance management to emphasise the wrong kind of actions 
is recognised in the literature on the “unintended consequences” of performance 
management. This literature highlights how performance on some measured metric 
can coincide with declines in additional dimensions of quality which have not been 
taken into account (see box 1). Examples include “teaching to the test” in schools 
(Volante, 2004) and the manipulation of patient admissions in A&E departments, 
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following the imposition of 4 hour waiting list targets (Bevan, 2006). This does not 
suggest that performance management has no role in the governance of public 
services, but it does suggest the approach has limitations. As Neil Carter argues, 
performance indicators only provide a partial view of performance: they are not 
“dials” but “tin-openers”, always prompting new questions of what is really going 
on behind the statistics (Carter et al., 1995). 
 
Box 1 – Unintended/Undesirable Consequences of Performance Management 
Tunnel vision – local actors might focus only on measured outcomes 
Measure fixation – local actors might focus on arbitrarily chosen targets that 
have a weak correlation with actual outcomes 
Sub-optimisation – local actors might pursue local objectives at the expense of 
broader organisational objectives 
Myopia – local actors might pursue short-term goals over long-term goal 
Misrepresentation – performance data may not be accurate 
Ossification – performance management might reduce the scope of innovation 
because of rigidities in what is measured 
Complacency/demotivation – local actors might feel their ranked position is not 
warranted and does not reflect effort, causing them to withdraw effort 
Gaming – local actors might alter their behaviour in ways that benefit them but 
without any benefit to the organisation 
Source: adapted from Smith, 1995 
 
2.3 Policy Evaluation as Evidence-Based Policy  
 
Alongside the increased use of performance management, Evidence-Based Policy 
(EBP) has emerged which seeks to improve decision-making through the evaluation 
of public interventions and practices. These approaches recognise some of the 
limitations to performance management, which beyond a snapshot of performance 
over time does not provide insight into the efficiency or effectiveness of public 
services. To that end, a range of scientific and economics form of evaluation have 
been developed for that purpose.  
 
Proponents argue that the widespread adoption of evaluation would greatly 
improve decision-making in public service contexts by surpassing ideological 
political channels (Banks, 2009) and ending a reliance on professional judgement, 
which is said to be fallible and has resulted in widespread variation and inefficiency 
(Thornton, 2006: 2; Chalmers, 2003). Ben Goldacre, a contributor to a recent 
government handbook on EBP, promotes scientific trials in all policy areas (Haynes 
et al., 2012). The Randomised-Control Trials (RCT) is an experimental form of 
evaluation which evaluates the efficacy of interventions by testing them out in an 
experimental group and comparing the effects with a control group, which has not 
been exposed to the intervention. According to Goldacre, this approach is suitable 




Do free uniforms improve school attendance, especially in pupils who don’t own one 
at all? … Do long prison sentences work? At the moment, sentences are hugely 
variable anyway: randomise properly and run a trial. Different teaching 
approaches? Run a trial. Harder exams? Run a trial. Job-seeking support? Run a trial 
(Goldacre, 2011) 
 
Similarly, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is advocated to evaluate the economic value 
of interventions, by weighing up the costs and benefits of interventions13.  
 
Yet the widespread adoption of EBP has proved controversial. Somewhat ironically, 
the approach has not itself been evaluated to show that it improves outcomes or 
constitutes a worthwhile use of public money relative to alternatives, such as a 
reliance on professionalism or more flexible interpretations of what constitutes 
evidence (Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009; Mullen and Streiner, 2004)14. Critics 
question the extent that evidence-base policy can improve public service decision-
making. 
 
One issue is the difficulties involved in calculating the costs of public services. While 
some of the costs of public services are easy to obtain, such as the costs of 
materials and equipment, the cost of labour and any overheads incurred in its 
production; other costs may be more difficult to quantify. Services-users may 
themselves incur costs travelling to receive public services. Friends or family 
members may incur costs in the absence of an intervention, for example from 
having to take time of work to help someone who is sick or cannot look after their 
children for whatever reason. Similarly, people can suffer personal traumas from 
the death of a loved one or a criminal act which are difficult to quantify. These 
intangible costs are often not taken into account in the economic evaluation of 
public services (Palfrey et al., 2012: 132).  
 
A further issue is the difficulties involved in calculating the benefits of public 
services. As with performance management, there are issues regarding the 
intangibility of public services and outcomes. Many public services are often 
implemented in combination with each other, making it difficult to attribute 
benefits to interventions. There is also signifricant debate over whether less 
complex and standardised services are favoured in Evidence-Based Policy over 
more complex interventions. Chapter 6 examines the claims of some commentators 
that RCTs advantage ‘bio-medical’ healthcare over other forms of healthcare, in 
part because it involves singular, standardised interventions which result in an array 
of easily measurable clinical outcomes (Dickinson, 2008: 11)15. Similarly, there is 
                                                           
13 The RCT and Cost-Benefit Analysis are examined in more detail in the next section. The focus here 
is the discussion over the use in public service contexts.   
14 Leslie Chapman argues that “although for proponents of EBP its claims are “self-evident truths”, 
there is actually no “evidence” for it, in the sense that there are, and probably never will be, any 
randomised controlled trials of RCTs” (Chapman, 2012) 
15 Critics argue that social care (Dickinson, 2008), mental health (Chapman, 2012), public health 
(Rychetnik et al., 2002) and complementary/alternative medicine (Hollinghurst et al., 2008; Jonas, 
2001) are all disadvantaged because they can involve complex interventions that produce outcomes 
that are not easily measurable.   
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some debate about the incorporation of the evaluation techniques developed in 
healthcare to other policy areas. Martyn Hammersley argues that experimental 
forms of evaluation are not relevant for teaching, because pedagogical strategies 
elude standardisation: part of teaching is to respond to distinctive and changing 
characteristics of children and outcomes are not easily measurable (Hammersley, 
2005: 90).  
 
As in health policy, there are concerns that certain teaching practices are 
advantaged over others. In phonetic reading, children are taught to read through a 
focus on the sounds of letters. The approach performs highly in RTCs and is 
favoured in teaching guidelines. However, critics argue that to teach reading in full 
requires teachers to draw upon multiple strategies and to teach children both the 
sound and meaning of words. On its own, phonetic reading promotes a 
“mathematical understanding” of reading, involving “children simply sounding out 
made-up ‘words’: this is hardly what we mean by reading” (Smeyers and Smith, 
2014: 153; see also Davis, 2013).  
 
In addition, it is difficult to identify and measure all possible benefits of 
interventions. Colin Palfrey and colleagues use the example of local authorities 
keeping major roads free of snow and ice in severe winter conditions. The main 
benefit accrues to the authorities themselves, in the form of keeping the local 
economy going and avoiding severe congestion. But citizens are also likely to 
benefit through lower council tax bills because of lower repair costs for road 
surfaces and reductions in car insurance premiums. Furthermore, other local 
services, including the NHS, the police and the emergency services, would benefit 
from reduced demand. A failure to accurately account for all benefit flows would 
“potentially lead to sub-optimal findings and inappropriate recommendations from 
evaluations” (Palfrey et al., 2012: 133). 
 
These issues raise similar questions as performance management regarding the 
intangible nature of both the activities of public services and their outcomes, which 
elude quantitative measurement. As I shall show in the next section, evaluations at 
the level of governance tend also to be quantitative and do not explore the quality 
of services at the level of policy. 
  
3.1 Governance Evaluation: A Survey of the Issues   
 
While the previous section discussed issues in the evaluation of policy, the present 
section explores the evaluation of changes to public sector governance. This serves 
to deepen understanding of different forms of public sector governance and 
identify issues associated with them. But it also provides insight into the 
weaknesses of dominant approaches to evaluation at this level. The evidence-base 
at this level is notably weak. As Angela Packwood comments, the “influence of 
research on governance policies has been negligible” (Packwood, 2002: 268; see 
also Rosen, 2000). Furthermore, as with evidence-based policy, there is significant 
debate over the appropriateness of dominant research methodologies to evaluate 




Evaluations of governance are typically quantitative and descriptive, tracking the 
performance of organisations before and after a change in governance. Much of the 
data is performance management data and as such takes the form of measurable 
outputs, such as activities and processes (Pollitt and Sorin, 2011). Furthermore, the 
overarching value of evaluations is productivity, or x-efficiency: evaluations typically 
examine the relationship between inputs and outputs, assessing whether a 
governance change has increased outputs. Yet this is a narrow conception of 
performance which does not consider the appropriateness of the goods and 
services produced or the wider costs and benefits attached to changes to public 
sector governance. Without taking into account these wider questions of 
evaluation, governance evaluation risks obscuring the full costs of governance 
policies.  
 
3.2 Evaluations of Privatisation  
 
Though the focus of the present project is public services, it is necessary to consider 
privatisation because the “spectre of privatisation” looms large in debates on public 
services (Newburn, 2003: 70). Furthermore, privatisation is as contested as the 
marketisation of public services and there is significant methodological debate 
about dominant approaches to evaluation.  
   
Of the academic evidence on privatisation, three studies stand-out, each of which 
adopt the same methodology and have similar titles: ‘The Financial and Operating 
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms’ (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and 
Megginson, 1999; Megginson et al., 1994). Combined, these studies analyse a total 
of 211 firms in a range of industries from around the world, including banking and 
finance, electric utilities, telecommunications, petroleum, steel and airlines. The 
studies analyse accounting data before and after privatisation and find that 
privatisation has been an overwhelming success. Significant increases are reported 
in efficiency, profitability and dividend payments, while the impact of privatisation 
on employment – said to be the “most politically-charged performance measure” – 
were inconsistent: two of the studies reported found that employment had 
increased, while one had reported that it had decreased (D’Souza and Megginson, 
1999: 20). 
 
The three studies are widely cited as evidence for privatisation16. However, various 
other reviews of the evidence suggest that the efficiency gains of privatisation were 
not always forthcoming. This is particularly true of the UK where a more varied 
account emerges (Sawyer and O’Donnell, 1999; Cumbers, 2012; Whitfield, 2001)17. 
Furthermore, critics question the  appropriateness of the evaluations which 
                                                           
16 Motasam Tatahi and Almas Heshmati refer to them as the “most comprehensive studies”, which 
demonstrate across multiple firms in a variety of industries “significant improvements after their 
privatisation” (Tatahi and Heshmati, 2009: 3; see also OECD, 2003).  
17 This is said to reinforce the possibility of ‘market failure’ in some industries, a concept explored in 
more detail in the next section.  
42 
 
dominant the field, suggesting they overstate the performance potential of 
privatisation policy (Ganesh, 1998; Jackson and Price, 1994; Whitfield, 2001). 
 
A key issue concerns the attribution of causality between privatisation and 
performance. The above-mentioned studies are not experimental, like RCTs, but 
descriptive or observational. Privatisation is evaluated by analysing certain 
measures of performance before and after the change in governance. Unlike other 
forms of observational study, no attempt is made to isolate the effects of additional 
causal factors. Yet the period of widespread privatisation, from 1980 into the 
1990s, was characterised by benign global conditions and extensive technological 
advance. Performance gains may therefore have occurred in the firms without a 
change in ownership and indeed often occurred in similar firms that had not been 
privatised and in the industries of countries that did not engage in privatisation 
(Parker, 2004). 
 
A further issue concerns the measures of performance themselves. Some of the 
measures discussed in the studies, including profitability and dividend payments, 
are poor measures of performance, for they are clearly weighted in favour of 
shareholders and leave open the question of the effects of privatisation on 
consumers, employees, managers and society more broadly. Furthermore, given 
that a core argument for nationalisation is that markets are not always efficient 
(see chapter 4), the question arises whether privatisation can really be said to have 
improved performance or whether increases in profitability and dividend payments 
represent the exploitation of market power.  
 
The studies do include measures of x-efficiency, but this does not address the 
problem. Crucial evaluative questions remain regarding the appropriateness of the 
goods and services produced and the wider spread of costs and benefits. The 
quality of the goods may have decreased or the price may have increased, as was 
the case in some industries. Furthermore,  prior to privatisation, nationalised firms 
and industries were typically constrained by various policy objectives such as to 
maintain high levels of employment, keep prices low, sell at uniform prices or 
maintain socially useful but unprofitable services. The purported gains associated 
with privatisation may have come at the cost of any of these different objectives 
(Ganesh, 1998: 94; see also Jackson and Price, 1994; Sawyer and O’Donnell, 1999).  
 
Certainly, privatisation has been linked to an increase in unemployment (Tickell, 
1998), inequalities – both internally within firms and externally in the broader 
society (Price and Hancock, 1998: 311) – and a decline in pay and working 
conditions (Sawyer and O’Donnell, 1999). This is not to imply that privatisation is 
not an appropriate policy tool for some firms and industries, but it would appear 
that dominant approaches to evaluation overstate the benefits relative to the costs.  
 




There is an extensive array of evaluations of New Public Management and far too 
many to consider here in any detail. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some 
core characteristics of the literature. As with evaluations of privatisation, the 
evaluations do not use the RCT but take the form of observational studies. Unlike 
the entirely descriptive evaluations of privatisation, however, econometric 
techniques are used to examine causal relationships between variables.  
 
A key distinction is between prospective and retrospective observational studies: in 
the case of prospective observational studies, performance criteria are identified 
and measured prior to a change in governance, with the data compared with the 
same data at the end of the period of study; in the case of retrospective 
observational studies, statistical techniques are used to analyse existing data sets to 
isolate the effects of the change in governance. Out of these, prospective 
observational studies are considered to be superior because they are more 
transparent: researchers set out the terms of the study prior to it commencing18. 
Retrospective observational studies, in contrast, typically involve the analysis of 
existing data sets. While they can be useful where the time and resources for 
setting up an experiment or a prospective observational study are not available, the 
analysis can take the form of complex regression analyses and invite the criticism of 
“data dredging”: 
 
…when subsequent ‘hypothesis testing’ is based on having seen the results – or 
worse, on selectively retraining those hypotheses that support a favoured direction 
(Williams et al., 2002: 106)           
 
Nevertheless, retrospective observational studies dominate most areas of policy19. 
Despite the use of more scientific forms of evaluation, there is some debate 
whether the use of statistical techniques overcomes the problem of causation in 
evaluation (Fukuyama, 2013: 9). Studies are often critiqued on the basis that the 
outcomes identified are down to some other factor than the proposed cause. As 
Christopher Pollitt and Sorin Dan note in their literature review on the topic, 
evaluations of NPM are characterised by widespread “problems of attribution” 
(Pollitt and Sorin, 2011: 16), with few evaluations adopting “the RCT model” (Pollitt 
and Sorin, 2011: 22).   
 
A further issue concerns the measures of performance used in the studies. As with 
privatisation, the focus is on x-efficiency, that is, the relationship between inputs 
and outputs; actual public service outcomes are rarely explored (Pollitt and Sorin, 
2011: 15). This is due in part to the difficulties involved in the measurement of 
outcomes, discussed above. The problem with this approach is that the change in 
governance might result in negative outcomes that are not captured in the 
evaluation. In this way, quantitative evaluations of governance proceed on the 
same assumption of performance management and scientific/economic forms of 
                                                           
18 RCTs are always prospective in this sense. 
19 An exception is health policy, where RCTs, prospective and retrospective observational studies are 
common (Le Grand, 1998).  
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appraisal typical of EBP: that performance can be captured in simple quantitative 
metrics.  
 
The pros and cons of performance management have already been discussed above 
and chapter 6 examines the evidence on performance management in health 
policy. As such, the focus here is evaluations of contracting out and quasi-markets.  
 
Contracting out  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Conservative Government sought to compel 
reluctant councils and other public sector bodies to contract out basic services 
through Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) in order to improve efficiency. 
Unlike privatisation, contracting out does not necessarily entail a change in 
ownership but the public sector can be in competition with the private sector to 
win contracts.  
 
There is a large body of evaluations of CCT, most of which focuses on catering and 
refuse collection. Overwhelmingly, the policy is found to have successfully 
improved  efficiency, thus indicating that the previous regime of in-house delivery 
was inefficient (Cope, 1995; Hartley and Huby, 1985; Domberger et al, 1986; 
Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993; GóMez-Lobo and Szymanski, 2001). 
 
However, once again, there are potential criticisms of these studies. Due to the 
absence of a control group, the reported improvements could have resulted from 
additional factors, such as technological development or improved working 
practices that would have occurred irrespective of contracting out (Boyne, 1998). 
Furthermore, evaluations do not consider the wider spread of costs and benefits. As 
a public service, the change in governance would not have increased the price of 
the service to the service-user, but nonetheless quality may have declined. 
 
A key issue is the measures of performance used in the studies. Evaluations of 
refuse collection typically focus on the frequency of collections because it is easy to 
measure and seemingly uncontroversial: 
 
Inputs are basically unskilled labour and trucks, output is measured simply by the 
volume of waste collected and quality of service does not tend to vary widely 
because: either the garbage is taken away or it isn’t (GóMez-Lobo and Szymanski, 
2001: 107).  
 
However, even in the case of seemingly basic services such as catering and refuse 
collection, there is a question mark whether performance can be captured in 
performance metrics. In the case of refuse collection, performance could be 
evaluated across an array of measures, such as whether garden waste and bulky 
waste is collected, or whether special arrangements are available to help disabled 
people (Boyne, 1997: 34). Furthermore, new challenges arise and the definition of 
‘performance’ changes with them. Recycling has added new complexity to refuse 
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collection, while increased recognition of the importance of healthy food adds to 
the complexity catering.   
 
Finally, as we saw in chapter 1, a key argument of theorists of ‘networked 
governance’ was that NPM has reinforced a “silo” approach to the delivery of public 
services. While catering and refuse collection may not involve much in terms of 
collaboration between providers, nonetheless a main criticism of CCT at the time 
was that it was creating an adversarial relationship between councils and providers 
which was preventing them from collaborating to achieve complex public service 
outcomes (Davis and Walker, 1997). Ultimately, quantitative research of this type 




Like CCT but unlike privatisation, quasi-markets do not always involve a change in 
ownership. But they differ from CCT because the aim is not only to improve 
efficiency but also to promote other values such as service quality, responsiveness 
and choice. Reforms to the health service (discussed in chapters 6 and 7) and 
education have sought to enhance performance through the development of quasi-
markets.  
 
In education, the development of the market has involved providing service-users 
with greater choice over their schools. While constituting a value in itself, for 
people are said to value choice of public services; choice is also expected to 
improve efficiency because resources follow pupils. The development of national 
curriculums, standardised testing, performance tables and inspection regimes have 
buttressed the operation of the ‘market’, safeguarding the quality of services and 
providing parents with information to enable them to make informed choices 
(Levačić, 2004). 
 
The headline statistics suggest quasi-markets have been successful in boosting the 
performance of schools. Between 1992 and 1999, the proportion of 16 year-olds in 
England achieving 5 grades A* – C rose substantially from 35.5 % to 45.8% (Adnett 
and Davies, 2003: 14). By 2004/05, this figure rose to 55.7% (Green et al., 2005: 1). 
Evaluations explore whether this increase in results is down to the introduction of 
the quasi-market. As with contracting out, quasi-markets are found to have 
improved performance, in terms of academic standards as reflected in test results 
(Bradley et al, 2001; Bradley and Taylor, 2010; Burgess and Slater, 2006; Gibbons et 
al, 2006; Gibbons and Silva, 2007). 
 
Yet there are a number of issues to consider. Once again, it is difficult to 
conclusively attribute outcomes to the change in the governance structure: quasi-
markets are purported to have the strongest positive effect in urban areas where 
competition between schools is at its highest, but other possible explanations 
include urban development and increased gentrification (Bagley et al., 1998: 6). 
More problematically, the studies rely upon data collected through processes of 
performance management: school test results. The problem with this approach is 
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that issues which can accompany performance management, discussed above, will 
not be picked up by the evaluation. Indeed, the close relationship between 
performance management and quasi-markets means that both are susceptible to 
similar problems.     
 
The incorporation of choice in public services stands to improve the responsiveness 
of services to the needs and preferences of service-users. Yet service-users 
(parents) are provided with performance data in order for them to make choices. 
The problem here is that performance management data can provide a misleading 
view of the quality of schools. The performance of schools and individual teachers 
may have more to do with the social composition of schools than the quality of 
teaching (Allen and Burgess, 2010). Grades may have been inflated by teachers 
teaching ‘to the test’ or by schools focusing attention on people who are on the D/C 
grade borderline to the detriment of other students (Levačić, 2004). Or, schools 
admissions policies may have been manipulated to ensure that only students with 
better prospects are admitted (West, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the choices of service-users are constrained. While service-users can 
choose their schools, the absence of a fully developed market ensures that choices 
are limited to what is available (West et al, 2009). Many patients choose 
“rationally”, on the basis of schools they believe their children will gain a place at 
rather than their genuine preference (Reay and Lucey, 2003).  
 
A further issue is that service-users lack choice over the performance indicators. It 
is pre-empted they will choose in terms of academic performance alone, conveyed 
as test results. However, research suggests parents choose schools in light of a 
variety of criteria such as the demographic of the schools and the happiness and 
preferences of their children (Bagley et al, 1998: 46; Wilson, 2008). The centrality of 
academic standards may therefore “skew the responsiveness of schools” away from 
their values and preferences (Bagley et al, 1998: 195)20. 
 
The development of national curriculums also represents a constraint on choice 
(Apple, 1993: 222; Whitty, 1989), as does the increasing involvement of EBP in 
determining policy at the level of teaching and learning strategies. Nick Adnett and 
Peter Davies criticise the notion that quasi-markets in education entail choice, 
when in fact the development of the quasi-market has entailed heightened central 
control: 
 
…through choice of school performance data, control of the curriculum, retention of 
funds and active control of large scale innovation (e.g. through the introduction of 
strategies for literacy and numeracy) central government has pre-empted parental 
                                                           
20 For this reason, there have been attempts to develop more complex performance indicators but 
these have foundered because parents continue to use GCSE results as they are easier to understand 
(Allen and Burgess, 2010: 5). Furthermore, studies have shown that parents who have a higher level 
of education have a better understanding of performance league tables, suggesting that developing 




influence. In some respects it has reduced parents to the role of agents, putting 
pressure on other agents (schools) to achieve the outcomes that the government, as 
principal, has determined (Adnett and Davies, 2003: 20) 
 
These counterexamples not only raise questions regarding the effectiveness of 
managerialist and market forms of governance to ensure the provision of effective 
public services, but they also question the capacity of quantitative, x-efficiency 
studies to provide a comprehensive evaluation of public sector governance. Many 
of the issues discussed here would lead to the adoption of ‘networked’ 
arrangements21.  
  
                                                           
21 New Labour would eventually abolish CCT in 1998/9, citing various problems with the initiative, 
including “uneven and uncertain efficiency gains”, costs for employees which resulted in high staff 
turnover and unnecessary antagonism between local authorities and the private sector, all of which 
were preventing the realisation of the full benefits of partnership working (DEFRA, 1998: 6). 
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3.4 Evaluations of ‘Networked Governance’  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, recognition of the limitations of NPM led many 
commentators to advocate more collaborative approaches to public sector 
governance (O’Toole, 1997; Staw and Cummings, 1990). But even here there is 
recognition that ‘networked governance’ can fail. Some commentators are critical 
of the approach, arguing that collaboration has become an end in itself and that 
‘joined-up’ processes and procedures constitute a new form of bureaucracy which 
skews attention away from a focus on achieving policy outcomes (Blackman, 2013; 
Travers, 2007). 
 
For this reason, evaluations are required to assess the performance of networks; for 
otherwise there is a danger that public funds are wasted supporting this form of 
governance when other forms of service delivery are more efficient. Yet there is a 
notable absence of literature on the evaluation of networks. Initial literature on 
changing forms of governance during the 1990s was more descriptive than 
evaluative (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007: 14). A second-wave of literature explored 
the political implications of networks and their performance, but the emphasis here 
is on policy processes and crucial questions are left open regarding the 
effectiveness of networks to improve policy outcomes (Kenis and Provan, 2009; 
Torfing et al., 2012; Turrini and Cristofoli, 2009). 
 
Indeed, evaluative claims, when they are made, typically identify the potential of 
networks to improve various process measures, such as commitment, trust and 
communication amongst network participants, which serve as a proxy for 
performance (Kenis and Provan, 2009: 442). A typical example is provided by Nancy 
Roberts, who makes the case for networks – or collaboration, in her schema – over 
authoritative strategies (hierarchy) and competitive strategies (markets), with a 
case study of international aid and development in Afghanistan following on from 
the 1980s conflict in that country. While entailing some drawbacks for participants 
(such as the time and effort it takes to participate), networks are said to be 
particularly appropriate for “wicked problems”, resulting in increased collaboration, 
new and improved relationships, regular meetings, agreement on difficult issues 
and the development of a common mechanism for coordination (Roberts, 2001: 
11). Roberts concludes by espousing a new approach to “wicked problems”, one in 
which stakeholders “trust the process” without guarantees of a particular outcome 
(Roberts, 2001: 16).  
 
Similarly, research explores the conditions of effective networks and strategies for 
successful network management (Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). 
These approaches provide useful guidance for policymakers in the design and 
management of networks. Yet they do not explicitly evaluate the effectiveness of 
networks. It remains possible that well managed networks characterised by high 





The absence of evaluations which focus on the effectiveness of networks may be 
explained by the fact that the challenges which confront any form of policy 
evaluation are exacerbated when it comes to network evaluation. Given that 
networks are considered particularly appropriate in the context of ‘wicked’ policy 
problems, the nature of the policy problem to be addressed will, by definition, be 
difficult to define. Furthermore, the temporal gap between the formation of the 
network, processes of policymaking/implementation and outcomes will be even 
longer than typical public service interventions and multiple stakeholders will be 
involved (Provan and Milward, 2001: 416). Additionally, networks are characterised 
by what Jacob Torfing and colleagues call “pluricentric negotiations” among 
stakeholders, which lead to “imprecise and competing goal formulations” and 
changing policy objectives due to “mutual learning and shifting power relations”: 
 
Indeed, a flexible adjustment of policy objectives to changing preferences and 
circumstances is often one of the primary reasons why interactive forms of 
governance are invoked (Torfing et al., 2012: 169) 
 
For these reasons, it is difficult to define objectives prior to policy implementation, 
making it difficult to establish whether or not the network has demonstrably 
improved whatever it is that requires improvement (Torfing et al., 2012: 169).  
Torfing and colleagues have sought to address this absence by developing a 
framework of process and outcome criteria derived from the specific promises of 
networks identified in the literature (see Box 2).  
 
Box 2 – Criteria for the Evaluation of ‘Networked Governance’ 
1. Facilitate a clear and well-informed understanding of the policy problem 
(by formulating a broad and inclusive story line that can subsequently be 
developed into specific objectives and tasks) 
2. Generate innovative yet feasible solutions (by drawing upon views from 
inside and outside the network) 
3. Reach joint policy decisions which go beyond the least common 
denominator (by facilitating agreement through a result of significant 
change in values and perceptions on behalf of one or more network 
actors) 
4. Ensure smooth policy implementation and creating acceptable results (by 
avoiding serious problems, duplication of efforts and practical/political 
conflict) 
5. Provide flexible adjustment of policies and services (by regular 
assessments of performance which identify early problems if they emerge 
and which can be translated into adjustments of policies and services) 
6. Improve the conditions for future cooperation (by developing a common 
frame of references which facilitates on going communication and 
collaboration) 
Source: adapted from Torfing et al., 2012  
 
As a guide for evaluations, this framework usefully highlights what should be 
expected of networks to justify the use of public funds. Stages 1, 2 and 3 relate to 
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policy processes, whereas stages 4 and 5 relate to policy implementation and 
outcomes. Like 1, 2 and 3, stage 6 is a process measure corresponding to 
heightened collaboration and trust which potentially result from the use of 
networks and which are assumed to improve policy process and outcomes in the 
future.  
 
Nevertheless, the framework does not provide any guidance as to the precise 
empirical methodology that might be used to acquire and analyse data across the 
criteria. Further still, the focus is on networks alone: it is unclear how other 
evaluative questions which arise in public sector governance might be addressed. 
What, for example, is the role for centralised forms of decision-making and 
performance management in ‘networked governance’? And what should be the 
relative roles of the public sector and the private sector? The question of how to 
address these evaluative questions of public sector governance remains very much 
open.  
 
4.1 Concluding Remarks    
 
This chapter has provided a critical analysis of dominant approaches to policy 
evaluation in public sector contexts. I began by examining policy evaluation, both as 
a practice of performance management and a mechanism to improve decision-
making via the appraisal of public services and interventions. I also examined the 
main approaches to the evaluation of governance, including privatisation, New 
Public Management and ‘networked governance’.  
 
I have argued that dominant approaches to the evaluation of policy and governance 
are problematic and have criticised in particular the dominance of quantitative 
research. Quantitative evaluation, while undoubtedly important, nevertheless only 
provides a partial view of performance. Neil Carter’s “tin-opener” analogy (Carter et 
al., 1995) can be generalised to all forms of quantitative evaluation. Indeed, the 
sociologist Robert K Merton warns against confusing measurement with 
performance (Meyer, 2003: xiii).  
 
Over the next three chapters, I develop an alternative approach to the evaluation of 
policy and governance. I begin in the next chapter by examining issues in policy 
evaluation in more detail, exploring the philosophical underpinnings of dominant 
approaches and their postpositivist critiques. In the process, I begin to outline a 
qualitative, postpositivist approach to policy evaluation. Chapters 4 and 5 then 




Chapter 3: Positivism, Postpositivism and Policy 
Analysis 
The level of contestation over public sector reform and indeed dominant 
approaches to policy evaluation suggest that an alternative approach to evaluation 
is necessary. My purpose in the present chapter is to begin the process of 
developing one such approach. I do this by first exploring the philosophical 
underpinnings of dominant forms of policy evaluation, before examining the central 
methods of Evidence-Based Policy in more detail: the Randomised-Control Trial 
(RCT) and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). This serves as a basis to go onto explore, in 
the second section, postpositivist criticisms of positivism and postpositivist forms of 
policy analysis. In the process, I outline the methodological position of the project. I 
make a case for a qualitative, postpositivist approach to policy evaluation which 
recognises the incomplete and partial nature of knowledge and the 
incommensurability of values.  
 
Section 1 introduces the philosophical perspective of ‘positivism’ and section 2 
examines both ‘positivist’ and ‘neoclassical’ approaches to policy evaluation, in the 
form of the RCT and CBA. Section 3 presents the main criticisms of ‘positivism’, 
identifying a number of distinct perspectives – including 
postmodernism/poststructuralism, interpretivism and critical realism – each of 
which identifies particular issues with the positivist framework. Section 4 draws out 
the implications of these criticisms for the topic of policy evaluation.  
 
1.1 Positivism and Policy Evaluation     
 
Defining positivism is somewhat precarious because few researchers consciously 
describe themselves as ‘positivists’, with the term read onto some peoples’ work as 
a “term of abuse” (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2010: 461). Nevertheless, positivism is 
generally associated with a view of science as the ultimate source of knowledge and 
associated belief that the social sciences should emulate the methods of the natural 
sciences.  
 
To understand positivism, it is useful to situate it in the context in which the 
perspective arose and the intellectual issues with which positivist philosophers 
debated. In Agnes Heller’s account, positivism emerges as a response to a 
fundamental paradox of the Enlightenment: between ‘universal’ and ‘reflected’ 
consciousness (Heller, 1989: 292). The Enlightenment project promised a new 
epoch for mankind free of dogmatism and tradition. Yet, despite this explicit 
universalism, the project was self-aware. It alone was capable of freeing mankind. 
But this tension between universalism and reflexivity was difficult to reconcile: 
“How can one know that one’s knowledge is true?” (Heller, 1989: 292). 
 
For positivists such as Auguste Comte, the way out of this quagmire was the 
emulation of the natural sciences. The natural sciences had had demonstrable 
success, evident in the increasing mastery of the natural world and unparalleled 
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technological development. By emulating the natural sciences, social researchers 
would be able to step out of their own particular worldviews and acquire objective 
knowledge of the social world. This required the development of social scientific 
methodologies modelled on the methods of the natural sciences (Niiniluoto et al., 
2004).  
 
There are three basic premises to positivist research:  
 
 Objectivity (neutrality);  
 Measurement (quantification);   
 Causality (determinism) (Hagan, 2012: 177).  
 
The first premise – objectivity – is the defining characteristic of positivist 
epistemology: that objective knowledge is possible. This, in turn, operates on the 
assumption that values are at least potentially separable from facts. Facts, for their 
part, can be ascertained through observation and can indeed be measured and 
quantified. Only data that are directly observable should be considered in research 
and “what is observable also includes what is measurable or possible to register 
through some kind of instrument” (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009: 17). Once data 
has been collected, researchers can examine causal relationships between 
variables. Indeed, the third premise corresponds to positivist ontology holds that 
reality is characterised by causal relations in which effects have causes. The 
collection and analysis of data enables the testing of hypotheses which, if verified, 
assume the status of scientific laws22. This, in turn, implies a ‘successionist’ 
conception of causation based on the following form: if B follows A, then A causes B 
(McLaughlin and Newburn, 2010: 205; see also Pawson, 2008).  
 
Positivism has had a profound impact on the social sciences in general and policy 
evaluation in particular, resulting in the prioritisation of quantitative research over 
qualitative research to understand social phenomena and the elevation of scientific 
experiments in the study of causality; for these methods are the surest guarantee 
of objective knowledge. It is for this reason that Eileen Loudfoot characterises 
positivism as a reduction of “epistemology to methodology”: complex philosophical 
questions regarding the status of knowledge are reduced to questions about 
methods (Loudfoot, 1973: 170). 
 
A brief consideration of public sector governance suggests that the influence of 
positivism is pervasive. As we saw in the previous section, New Public Management 
involves the quantitative measurement of performance on the positivist 
assumption, shared by neoclassical economics, that value can be quantified. Also, 
                                                           
22 There are differences within positivism regarding the role of theory in developing hypotheses and 
the status of hypotheses once they are tested. Karl Popper, for example, allows an extensive role for 
theory in the development of hypotheses and has argued that rather than proceed on the basis of 
verification – implied by the positivist notion of ‘laws’ – science proceeds on the basis of 




Evidence-Based Policy is premised on the notion that the objectivity of knowledge 
depends upon the rigour of the methods applied in research. Lucie Rychetnik and 
colleagues observe a general “reliance on the study design as the main criterion of 
credibility of evidence” (Rychetnik et al., 2002). It is assumed that the application of 
rigorous and value-free research will improve decision-making, which has 
purportedly relied too heavily upon a combination of ideological political 
judgement or fallible professional judgement.  
 
1.2 Positivism and Evidence-Based Policy  
 
As we saw in the previous section, policy evaluation has become a central feature 
of policy processes and, via so-called Evidence-Based Policy, seeks to improve 
decision-making across all levels of the public sector. It is important to examine the 
methods of EBP in detail, both to understand limitations to EBP as it has developed 
in recent years and to begin the process of developing an alternative approach to 
evaluation. 
 
The EBP literature identifies a number of core questions for evaluation (Palfrey et 
al., 2012: 128; see also Haynes, 1999): 
 
 Can it Work? 
 Does it Work? 
 Is it Worth It?  
The first is a scientific question, which refers to attempts to establish the efficacy of 
a policy, public service or intervention; the second question is a practical question, 
which refers to attempts to establish the effectiveness of such interventions in real 
life, policy contexts; and the third question is an ethical question, involving a 
consideration of the values that are sought by an intervention and the relative 
efficiency of different options to realise those values. Indeed, establishing the value 
or worth of a policy option concerns the economic dimension of policy evaluation. 
 
The influence of positivism is most apparent with the application of experimental 
methods to policy evaluation in the form of the Randomised-Control Trial (RCT). 
The logic behind the elevation of the RCT is essentially the same as that outlined in 
the 1960s by Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley. Then, Campbell and Stanley 
called for more rigorous forms of policy evaluation and identified the RCT as the 
most rigorous method that was available. Early evaluations had taken the form of 
the ‘one-shot case study’, whereby research subjects were simply exposed to an 
intervention and outcomes were measured. For example, a new method of 
teaching might be evaluated by measuring student achievement in exams, thus 
providing evidence of its effects. However, evaluations of this type, according to 
Campbell and Stanley, have “almost no scientific value” because a counterfactual is 
required in order to establish that the effects would not have arisen without X 
(Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 6). Alternatively, students might be tested before and 
after they are exposed to the new method of teaching, a ‘one-group pre-test-post-
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test study’. Though this is an improvement on the ‘one-shot case study’, 
confounding factors may still have caused the outcome: remaining with the 
teaching example, students  
 
…may have grown older, hungrier, more tired, more bored … the difference 
observed may reflect this process rather than X (Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 8) 
 
By selectively exposing research participants to either an experimental or a control 
group, RCTs solve this problem. Figure 1 presents the structure of the RCT, where O 
represents an act of measurement and X represents exposure to an intervention. 
Once measuring is completed, the difference can be attributed to the intervention, 
thus providing insight into its efficacy23.  
 
Figure 1 – The Randomised-Control Trial  
 
 Pre-test Intervention Post-test 
Experimental 
Group 
O1 X O2 
Control Group  O1  O2 
Source: adapted from Pawson and Tilley, 1997 
 
Similar arguments to Campbell and Stanley’s are expressed in policy documents and 
evidence manuals today, where studies which do not feature a control, 
randomisation or a ‘blind’ – whereby participants and occasionally researchers are 
unaware of the status of each group – are considered inferior to those that do 
(Haynes et al., 2012).  
 
The RCT potentially solves the problem of causation in policy evaluation, providing 
insight into the efficacy of policy interventions to bring about a desired end. Yet it 
does not provide any insight into the value of the outcome(s) or the relative 
efficiency of an intervention relative to others, which is precisely the purpose of 
economic evaluation in policy analysis. The next section explores the ‘neoclassical’ 
economics framework, which has been highly influential in policy analysis. It 
suffices to examine here the principle form economic evaluation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (CBA). 
 
CBA gained prominence in the US in the 1960s, where it was applied to the 
management of water quality and land conservation, among other services (Hoch, 
1965)24. The procedure aims to inform decision-making when decision-makers are 
confronted by two or more options and involves a number of steps. First, the 
nature of the policy problem is defined. Following that, all stakeholders affected by 
                                                           
23 This is still dependent on a number of further criteria, such as the size of the sample (to ensure that 
outcomes are not affected by the peculiar characteristics of a minority) and duration of the study (to 
ensure that interventions are sufficiently evaluated) (Campbell and Stanley, 1966: 13). 
24 Early developers of the procedure sought to improve decision-making which was deemed 




the policy issue are identified, who may experience either a cost or a benefit from a 
policy decision25. Also, the relevant options are identified, which include the status 
quo and whatever other options are deemed viable. The next step is to predict the 
outcomes of the different decisions and assign a monetary value to any costs and 
benefits which might arise. This can be done by three main options: market 
valuation, revealed preferences or stated preferences (see box 1) 
 
Box 1 – Techniques of Monetary Calculation  
Market valuation – where goods or services are valued vis-à-vis market prices. In 
one variant of the approach, the value of a service can be derived from the 
estimated costs that would occur in the absence of a policy intervention, such as 
the damage caused from flooding in the absence of flood defences. An additional 
variant measures the production function of a service. Improvements to water 
quality, for example, might increase the catch of fish, thus benefiting fishermen 
and consumers through lower prices and/or improvements in the quality of the 
stock. 
 
Revealed preferences – where goods or services are valued vis-à-vis consumer 
behaviour in proxy markets. The hedonic pricing method derives the value of 
services by measuring prices in related markets, such as the effect of 
environmental quality on house prices. Likewise, the travel cost method derives 
the value of services provided for free by quantifying the resources that 
consumers expend obtaining it, such as the time and money spent attending a 
health service that is provided for free (McIntosh, 2010: 11). 
 
Stated preferences – where values are derived through consumer surveys in 
which individuals are asked what price they would for a good or service in a 
hypothetical situation. Thus, respondents might be asked to express what they 
would pay to improve the water quality of a nearby lake so that they can enjoy 
activities such as swimming and fishing (Kumar, 2010: 205).  
 
The monetised costs of a policy option constitute the cumulative amount of money 
that people who are disadvantaged would require as compensation for accepting it; 
the monetised benefits constitute the cumulative amount of money that the people 
who are advantaged would pay in return for securing the benefit (Adler, 1994: 
1373). Once the costs and benefits of different options have been assigned a 
monetary value, it is possible to compare the different options because they now 
have a commensurable value attached to them. The option which produces the 
most benefit at the least cost is proposed for implementation (Hanley and Spash, 
1994: 9).  
 
As with the RCT, the procedure is highly influential and is central to Evidence-Based 
Policy (HM Treasury, 2011a; HM Treasury, 2011b). Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
previous section, the emergence of EBP and these dominant forms of scientific and 
                                                           
25 Data from RCTs and other forms of scientific evaluation can be used to estimate the possible 
consequences of policy options. This is particularly the case in health policy, where RCTs are in 
abundance (Cairns, 1998). 
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economic evaluation has proved controversial. The criticisms of EBP today resemble 
more general concerns of postpositivist scholars of positivism and neoclassical 
economics in policy analysis. The next section explores a number of postpositivist 
perspectives, each of which has important insights into specific weaknesses of the 
positivist paradigm. The following section then draws out the implications of 
postpositivist philosophy for policy analysis and evaluation. 
 
2.1 Postpositivist Perspectives of the Sciences  
 
The philosophical perspective of positivism has come under sustained criticism in 
recent years, both in the philosophy of science and policy evaluation. Though a 
variety of perspectives are associated with the term, postpositivists share a belief 
that knowledge is always partial, incomplete and value-laden. It is not possible for 
social researchers to entirely step out of their own particular worldviews and 
acquire objective knowledge of the external world. In different ways, these 
perspectives criticise the positivist view that science is the ultimate source of 
knowledge and the associated belief that the social sciences should be modelled 
along the lines of the natural sciences (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009).  
 
A central point of contention between positivism and postpositivism is the role of 
theory in science. Where positivists hold that only theories that can be empirically 
verified can be accepted as true, postpositivists argue that theory, judgement, 
belief and ultimately values have a role in the construction of scientific theories and 
the collection and interpretation of empirical data (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009).    
A particularly ‘radical’ view of the relationship between theory and facts is provided 
by Thomas Kuhn, who argued that the background assumptions, beliefs and 
theories of the scientific community determine what is accepted as true. For Kuhn, 
science does not develop in a linear manner but is characterised by “periodic 
revolutions” in which the conceptual apparatus underpinning science and which 
inform how scientists think about reality, or “paradigms” as they would come to be 
known, are called into question and replaced with alternatives. These paradigms 
are incommensurable and shifts in paradigms are accompanied with shifts in the 
notion of “truth” which pertains at any point in time. Objectivity, then, is a 
misnomer because it is ultimately founded upon the background assumptions of 
the scientific community which change over time and characterised by sharp 
ruptures or ‘revolutions’ (Kuhn, 2012).  
 
A less radical view of the role of theory in scientific research is provided by Michael 
Polanyi. For Polanyi, all activities depend upon a background of beliefs, values and 
mental models that are difficult to articulate in propositional form. Such ‘tacit’ 
knowledge tends to be learnt through association, experience and practice, rather 
than through language. Science itself depends in large part on the ‘tacit’ knowledge 
of scientists acquired through years of training. Furthermore, guesswork and 
heuristics are just as important to the development of scientific knowledge as 
reasoned interrogation and the testing of hypotheses in scientific experiments. In 
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this way, tacit knowledge – that which “we know but cannot tell” – is foundational 
to scientific knowledge and all other forms of knowledge (Polanyi, 1962: 601). 
 
Where these works unsettle positivist epistemology, other postpositivists have 
critiqued positivist ontology. Thomas Cook has argued that developments in the 
natural sciences, most notably around quantum theory and chaos theory, unsettle 
the positivist assumption of an orderly natural and social world which is amenable 
to scientific inquiry. This, in turn, suggests the ‘successionist’ conception of 
causality is untenable. Reality is not made up of simple cause/effect relations, but 
causes can have multiple effects (and vice versa) and intervening variables 
complicate efforts to test hypotheses. This is particularly true of society: 
 
Human relationships are more like pretzels than single-headed arrows from A to B … 
more like convoluted multivariate statistical interactions than simple main effects 
(Cook, 1985: 25).    
 
These rejections of positivist epistemology and ontology share similarities with 
post-modern and post-structuralist schools of thought which reject any notion of 
objectivity and causation (Atabor, 2014). Post-modernists and post-structuralists 
argue that modern science and the Enlightenment project more broadly are closely 
bound up with the exercise of power, lending authority legitimacy to powerful 
individuals and groups. Positivism is criticised for valorising the knowledge of some 
individuals, groups and cultures over other, localised, subordinate and indigenous 
forms of knowledge. It is precisely these radical epistemologies which were 
influential among the New Left, discussed in chapter 1. 
 
Yet these more radical rejections of positivism have themselves been criticised in 
recent years. A key criticism of postmodernism and poststructuralism is that they 
leave a weak basis for progressive research agendas (Collier, 1994). Certainly, the 
outright rejection of science closes down the possibility of utilising science for 
progressive ends26 and is also self-refuting, since it depends upon truth claims 
established through research (Putnam, 1982). 
 
An alternative framework is interpretivist philosophy. Interpretivists argue that the 
natural and social sciences should be entirely different because they pertain to 
different object domains: whereas natural science explores the natural world, the 
social science explores the social world. The fundamentally different makeup of 
society implies that different methods are required to study it. Whereas natural 
science proceeds via the testing of hypotheses, the social world is not reducible to 
simple cause/effect relations but is constituted by conscious beings who ascribe 
meanings to their actions and to social events. Furthermore, researchers are part of 
the social world and cannot simply observe it as a phenomenon external to them. 
To establish truths about the social world requires that researchers drop prior 
assumptions and categories and establish a dialogical relationship with their subject 
                                                           
26 This argument is often made in the field of environmental scholarship. Science, though seemingly 
bound up with industrialisation, also provides knowledge of climate impacts that are vital to advance 
environmental causes (Jones, 2002). 
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matter, exploring, as in phenomenological thought, how social phenomena appear 
in the consciousness of research subjects27.  
 
Interpretivist philosophy provides a powerful criticism of positivist attempts to 
construct the social sciences along the lines of the natural sciences and in particular 
the elevation of quantitative methodologies. Qualitative methods breakdown the 
relationship between researchers and the researched, enabling researchers to tap 
into multiple understandings which people have of reality (Englander, 2012). 
Nevertheless, interpretivism raises questions of the status of social scientific 
research and that of quantitative, ‘positivist’ science (Lin, 1998; Roth and Metha, 
2001). As in the case of outright rejections of science, a concept of objectivity is 
difficult to uphold if the social sciences are geared towards identifying and 
exploring multiple ‘realities’. Furthermore, quantitative methods in the social 
sciences, in their various guises, have undoubted benefits, greatly enhancing the 
administration of society and performing an important role in the pursuit of social 
justice (Cokley and Awad, 2013)28. Rather than argue for a fundamentally different 
kind of science for the social sciences, a balance of quantitative and qualitative 
research may be more appropriate. Statistics have valued as background material in 
qualitative research (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009: 4).  
 
A further issue with interpretivist philosophy is that its sharp demarcation between 
the social and natural sciences may have the effect of immunising the (positivist) 
natural sciences from critique (Mitchell, 2003).  
 
An important development in recent years has been the emergence of critical 
realism, a further post-positivist perspective. Critical realism serves as an “under-
labourer” for researchers, clarifying epistemological and ontological issues. Central 
to the framework is a concept of epistemic relativism, which suggests that all 
knowledge is a social product and fallible29. Furthermore, critical realism provides 
an account of reality as complex, structured and emergent (Bhaskar, 2008). These 
assumptions usefully clarify the status of both qualitative research and scientific 
research.  
 
On the one hand, the complexity of society is precisely why there are different 
interpretations of it. People have different interpretations of reality because of the 
different positions they occupy in the social milieu. In this way, different 
interpretations of reality can be recognised without rejecting a concept of 
                                                           
27 Magnus Englander writes that “the relationship subject-object is different from subject-subject, 
making the evaluative, methodological criteria of the research procedure different as well. Due to this 
difference, the phenomenological, human scientist’s challenges throughout the entire research process 
will also be very different from that of the natural scientist’s. And most important of all, this 
difference demands a distinctly different methodology based on a distinctly different theory of 
science” (Englander, 2012: 15).  
28 Indeed, certain aspects of society can only be grasped via quantitative methods. Statistical analyses 
of large data sets provide insight into relatively durable social structures which exist irrespective of 
the awareness of actors who reproduce them, such as class or patriarchal relations (Olsen, 2009: 8). 
29 The concept of ‘epistemic relativism’ is distinguishable from ‘judgemental relativism’, according to 
which there are no grounds to evaluate truth claims and which informs the postmodern and 
poststructuralism position.  
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objectivity. Qualitative research improves our understanding of objective reality by 
providing insight into the different interpretations of reality which can be more or 
less correct (Maxwell, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, critical realism clarifies the status of scientific knowledge, 
following a reconstruction of the nature of scientific inquiry. The complexity of 
reality limits positivist attempts to generalise research findings. Critical realists 
replace the ‘successionist’ conception of causality with a ‘generative’ conception 
which recognises that causes can have multiple effects (and vice versa). Scientific 
research proceeds by engineering “closed systems” in the form of scientific 
experiments in order to acquire knowledge of causal relationships. Yet cause-effect 
relationships uncovered in scientific experiments may not occur in the real world, 
where multiple other factors come into play. Research findings may therefore fail to 
translate into the “open systems” of the real world (Pawson, 2008). For this reason, 
the positivist attempt to establish generalisable truth in the form of scientific laws is 
misguided. Rather than assume the status of ‘laws’ if verified (or, indeed, not 
falsified), scientific insights take the form of tendencies that may or may not occur 
(Bhaskar, 2008: 11).  
 
As discussed in the next section, critical realism, along with the other postpositivist 
perspectives discussed here, have significant implications for policy analysis. 
 
2.2 Postpositivist Policy Analysis  
 
Postpositivist perspectives of the sciences have significant implications for policy 
analysis. Postpositivism suggests there is no value-neutral framework or procedure 
to establish the veracity of truth claims, problematising the “hierarchies of 
evidence” which characterise Evidence-Based Policy (Gabriel, 2008). For Sandra 
Nutley and colleagues, the use of evidence “hierarchies” serves only to suppress 
the values and knowledge of certain individuals and groups in society: 
 
Quality judgements are contested because ultimately ‘evidence’ and ‘good evidence’ 
are value labels attached to particular types of knowledge by those able to assert 
such labelling. In any decision–making setting there will be people with greater 
power than others to assert what counts as good evidence, but this does not mean 
that the less powerful will agree (Nutley et al., 2013: 7) 
 
While this provides grounds to question and reappraise positivist criteria of what 
constitutes evidence, postpositivist philosophy has also provided the theoretical 
impetus for a range of empirical approaches to policy evaluation. Interpretivist 
philosophy has been drawn upon to orientate policy analysis to the different 
perspectives, or ‘framings’, which people have of policy issues. Far from objective 
social facts, policy problems have an important discursive dimension and people 
often define them differently, in accordance with their particular values and 
knowledge. Qualitative research is considered uniquely capable in exploring 
60 
 
different perspectives, for the reasons discussed above (Rein and Schon, 1996; 
Yanow, 1997). 
 
Frank Fischer has developed a form of postpositivist form of process evaluation. He 
argues that, when policy actors deliberate about policy, they make both empirical 
and normative claims. Policy evaluation must seek to integrate the two. Policy 
actors make claims which correspond to two orders of discourse: first order 
discourse includes claims about efficiency and the balance of criteria when 
establishing policy priorities; second order discourse includes claims about 
fundamental values and ideological principles which characterise the social order. 
Exploring the kinds of claims that stakeholders make through qualitative research 
can clarify the nature and significance of disagreement (Fischer, 1995).  
 
Fischer’s approach is specifically geared towards evaluating processes of policy 
formation rather than its effectiveness upon implementation. Mona Choudhary 
usefully applies the approach to debates over proposals for a controversial damn in 
India, where she clarifies the nature and significance of the disagreement between 
stakeholders (Choudhary, 2009). Other postpositivists have sought to develop 
forms of outcome evaluation, more directly criticising positivist methodologies in 
the evaluation of policy in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness. Peter Mathews 
demonstrates that concepts like efficiency and effectiveness are contested and 
have different meanings attached to them. He evaluates two government urban 
regeneration schemes and brings to fore the different accounts of effectiveness 
that stakeholders have, informed by the different criteria they prioritise in their 
evaluations (Matthews, 2012: 5).  
 
These kinds of interpretivist policy analysis pose significant challenges to CBA, 
which seeks to inform choices between policy options by weighing up the 
monetised costs and benefits attached to them. Interpretivisit policy analysts claim 
that only qualitative research can tap into the values of stakeholders, which can be 
qualitatively distinct. Additionally, values can be incommensurable and thus not 
suited to monetary calculation. Joseph Raz uses the example of an offer of payment 
to leave one’s spouse for a month, which would surely incite indignation. For Raz, 
this suggests “companionship is incommensurable with money” (Raz, 1986: 350).  
 
In similar ways, significant social or cultural services can be incommensurable with 
money. Furthermore, assigning monetary values to certain objects can damage or 
corrupt them, such as education, public service and citizenship: paying someone to 
take part in democratic elections, for instance, corrupts notions of citizenship which 
hold that people have a responsibility to engage in civic duties regardless of any 
economic return they might gain (Sandel, 2012). These examples imply the 
presence of significant ethical and social values which cannot be reduced to 
monetary terms.   
 
The incommensurability of value has been a central issue in environmental 
economics, where individuals and communities can assign significant value to 
environmental ‘services’ such that costs or benefits in this area of policy cannot be 
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easily monetised (O’Connor and Spash, 1999). Critics of CBA highlight negative 
reactions of people when asked to put a price on environmental services through 
consumer surveys, which is said to imply the impropriety of valuing such items in 
monetary terms:  
 
...many respondents – up to a half in some surveys – become very angry when asked 
how much they would take in return for some degradation of the environment, 
saying that they are not in the business of accepting bribes. Quite a few are so 
indignant that they throw the interviewer out as soon as the question is asked 
(Barry, 1995: 156) 
 
Environmental economics has been at the forefront of the development of 
alternative decision-making aids such as Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA). MCA 
recognises that policies have more than one goal to achieve and policy choices will 
involve trade-offs between different and sometimes incommensurable values. 
Furthermore, the actual measurement and valuation of policy impacts does not 
proceed upon monetary terms alone, but is based on a “wide range of qualitative 
impact categories and criteria” (Epstein and Harrison, 2010: 21). Where significant 
trade-offs are apparent, these are identified for political discussion and deliberation 
(Hajkowicz and Higgins, 2008).   
 
The theory of incommensurable values serves as a reminder that choices between 
policy options are not simply technocratic issues. It is important for policy 
evaluation to explore peoples’ potentially qualitatively different values and identify 
any trade-offs that are apparent. Yet postpositivism also has implications for the 
choice of particular policy ‘means’ even where values are seemingly shared; for 
technical forms of knowledge are similarly fragmented and dispersed.   
 
It is interesting here to note the contribution of critical realism to policy evaluation. 
Invoking Roy Bhaskar’s distinction between ‘closed systems’ and ‘open systems’, 
critical realist researchers have criticised the priority attached to the Randomised-
Control Trial in policy evaluation. The RCT is a “closed system”: the researchers, the 
research participants, the research environment and possibly the interventions 
themselves are likely to differ from actual policy practice. While RCTs provide 
researchers with the ability to control variables in order to establish the intrinsic 
efficacy of interventions, research findings will to a certain extent be specific to the 
experiment and may not translate into the real world (Blackwood, 2010)30.  
 
This would suggest a disjuncture between two of the central questions of policy 
evaluation discussed above. The RCT tests out interventions under scientific 
conditions, which corresponds to the question Can it Work? However, it remains to 
be seen whether the intervention does work in the practical world of policy 
implementation (Haynes, 1999). Researchers working within a critical realist 
framework are also critical of attempts in observational studies to deploy statistical 
                                                           
30 This issue is recognised by EBP, which distinguishes between the internal and external validity of 
studies. Yet much of the emphasise of evaluations remains on whether interventions can work under 
ideal, experiment conditions, rather they do work in actual practice (Haynes, 1999) 
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techniques to uncover causal relationships between phenomena; for there is 
always a danger of confusing correlation with causation (Layder in Lopez and 
Potter, 2005). Both of these forms of evaluation amount to “black-box” approaches, 
which provide little insight into why or how an intervention has produced an 
outcome; only that it has or has not had an effect. Only qualitative research can 
provide the level of detail required to explore causal pathways in complex social 
environments and tap into contextual factors which enable or constrain 
interventions (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pawson, 2006).  
 
Once again, this is important because it highlights the difficulties involved in 
deciding upon ‘means’ to attain certain ‘ends’. Clearly, complex environments make 
it difficult to infer policy recommendations based on even the most robust scientific 
studies. This orientates policy analysis to stakeholders’ precise knowledge of policy 
options and policy impacts. But it also highlights the importance of taking into 
account the messy world of policy implementation and governance. 
 
Indeed, the postpositivist perspectives outlined here imply clear limits to 
centralised forms of decision-making within public sector governance. As we saw in 
the previous section, the rise of Evidence-Base Policy has been controversial, in part 
because it is associated with managerialism. Yet, given that knowledge is dispersed 
and incomplete, even decisions which are clearly evidence-based may not 
encapsulate the knowledge required to solve policy problems. Even the most 
robust scientific studies produce knowledge that is to a certain extent specific to 
particular experiments, suggesting that professional judgement may be required to 
interpret and adapt the evidence to particular cases and circumstances. This 
resonates with Michael Polanyi’s views, discussed above, for this act of 
interpretation will require the exercise of ‘tacit’ knowledge, intuition and 
theoretical reasoning (Burns and Grove, 2008: 6).  
 
However, if post-positivism undermines managerialism, it also undermines 
professionalism, because professional knowledge is just as partial and professional 
interpretations are just as normative and potentially contestable as any other.  
 
The issue of the appropriate balance between centralisation and decentralisation 
relates to the motivational question of the interests and motives of public sector 
workers and professionals. Studies of implementation have highlighted how policies 
are shaped, interpreted and redefined at each stage of the process by different 
stakeholders, often resulting in very different outcomes from what was originally 
intended (Lipsky, 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Michael Lipsky’s work in 
particular highlights a fundamental question of public sector governance: is poor 
implementation caused by local actors subverting policy goals because they have 
pursued their own interest? Or is it that the goals set for local actors were incorrect, 
poorly defined or that local actors were asked to do too much, without the 
requisite resources?  
 
NPM appears to favour the first interpretation: “embedded within it is a suspicion 
of professional autonomy and a desire to create public organizations in which 
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discretion is curbed” (Hill, 2014: 320). Yet the limitations to centralised forms of 
decision-making described here and in the previous chapter caution against an 
uncritical adoption of such a view. Indeed, the second interpretation implies the 
need for greater autonomy for public sector workers and professionals in their 
work and is aligned with efforts to breakdown the distinction between 
policymaking and implementation in “networked governance” (Sorensen and 
Torfing, 2007: 5).  
 
These issues raise broader questions about the appropriate governance structures 
and arrangements in the public sector. However, as we saw in the previous 
chapters, these evaluative questions are contested and there remains a question 
mark over how to evaluate governance. In the absence of scientific conditions, 
statistical techniques are used to track the performance of public services over the 
course of governance changes but there is significant debate whether these 
techniques overcome the problem of causation in evaluation (Fukuyama, 2013: 9). 
Furthermore, the use of quantitative metrics in evaluation provides only a partial 
view of performance and do not address the problem of incommensurable values. 
Clearly, the postpositivist critiques described in this section have a lot to contribute 
to debates in the field of governance evaluation. Yet postpositivist policy analysis 
tends to refrain from addressing broader questions of political economy and the 
design of governance (Lynn, 1999: 413). 
 
3.1 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has explored the dominant philosophical perspectives and research 
methodologies of policy evaluation. It has made a case for a qualitative, 
postpositivist approach to policy evaluation as a complement to the positivist and 
neoclassical approaches which dominate the discipline. Nevertheless, while 
postpositivism provides insights at a policy level, it typically does not address 
questions of governance and institutional design. At this level, national 
policymakers confront options between different governance structures and 
approaches: between variants of markets, hierarchy and networks. There remains 
scope to develop postpositivist policy analysis to evaluate policy options at this 




Chapter 4: Evaluation and Institutions 1 – the 
Neoclassical Framework and its Extensions 
My purpose in the present section is to explore theoretical perspectives in political 
economy to identify concepts that are relevant to the topic of governance 
evaluation. Indeed, a central debate within political economy is the 
appropriateness of markets and centralised forms of decision-making in the 
economy. In many ways, debate about marketisation and managerialism in the NHS 
and the public sector are a microcosm of this wider debate at the level of the 
economy. The analysis centres upon the key problems introduced in first section: 
the ‘knowledge problem’ and the ‘motivational problem’. 
  
Recent scholarship in political economy is highly sceptical of the capacity of political 
processes and the public sector to address these twined problems. It is argued that 
only markets can provide signals about what kind and type of goods that are to be 
produced, while also aligning the motivation of actors (Boettke and Leeson, 2012; 
Pennington, 2010). I argue against this avowedly pro-market position. While 
markets are indispensable mechanisms for society and efficiently deliver many 
consumer items, there are instances where markets are both inappropriate and 
inefficient. There are a range of possible governance arrangements and their 
appropriateness can only be determined through empirical research. 
 
Over the following two chapters, I take a different economic framework in turn, 
critically analysing them for their relevance and potential for the evaluation of 
governance, in particular public sector governance. Where chapter 5 explores the 
field of heterodox economics, the present chapter explores the neoclassical 
framework and its extensions. Section 1 explores the neoclassical system and in 
particular the concept of market failure, which provides the central justification for 
public policy today. While the concept of market failures is undoubtedly important 
to take into account when evaluating governance, it does not provide a 
comprehensive account of how market failures are to be solved.  
 
Section 2 examines efforts to extend the neoclassical paradigm to address issues of 
institutional design, in Public Choice Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. Once 
more, these frameworks provide important concepts for the evaluation of 
governance, highlighting the importance of taking into account the ‘motivational 
problem’ in public policy and transaction costs. Nevertheless, the frameworks share 
questionable motivational assumptions which lead them to overstate the 
importance of market mechanisms and/or hierarchical management strategies in 





1.1 The Neoclassical Framework and the Theory of Market Failures 
 
The neoclassical economics framework is the preeminent economics framework 
(Caldwell, 2003). The framework is important to consider because, as we saw, it has 
been influential in the field of policy evaluation, informing the development of 
methods which evaluate policies in terms of their impact on human welfare. 
Additionally, the framework provides the central justification for public policy 
today, providing an objective basis for public policy interventions in the form of the 
theory of market failure.  
 
The starting point of the framework is a conception of the perfectly competitive 
economy, consisting of utility-maximising consumers on the one hand, and profit-
maximising firms on the other. Voluntary exchanges between the two are assumed 
to be welfare-enhancing, for otherwise they would not have entered into them. 
 
On the demand-side, each person has a set of preferences and a budget derived 
from their initial resource endowments and their labour. Each person increases 
their utility through the purchase of consumer items and the more purchases they 
make, the greater their utility. However, because consumers have limited resources 
at their disposal, they have to make choices between different options. Such 
choices are made on the basis of calculations of the net costs and benefits attached 
to incremental changes to consumption. Additionally, the value of consumer items 
declines for the individuals who buy them, providing ever-smaller increases in utility 
(Blaug, 1997: 381)31.  
 
On the supply-side, firms seek to maximise profits by efficiently converting factor 
inputs (such as land, labour and materials) into consumer items that are demanded 
by consumers. Like consumption decisions, investment decisions are made on the 
basis of calculations of the net costs and benefits attached to incremental changes. 
At best, firms can only convert inputs into consumer items at a rate that equals the 
production of the preceding unit, such that it is always costlier to produce more of 
the good (Weimer and Vining, 1999: 59).  
 
Both consumers and producers are incentivised to seek out efficient ways to 
maximise their utility and profits respectively. Through their interactions, a set of 
prices emerge which distribute factor inputs (goods used in the creation of 
consumer items) to firms and consumer items to consumers. In the perfectly 
competitive economy, these prices vary until the quantity of goods and services 
purchased by consumers equals that supplied by producers, at which point 
equilibrium is attained and there is perfect coordination between purchases and 
sellers (Levačić in Thompson et al., 1991: 21). This levelling out potentially takes 
place in markets for consumer items, factor inputs and labour, where individuals 
                                                           
31 Mark Blaug uses the example of wallpaper to elucidate this ‘law’ of declining marginal utility: 
though it would appear that for someone decorating a room the second piece of wallpaper is equally if 
not more important than the first, the unit of analysis has to be scaled up to cover the whole wall or 
the whole. Once one such unit is purchased, the utility derived from extra units declines for the 
individual (Blaug, 1997: 381). 
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weigh up the cost of working in terms of effort with the benefits they might accrue 
from spending their wages. At the point of equilibrium, it is impossible to change 
the patterns of consumption and production without disadvantaging some 
person32.  
 
The widespread acceptance of the laws of supply and demand towards the end of 
the 19th century increasingly saw economics take on a mathematical orientation 
geared towards an analysis of the determination of prices (Rutherford, 2007). This 
mathematical turn also provided an objective basis for public policy: where markets 
could be shown to have failed to attain equilibrium, policy interventions are 
justified on the basis that they might improve upon market outcomes. Indeed, 
though the neoclassical framework is consistent with a range of policy positions, 
from support for a centrally planned economy to a market economy33, a common 
position is support for a mixed economy in which policy interventions seek to 
correct market failures. This provides the central justification for policy 
interventions today:  
 
 …states should be allowed to intervene when markets, the preferred allocative 
mechanism, fail to produce optimal outcomes (Haglund, 2011: 26) 
 
But what exactly is it about markets which necessitate policy interventions?  
 
 Public Goods and Externalities  
A key factor is the characteristics of the goods or services that are produced and 
exchanged. Two main criteria are used to define goods and services – rivalry and 
excludability – which affect the likelihood of market failures. Excludability refers to 
the extent that individuals can be excluded from goods, while rivalry refers to the 
extent that goods, once consumed by one individual, cannot be used by another 
(see box 1) (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). 
 
Box 1 – Classical Typology of Goods 
 
 Excludable Non-Excludable 
Rivalrous Private goods Commons goods 
Non-rivalrous Collective goods Public goods 
  
Private goods are typical consumer items that are rivalrous in consumption and 
from which people can easily be excluded. The ideal of the perfectly competitive 
market assumes that all goods are private goods. Markets in such goods will tend to 
equilibrium because if people want to have them, they have to purchase them; in 
turn, the provider receives full price for selling the item. In this way, incentives are 
                                                           
32 This is a state of so-called ‘Pareto-optimality’, after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto.  
33 For the free market neoclassicals associated with the Chicago school the actually existing economy 
is characterised by equilibrium, or is as close to it as could possibly be. In contrast, neoclassical 
socialists argue that in a planned socialist system prices could be manipulated so that equilibrium 
would be attained (these thinkers are discussed in the next section) (Pennington, 2010). 
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aligned and consumers and producers are motivated to act in each other’s 
interests, and ultimately the interests of society as a whole.  
 
However, incentives issues arise if goods are characterised as anything other than a 
private good and may be under- or over-supplied in markets. Goods can be 
undersupplied if it is difficult or costly to exclude people from enjoying them. For 
example, since it is difficult to exclude people from street lighting and national 
defence, few would be willing to pay money for them out of their own pocket, 
resulting in little incentive for producers to provide them. These goods are also 
non-rivalrous in consumption, since they do not deteriorate when consumed and 
would therefore be under-supplied by the market. Yet street lighting and national 
defence are important for society. Providing ‘pure’ public goods through public 
policy would improve the level of social welfare in society.  
 
A special case is goods that are rivalrous in consumption but are non-excludable 
such as fish stocks and open parks, i.e. ‘commons goods’. These may lead to the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario where resources are eroded and depleted, as 
people plunder resources or pollute without accounting for the costs they are 
incurring on others (Hardin, 1968). Once again, state intervention may be provided 
to provide the goods34.  
 
A closely related concept is externalities, which arise when there are third party 
costs to a market transaction. Examples of externalities and public goods tend to 
overlap as both concepts concern goods with a non-private element. When two 
individuals or parties come together in a market transaction they do not consider 
the costs or benefits of that transaction for third parties. Rosalind Levačić uses the 
example of coal mining to explain the notion of external costs. These arise from the 
burning of coal because the emission of sulphur dioxide causes air pollution, for 
which sufferers receive no compensation (Thompson et al., 1991: 36). However, 
just as market exchanges can have negative spill-overs, so too can they have 
positive spill-overs. Keeping with the example of coal mining, external benefits 
accrue from keeping coal pits open as mining communities retain high quality 
employment and there may be benefits to future generations of leaving them 
cheaply workable coal seams (Thompson et al., 1991: 37). Where externalities can 
be identified, the state can be called upon to intervene, here a possible policy may 
be to subsidise coal mining.   
 
 Asymmetric information  
Up to now, we have considered the characteristics of goods and their implications 
for political economy: the market may under- or over-supply goods that have non-
private aspects. Part of the reason for this is misaligned incentives which result in 
market actors either failing to invest in socially-useful goods or investing too much 
                                                           
34 “Collective goods” are less problematic. They are often called “club” goods because they include 
goods that are associated with clubs such as live music or access to a golf course: goods that are non-




in socially-harmful goods because the value of the good differs from its actual price. 
A further source of market failure concerns information. Market actors often do not 
have the requisite information available to them to get the most out of their 
transactions. George Akerlof, writing in the 1960s, uses the examples of a second-
hand car to demonstrate this issue of information asymmetry. Sellers may know full 
well the quality of the car, but buyers generally do not and will reduce the price 
they are willing to pay. This, in turn, deters sellers of high quality cars from the 
market and results in a market dominated by low quality cars. Sellers could seek to 
convey information to buyers about the quality of the car or buyers might seek out 
such information before they buy, but either of these solutions is costly to 
undertake and there is always the risk that buyers will not buy or the product is 
poor quality (Akerlof, 1970: 489). 
 
 Imperfect competition  
Finally, market failures can arise when conditions are such that perfect competition 
is unlikely. Competition will be greater the more firms there are in a market and/or 
the more opportunities there are for new entrants to a market. Where competition 
is imperfect, there is a risk that firms will charge higher than marginal costs in a bid 
to maximise profits or operate at inefficient rate. These examples of x-inefficiency 
result in higher prices for consumers (Levačić  in Thompson et al., 1991: 40). 
Industries such as electricity, gas and water are considered natural monopolies 
because it is difficult and costly for a firm to replicate their supply networks. 
Imperfect competition might also arise due to increasing returns to scale: this 
occurs when the average cost of production falls as the scale of production 
increases, which affords large firms with a competitive advantage. Firms might also 
collude to fix prices, restrict sales outlets or enforce tie-in sales ( Levačić  in 
Thompson et al., 1991: 43).  
 
1.2 Appraising the Neoclassical Framework 
 
The theory of market failures provides a central argument for public policy 
interventions and is important to take into account in the evaluation of governance. 
The concepts of public goods and externalities potentially justify a range of policy 
interventions, including the direct provision of goods and services through the 
public sector, taxes, subsidies and regulations (Le Grand, 1991). Similarly, the 
concept of imperfect competition was a central argument in the nationalisation of 
public utilities and the provision of some welfare services, such as education and 
health, where the costs of entry into the market, in terms of building schools and 
hospitals, are high (Fuchs, 1996: 278). Finally, the concept of information 
asymmetry suggests that consumption decisions made by consumers are not 
always welfare-maximising. This potentially justifies a range of interventions to 
improve consumer choices and indeed provides a central justification for 
professionalism in the provision of services (Broadbent et al., 2005).    
 
However, while it is important to take into account the presence of market failures 
when evaluating governance, the framework has a number of limitations. A key 
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issue is the emphasis on efficiency and market failure, which suggests that policy 
interventions are appropriate only where goods can be objectively shown to be 
undersupplied, oversupplied or inefficiently produced. Yet some goods have social, 
political and moral import such that markets can fail to produce an optimal amount 
even when operating efficiently. Elizabeth Anderson refers to a distinct category of 
“political goods”: goods that individuals ought not to be excluded from and which 
speak to the kind of society that we seek as a community (Anderson, 1990). This 
issue reflects wider concerns about Cost-Benefit Analysis and whether all values 
relevant to decisions can be measured in quantitative, monetary terms.  
 
Related to this issue, neoclassical economics is neutral with regards to inequality. 
Its purpose is to enhance economic outcomes. Yet this assumes an initial 
distribution of resources. For the early neoclassical thinkers, it was necessary to 
avoid issues of distribution and inequality because they involve value-judgements 
and therefore cannot be studied scientifically (Rosenberg, 1992: 23). Yet this move 
has meant the neoclassical economics is consistent with vast inequalities in income 
and wealth, inviting allegations that the framework “is a protection of the status 
quo” (Gowdy, 1998: xvii). 
 
Besides these issues of values, the approach presupposes a ‘positivist’ conception 
of knowledge which does not take into account market actors’ potentially very 
different perceptions of reality or the fragmented and incomplete nature of 
knowledge. In the market, consumers are assumed to have full knowledge of their 
preferences and any consumer items that exist; vice versa for producers, who are 
fully aware of changes to demand and respond accordingly. The market has a 
tendency towards equilibrium because each party reacts to market signals in 
equilibrium-enhancing ways. But the inherent frailties of human cognition make it 
likely that consumers will make questionable consumptions decisions or that 
producers will fail to produce goods of the appropriate quality or quantity 
(Zafirovski, 2002: 564). 
 
The concept of information asymmetries does relax the assumption of perfect 
information, but where this issue arises the state is said to be well placed to 
intervene and restore the proper functioning of the market: the perfect knowledge 
and rationality of policymakers fills in for the cognitive frailties of market actors on 
the ground. However, policymakers, who make decisions in centralised positions in 
society, may also lack knowledge of the quality of goods and services or, indeed, 
consumer demand (Zappia, 1999). Indeed, this is precisely the ‘knowledge problem’ 
in public policy. 
 
Finally, the neoclassical framework does not take into the ‘motivational problem’ in 
public policy (Rabin, 2003: 573). As we saw, the neoclassical ideal of the 
competitive economy contains within it a concept of incentives: all things being 
equal, markets tend to equilibrium because individuals actors are incentivised in 
operate in ways that maximise social welfare (Laffont and Martimort, 2009). The 
flip side of this is that market failures arise in part when markets fails to provide 
appropriate incentives, say to invest in an appropriate amount of a good, seek out 
70 
 
product information or operate efficiently in contexts of imperfect markets. 
However, the political sphere and the public sector also lack any obvious economic 
incentives of this sort.  
 
Indeed, chapter 1 provided some background on changing intellectual and political 
shifts regarding the structure of the economy and the organisation of public 
services. We saw how increasing disillusionment with state intervention in the 
1970s led to a shift to market forms of governance in the 1980s, following the 
electoral success of the New Right. This disillusionment with state intervention was 
accompanied with an increasingly influential criticism of the neoclassical framework 
from within the economics profession: that it only analyses market failures and 
leaves open the question of whether the state can actually solve them. For some 
commentators, the framework makes unrealistic assumptions about the capacity of 
policy processes to solve policy problems35.  
2.1 Public Choice Theory and the ‘Motivational Problem’ 
 
Public Choice Theory extends the neoclassical framework to the political sphere, 
which is found to contain few mechanisms to align incentives, creating the potential 
for inefficiencies on the supply and demand sides of the political ‘market’. A key 
text of the framework is Mancur Olson’s ‘The Logic of Collective Action’. Olson 
argued that motivating people to engage in political action to influence policy is 
easy when a small group is affected: individuals will either benefit a great deal if a 
policy decision goes their way or be harmed a great deal if it goes against them. 
Their motivation can be assured because their contribution is vital to the cause. 
However, as numbers increase, political organisation gets more difficult. The costs 
and benefits accruing to each member are smaller and each person could 
reasonably think that their contribution would not make a difference: the so-called 
“free rider” problem (Olson, 1974). 
 
Public choice theorists have applied the “free rider” concept to the political sphere 
more broadly. Because the costs and benefits of political involvement are shared, 
citizens in liberal democracies are unlikely to get involved in politics in any 
meaningful sense. They are unlikely to vote in the first place or, if they do, unlikely 
to seek out information required to make rational choices. Furthermore, there is 
little incentive for them to put sufficient pressure on elected representatives once 
they are in office. Ultimately, this will result in ambiguous and irrational political 
signals and the election of people who do not reflect the public interest36.  
 
                                                           
35 For Ronald Coase, this assumption “has led economists to derive conclusions for economics policy 
from a study of an abstract of a market situation … Until we realize that we are choosing between 
social arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to make much headway” 
(Coase, 1960: 145).  
36 There is a similarly here with Kenneth Arrow’s work on the problematic nature of voting 
procedures to arrive at a coherent social choice (Arrow, 1970). But whereas Arrow stresses the logical 
problem of social choice – a problem that has arguably been addressed by deliberative democratic 
theorists (Dryzek and List, 2003)  – public choice theorists stress motivational reasons. Recent 
accounts suggest that a combination of motivational and knowledge problems combine to ensure the 
irrational nature of democratic procedures (Brennan and Lomasky, 1997; Caplan, 2008). 
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The lack of informed choices and pressure on the demand-side may translate into 
inefficiencies on the supply-side. Politicians, seeking power and reelection, promise 
and deliver wasteful and inefficient public programmes: without excessive 
promises, they will not get voted into office. The political process is also corrupted 
by vested interests, while for their part politicians are open to such corruption in 
order to further their careers and ultimately their power. Meanwhile, the civil 
servants who are called upon to put public policies into practice cannot be relied 
upon to do so efficiently. Sheltered from market competition, they maximise their 
utility by maximising the budgets of their organisations which in turn increases their 
salaries and power (Niskanen, 2007). As a result, government intervention through 
the public sector is likely to result in widespread inefficiency. 
 
Market solutions to public policy problems  
 
While Public Choice Theory provides a range of criticisms of state intervention, the 
framework is also associated with the promotion of market-oriented policies. A 
prominent theorist of market-oriented policy is Ronald Coase, a thinker closely 
aligned with the framework. Coase argued that market failures would not arise if all 
services were assigned well-defined property rights: where a factory is polluting a 
nearby lake, for instance, having some person or organisation own the lake would 
ensure the factory is made to pay compensation for its pollution. In this way, 
economic problems can arise because markets are not  developed enough (Coase, 
1937; Coase, 1960; Coase, 1974).  
 
Coase also criticised the neoclassical concept of market failures. For Coase, 
situations in which externalities arise are ambiguous: keeping with the example of 
the lake, it may be the case that the pollution is justified if it is a side-effect of the 
production of a unique and popular product37. Only by assigning property rights to 
the lake and having its owners discuss with the polluters (and other interested 
parties) can the direction and significance of the externality be established. The 
polluters could choose one of three options: cease their activities, pay the owners 
of the lake compensation or buy the lake outright. Other interested parties could 
bid for the lake if they feel the current owner is underselling it. Either way, 
competitive market processes will ensure that the most valued use of resources, in 
this case the lake, is identified and aligns incentives to ensure this knowledge is 
acted upon. 
 
In any case, policymakers are unlikely to be aware of the most valued use of 
resources (an example of the ‘knowledge problem’) and a system of well-defined 
property rights creates a clear incentive for goods and services to be used in 
socially-beneficial ways (thus overcoming the ‘motivational problem’). 
 
                                                           
37 According to Coase, neoclassical economics asks: “how should we restrain A?” But a more 





2.2 Appraising Public Choice Theory 
 
Public Choice Theory provides a significant challenge to advocates of greater state 
involvement in the economy and identifies a major weakness in neoclassical 
economics: that it does not demonstrate exactly how market failures can be solved. 
The framework provides some important insights that are necessary to take into 
account the evaluation of governance, particularly with regards to the issue of 
incentives. However, it remains to be seen whether markets are appropriate in all 
policy sectors. 
 
In public sector governance, the issue of incentives is mainly relevant to the 
motivation of individuals and groups involved in delivery of public services, 
including public sector employees and service-users. Given the absence of markets, 
Public Choice Theory is sceptical that these groups will work in the public interest. 
Public sector workers are likely to shirk because they are not subject to market 
discipline like their private sector counterparts. The users of public services do not 
have influence over public sector employees because the government pays their 
incomes and many are unionised (Le Grand, 1991: 433). As such, service-users, 
unlike consumers in markets, have very little influence over public sector 
employees and have to accept substandard services. But problems can arise among 
service-users, for they do not have to pay for the services they receive and may 
take advantage of them.  
 
However, as we saw in chapters 1 and 2, while the marketisation of public services 
has in large part sought to address these motivational problems, the reforms have 
had an ambiguous impact on performance. These issues at a practical level reflect 
wider concerns with Public Choice Theory that the framework overstates the 
capacity of markets to improve the performance of public services.    
Below, I explore Transactions Costs Economics, which operates on similar 
assumptions to Public Choice Theory but offers a more realistic appraisal of market 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, a major criticism of Public Choice Theory is that it 
ignores the potential of market mechanisms to exacerbate incentive-based issues. 
The adoption of market contracting across the government and public sector 
creates opportunities for undue influence and bribes (Chang, 2008: 169).  
 
Additionally, the framework operates on the basis of questionable motivational 
assumptions. In the neoclassical framework, though a concept of incentives 
underpins the model of the perfectly competitive economy, the actual content of 
consumer preferences is left open. It does not matter whether individuals have 
benevolent or malevolent goals; whatever their preferences, they aim to fulfil them 
in their market transactions (Dearlove, 1989). Yet this differs markedly from Public 
Choice Theory, which assumes a concept of universal avarice. Within politics, 
citizens do not fulfil their duties qua citizens because it is not in their material 
interest to do so. Politicians, meanwhile, are oriented towards votes and power. 
Within bureaucracies and public sector organisations, civil servants, professionals 





By inserting malevolent intentions into the model, public choice theorists make 
significant assumptions about the nature of people. While it is undoubtedly true 
that incentives issues can arise in the delivery of public services, there is need for 
empirical research to explore the presence of these issues and identify possible 
solutions. Yet the assumptions of Public Choice Theory close down the possibility 
that incentives issues do not arise in non-market contexts or that markets may be 
inappropriate in their solution. Making a similar point, Sidney Shapiro and 
Christopher Schroder argue that Public Choice Theory not only lacks the “means to 
establish the objectivity” of its approach but is itself “not neutral”, imposing a 
“vision of society in lieu of other visions of society” (Shapiro and Schroeder, 2008: 
443; see also Shapiro et al., 1996).  
 
3.1 Transaction Cost Economics: Towards a Compromise? 
 
Whereas Public Choice Theory propounds market solutions to policy problems, 
Transaction Cost Economics provides a more nuanced analysis of the potential of 
the market mechanism. The framework draws extensively from Ronald Coase who, 
though a prominent theorist of market solutions to policy problems, recognised 
limitations to those very solutions. Observing that much of economic activity is 
coordinated through firms rather than markets, Coase argues that the very 
existence of firms is testament to the imperfections of markets. Firms and 
industries are organised in different ways. Some operate on the basis of long-term 
employment contracts, whereas others employ workers on a day-to-day basis in a 
manner more akin to a market. According to Coase, this is because market 
exchanges can incur costs. It is necessary for buyers to search for and identify 
suitable producers of the products they require, to conduct contract negotiations, 
to draw up contracts and to monitor them to ensure that the terms of the contract 
are observed. When such costs are high, it can be more efficient for a buyer to 
directly employ producers rather than engage with them in the market place 
(Coase, 1960). 
 
Oliver Williamson has developed Coase’s insights. Mirroring Coase, Williamson 
distinguishes between hierarchy and markets but he also identifies various hybrid 
forms of governance modes which sit between the two, including networks and 
long-term contracts. The purchaser of a good or service confronts a ‘make-or-buy’ 
decision: where markets are developed, they are likely to buy the good, as in 
standard commodity markets. Or they may seek to ‘make’ the good themselves. In 
imperfect markets, purchasers and providers decide among themselves what 
governance arrangement is appropriate, in order to minimise transaction costs38. 
The appropriate governance arrangement will be determined by the varying 
degrees of three characteristics that feature in all transactions: 
                                                           
38 Costs include ex ante costs incurred prior to an exchange (such as the costs of negotiating and 
drafting contracts and the collection of relevant information) and ex post costs incurred after the two 
parties have agreed on the terms of the exchange (such as the costs of setting up the governance 
structure, monitoring performance and seeking redress if the expected outcomes are not forthcoming) 




 Asset specificity – the degree to which the physical and human assets 
involved in a transaction are specific to the good or service that is 
exchanged; 
 Frequency – the frequently the transaction is carried out; 
 Uncertainty – unanticipated changes to the environment in which a contract 
is delivered and/or difficulties in the measurement of outcomes, resulting in 
problems with performance evaluation (Tomassen, 2004: 29). 
At one extreme, market transactions are likely to be the most efficient option when 
uncertainty is at a minimum, the exchange is infrequently carried out and asset 
specificity is low, as in the case of standardised and mass-produced goods. At the 
other extreme, hierarchical production is likely to be the most efficient option when 
uncertainty is high, exchanges are frequent and assets are specific to them. Indeed, 
where goods and services are complex and highly customised, production may 
require specialist equipment or involve uncommon professional skill and high levels 
of ‘tacit’ knowledge (Mendenhall and Kühlmann, 2001: 45). This, in turn, will mean 
the parties to an exchange are to a large extent dependent on each other: the costs 
of terminating the relationship and exchanging with another party are high 
(Mellewigt et al., 2006: 32).   
 
The efficiency potential of hierarchical production stems in part from the flexibility 
which direct employment provides. Employment contracts are more flexible than 
market contracts, which is particularly important when goods are complex and 
heterogeneous (Hodgson, 2004: 411). Direct employment can also reduce costs 
when goods and services are frequently exchanged because multiple contracts will 
not be required (although the cost of each contract will itself be determined by the 
complexity of the good exchanged). Furthermore, through direct employment, 
purchasers – now employers – can monitor their employees, which is particularly 
necessary where uncertainty pertains. Yet hierarchy is attached to significant costs, 
for the reasons identified in Public Choice Theory: 
 
Incentives are unavoidable compromised and added bureaucratic costs are 
unavoidable incurred upon taking a transaction out of the market and organizing it 
internally. The upshot is that the move from market to hierarchy is attended by 
trade-offs (Williamson in Menard and Shirley, 2008: 51) 
 
3.2 Appraising Transaction Costs Economics  
 
The conception of transaction costs is highly relevant to the study of public sector 
governance. There is the possibility that public sector provision saves upon 
transactions costs in public service contexts, just as firms save upon such costs in 
market contexts, since the decision to produce in-house or contract out is 
essentially the ‘make-or-buy’ decision as formulated by Williamson (Dollery, 2001). 
As we saw in chapter 1, a range of market mechanisms have been incorporated into 
the public sector and the efficiency potential of such mechanisms have been called 
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into question precisely because they have often incurred significant increases in 
transaction costs (Boyne, 1998). There is a need to explore the fit between the 
goods and services provided by providers of services and the governance 
arrangements in place.  
 
In market or quasi-market contexts, consumers (which may include commissioners 
or service-users) and producers might incur excessive administrative costs which 
would be unnecessary if production was organised internally. Yet the inverse of 
high administrative costs in market and quasi-market contexts is excessive 
monitoring costs in hierarchical contexts, which arise due to information 
asymmetries between employer and employees. It might be the case that public 
sector employees are not working in the public interest and alternative services are 
available for purchase on the market, in which case it would be more efficient for 
the government to buy from a private provider rather than procure it through the 
public sector.   
 
Nevertheless, while the concept of transaction costs is important to take into 
account in the evaluation of governance, the framework, like Public Choice Theory, 
assumes questionable motivational assumptions which result in it favouring certain 
policy strategies over others. While recognising the efficiency potential of 
hierarchical production in certain cases, the framework assumes a concept of 
universal avarice – “opportunism”, in Williamson’s terminology – which implies that 
hierarchical production must involve hierarchical management strategies in order 
to ensure the compliance of employees. The efficiency potential of hierarchical 
production stems predominantly from the capacity it provides employers to 
monitor employees.  
 
However, as Geoffrey Hodgson makes clear, transaction costs can also arise due to 
limited knowledge on behalf of parties to an exchange and the difficulties involved 
in verbally articulating the specificities of complex goods and services. Hierarchical 
production, in this context, could potentially improve the efficiency of transactions 
by minimising “distortions in cognitive and communicative transitions”, for the 
buyer and seller of a product now work together in the same organisation. TCE, by 
emphasising opportunism, assumes a ‘Taylorist’ model of management in which 
managers are in full possession of all relevant product information and the role of 
employees is merely to follow instructions. Yet in the case of complex and 
heterogeneous goods and services the efficiency role of management  
 
…may not be principally a gendarme, but equally if not more an educator, 
concerned with the minimization of misunderstandings and the development of a 
common corporate culture where—as much as possible—shared aims and 
conceptions dominate sectional interests (Hodgson, 2004: 411) 
 
The upshot of this alternative analysis is that added bureaucratic costs need not 
follow if a transaction is organised internally, at least not from the monitoring of 
employees. This is a particularly important insight in public service contexts where 
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goods and services are complex and a potential source of efficiency is public service 
motivation, as discussed in the next chapter.  
 
4.1 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has explored a number of frameworks which provide useful concepts 
for the evaluation of governance. The theory of market failure and associated 
concepts – public goods/externalities, information asymmetries and imperfect 
competition – highlight failures of market mechanisms, providing justifications for 
policy interventions. In a similar vein, the ‘motivational problem’, as theorised by 
Public Choice Theory, serves to explain inefficiencies resulting from government 
intervention which can arise from a failure of policy processes or public 
bureaucracies. Additionally, Transaction Cost Economics highlights the wider costs 
of production and exchange. A failure to select an ‘efficient’ governance 
arrangement can result in costs which would not arise under an alternative 
governance arrangement. I have argued that empirical research is required to 
explore the presence and significance of the issues identified by these different 




Chapter 5: Evaluation and Institutions 2 – the 
Austrian School and ‘Old’ Institutionalism  
This chapter follows on from the previous chapter, exploring various schools of 
‘heterodox’ political economy. In different ways, heterodox schools reject the 
positivist assumptions of neoclassical economics in favour of a concept of 
incommensurable values and incomplete knowledge. The chapter assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks, drawing out the themes that are 
relevant to the evaluation of governance and public service reform. 
 
Heterodox economics is itself a diverse field and I focus on two main frameworks: 
the Austrian School of Economics and ‘old’ institutionalism. As is well known, the 
Austrian School was highly influential over the New Right. The framework provides 
a significant challenge of advocates of greater state involvement in the economy. 
The ‘knowledge problem’, as theorised by one of the Austrian School’s key figures, 
Friedrich Hayek, constitutes a fundamental challenge of any governance 
arrangement and places limitations on what centralised forms of decision-making 
can achieve. However, Hayek’s pro-market conclusions do not necessarily follow on 
from his analysis of market processes. ‘Old’ institutionalism suggests markets often 
have an uneasy relationship with the encapsulation and discovery of knowledge 
and may indeed exacerbate motivational problems due to a proliferation of 
individualist and materialist values. Nevertheless, Hayek concept of coordination is 
potentially useful for the purposes of governance evaluation, orienting analysis to 
the interactions of stakeholders and the effective discovery and utilisation of 
knowledge.  
 
The first section examines the Austrian School and the ‘knowledge problem’ in 
more detail, before considering some criticisms of the School and its relevance to 
the topic of public service reform. The second section examines ‘old’ 
institutionalism, before likewise considering the framework’s relevance to the 
reform of public services. The analysis paves the way for chapter 6, which outlines 
an approach for the evaluation of governance. 
 
1.1 The Austrian School and the ‘Knowledge Problem’ 
 
The Austrian School of Economics has an ambivalent relationship with the 
neoclassical framework. On the one hand, it shares an emphasis on consumer 
preferences as the ultimate source of value and begins at the same starting point: 
scarcity and choice. On the other hand, whereas neoclassical economics is positivist 
and is based on the statistical analysis of markets in relation to equilibrium, the 
Austrian School is based on more theoretical analysis which explores the evolution 
and historical development of economic institutions. This results in a view of 
market processes as never attaining equilibrium but always unfolding in 




Carl Menger, widely regarded as founder of the School, developed the concept for 
the purposes of economic theorising in order to capture the essence of economic 
phenomena, which he believed was not possible through mathematical analysis 
(Caldwell, 2008: 31). Menger’s approach was to analyse the emergence of 
economic phenomena in terms of the conscious and unconscious decisions of 
individuals. Money, for instance, evolved from an agreement between two 
individuals to trade with a third commodity that would hold its value. Gradually 
more and more individuals realised that it is expedient for them to exchange goods 
with a commodity capable of holding value, usually gold. Eventually, money was 
institutionalised by the state through legislation. Yet this legislative act is 
coincidental to understanding the origin of money (Menger, 1985: 155). 
 
Others institutions arise in a similar manner, such as language, law, morality and 
professionalism (Menger, 1985: 157). Like money, these institutions dramatically 
improve the welfare of society but are not purposefully pursued. They “come about 
as the result of individual human efforts (pursuing individual interests) without a 
common will directed toward their establishment” (Menger, 1985: 133). Institutions 
that are created through conscious social action are unlikely to improve welfare in 
this way because they encroach upon the developmental process and often fail to 
achieve what they intend to achieve (Menger, 1985: 157). 
 
This approach, of counter-posing institutions that emerge out of unconscious and 
conscious activities, is adopted by Frederick Hayek in his more detailed analysis of 
the market mechanism. Hayek developed his views in the ‘Socialist Calculation 
Debate’ during the 1920s, when the economist Oscar Lange outlined a model of 
socialism based upon the neoclassical framework. Lange’s model permitted 
markets for consumer items and labour but production was to be planned, 
informed by guidelines based on analysis of data on consumer preferences and 
production possibilities. According to Lange, such an economy would result in more 
egalitarian distributions and achieve greater efficiency because the full benefits and 
costs of market transactions could be incorporated into the price mechanism, 
ensuring that market failures would not arise (Roberts, 1971). 
 
Hayek strongly rejected Lange’s proposals, arguing they exposed more issues with 
neoclassical economics than they did establish the feasibility of a centrally planned 
economy (Boettke in Feser, 2006: 56). A key issue is the neoclassical analysis of the 
market as a system governed by laws of supply and demand, in which individuals 
respond to prices in equilibrium-enhancing ways. Yet processes of preference 
formation and entrepreneurship, in which producers seek out knowledge of profit 
opportunities and develop new consumer items, are left under-theorised (Kirzner, 
2006).  
 
Indeed, Hayek’s criticism of Lange’s system hinged upon the concept of 
coordination (Farrant, 1996: 3). The market facilitates coordination, not by central 
direction, as with the case with state intervention, but via price signals which 
emerge spontaneously from the buying and selling of multiple individuals dispersed 
across society. Market participants engage in market processes freely, buying and 
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selling goods and services in accordance with their own values and preferences. The 
prices which emerge from this process encapsulate, in simple numerical form, 
highly complex information regarding supply and demand in the economy. These 
signals provide guidance to economic actors – whether consumers or producers – 
who can assess the value of products as means to achieve their ends, which may 
not have been immediately apparent to them before. Producers engage in a 
process of discovery whereby they respond to profit opportunities indicated by 
price signals by converting factor inputs into consumer items in innovative and 
unpredictable ways, utilising their own knowledge and expertise in the process. As 
prices change and profit opportunities diminish, they are led into new ventures, in 
an on-going process which facilitates innovation and ultimately economic growth. 
Likewise, as the process unfolds, the nature of demand changes, consumers 
discover knowledge of their own preferences and the capacity of goods to satisfy 
them (Caldwell, 2008: 33). 
 
Analogous to this appraisal of the market is Hayek’s critique of policy processes. 
Where market processes are decentralised, policy processes are highly centralised: 
decisions are not made by individuals dispersed across society, but individuals or 
groups of elite policy actors. These actors confront a profound ‘knowledge 
problem’: even assuming a concept of universal benevolence, it is unlikely that 
centralised decisions will be congruent with the values and objectives (‘ends’) of 
individuals dispersed across society. Furthermore, even if there is broad agreement 
regarding the objectives which policy should pursue, decision-makers are likely to 
lack knowledge of the precise ‘means’ through which they might be fulfilled.  
 
Indeed, central planning is prone to inefficiency because knowledge is always 
partial, incomplete and cannot be centralised. As we saw, in markets, price signals 
coordinate the actions and decisions of consumers and producers, “telling people 
what they ought to do in particular circumstances” (Hayek in Pizano, 2009: 5). 
Market actors do not need to understand why prices change but are nevertheless 
free to respond in ways which benefit them and society. In this way, the market 
system is uniquely capable of facilitating coordination in spite of human cognitive 
frailties and incomplete knowledge: 
 
The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole 
field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap (Hayek, 
1945: 526) 
 
For planning to be efficient it would require full knowledge of consumer demand 
and production possibilities which would be difficult to access at any one point in 
time. What is more, market processes are dynamic and unpredictable. The values 
and preferences of participants change as the market unfolds and new production 
possibilities emerge. Even if data could be made available at any one point of time, 
it would soon be out of date, which places further constraints on central planning. 
On this issue, Hayek notes a divergence between his views and advocates of central 
planning concerning “the significance and frequency of changes which will make 
substantial alterations of production plans necessary”. Yet the contra view holds 
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only if “things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise 
no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan” (Hayek, 1945: 
523). 
 
But the final and insurmountable flaw of central planning is the ‘tacit’ nature of 
much of economic knowledge (Boettke, 2000: 18), or what Hayek calls the 
“knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” that is dispersed 
throughout society: 
 
(P)ractically every individual has some advantage over others in that he possesses 
unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be 
made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active 
cooperation … central planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot 
take direct account of these circumstances of time and place … the central planner 
will have to find some way or other in which the decisions depending on them can 
be left to the ‘man on the spot’ (Hayek, 1945: 522)39 
 
For Hayek, only the market system can facilitate the utilisation of this knowledge. 
Its prices “act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same 
way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan” 
(Hayek, 1945: 526).  
 
1.2 Appraising the Austrian School 
 
The Austrian School has been highly influential in policy circles, providing much of 
the theoretical impetus for the New Right and the increased use of markets in all 
policy areas. However, the effectiveness of markets is a highly contested topic and, 
as with Public Choice Theory, critics argue that the Austrian School overstates the 
potential of market mechanisms to solve policy problems.  
 
Indeed, the Austrian case against central planning as the major form of economic 
coordination is widely accepted today and taken to explain the collapse of state 
socialist systems such as the Soviet Union (Scharpf, 1999: 31). Yet, this criticism of 
centralised planning aside, it remains to be seen whether markets can always 
efficiently coordinate activity. The neoclassical concept of ‘market failures’ has 
already questioned the capacity of market prices to accurately convey information 
about supply and demand. In the next section, I also consider the Marxist argument 
that the market system has centralising tendencies of its own.  
 
A number of commentators have sought a reappraisal of Hayek’s work in this 
regard. In different ways, they accept Hayek’s critique of central planning but reject 
the notion that markets are the only mechanisms to facilitate the coordination of 
                                                           
39 This closes down the possibility of Paul Cockshott and Allin Cottrell’s concept of socialist 
planning based on “modern computer technology”, outlined in their ‘Towards a New Socialism’ 
(Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993: 25). 
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economic activities and (‘tacit’) knowledge (Cumbers, 2012: 68; Gamble, 1996: 1; 
Greenwood, 2010: 37; O’Neill, 2013: 193; Wainwright, 1994).  
 
For example, John O’Neill remarks that it is “odd” Hayek references Michel 
Polanyi’s work on ‘tacit’ knowledge when making a case for market coordination; 
for Polanyi developed the concept with the practices of the scientific community in 
mind40. Science is, for O’Neill, one of the achievements of the modern world and is 
testament to what can be achieved by decentralised, non-market coordination. 
What is more, the increasing marketisation of science – involving the incorporation 
of intellectual property rights regimes – poses a threat to science and slows the rate 
of scientific innovation (O’Neill, 2013: 191). In this way, markets can actually hinder 
the encapsulation and discovery of knowledge, suggesting at least some forms of 
knowledge have public good characteristics and will be under-supplied by markets 
(Stiglitz in Kaul et al., 1999: 311)41.  
 
The debates are highly relevant to the topic of public service reform, where 
policymakers have sought to incorporate market mechanisms into the public sector 
under NPM. While in some respects this process can be seen as further evidence of 
the influence of the Austrian School, in others respects it is not. For the process of 
marketisation has been accompanied with heightened managerialism. The rise of 
Evidence-Based Policy is at odds with Hayek’s epistemology, which in many ways 
resembles postpositivism42. Furthermore, the incorporation of markets into the 
public sector has coincided with increasingly centralised forms of decision-making. 
Some commentators note a similarity between the public sector bureaucracy which 
exists today and the system of central planning in the Soviet Union. These 
commentators recognise the potential for performance management to result in 
unintended and undesirable consequences (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; 
Ann et al., 2009; Propper et al., 2008). Such accounts highlight tensions between 
centralised and decentralised decision-making which resonate with Hayek’s work, 
serving to emphasise the epistemological problem of “choosing the right indicators 
in the first place” (Levačić, 2004: 188)43.  
 
This potential for centralised decision-making to result in unintended consequences 
is recognised by advocates of ‘networked governance’. As we saw in chapter 1 and 
                                                           
40 In ‘The Tacit Dimension’, Michel Polanyi argues that science is a non-hierarchical sphere that 
operates on principles of “mutual adjustment and mutual authority” in which scientists coordinate 
their activities and regulate one another, with groups of scientists linked together in “chains of 
overlapping neighbourhoods” (Polanyi, 2009: 72). 
41 This is also a theme which emerges in Marxist theory, most notably among labour-process 
theorists, discussed in more detail below (Braverman, 1998). 
42 Theodore Burczak draws a similar parallel, arguing that Hayek’s work resembles the application of 
“postmodern notions of indeterminacy, open-endedness, incompleteness and social constitution to the 
study of ordinary life and the knowledge of ordinary people” (Burczak, 2006: 390). 
43 Yet the literature frames problems attached to performance management in terms of the 
‘motivational problem’ in public services. Titles include ‘Gaming in Targetworld’ (Hood, 2006) and 
‘What is Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the English Healthcare System’ (Bevan 
and Hood, 2006). Yet they can also be framed in terms of the ‘knowledge problem’: i.e. as a failure of 
policymakers to define performance management protocols in such a way as to encapsulate local 
values and knowledge. 
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2, there is increasing recognition of the importance of more collaborative forms of 
governance. In many ways, there are similarities between Hayek’s account of 
coordination in markets and accounts of networks, in which actors collaborate with 
each other to achieve changing objectives, while utilising their own knowledge and 
expertise in the process. Nevertheless, networks in the public sector do not emerge 
spontaneously and require governance frameworks to function (Torfing et al., 2012: 
169). Hayek’s problematic poses evaluative questions of these governance 
frameworks: what policy tools, strategies and organisational forms facilitate the 
coordination of actors and the effective use and discovery of knowledge?  
 
In the next chapter, I outline a framework for the evaluation of governance which 
draws upon Hayek’s concept of coordination. A focus on coordination would entail 
examining the interactions between stakeholders at different stages of the policy 
process, while also identifying issues arising from the use of specific policy tools. 
Indeed, given the potential for centralised decision-making to result in unintended 
consequences, there is a need to explore stakeholder accounts at a local level to 
identify where such consequences arise and how they might be avoided.  
 
2.1 ‘Old’ Institutionalism: Revisiting Issues of Knowledge and Motivation 
 
Where Hayek’s work identifies clear limitations to centralised forms of decision-
making, other forms of ‘heterodox’ economics are more critical of the use of 
markets in society. ‘Old’ institutionalist economics44 in particular emphasises 
limitations to the market system and assigns a positive role to policy processes and 
other organisations, such as professional organisations and trade unions, in 
facilitating the coordination of economic activities. The framework has insights that 
are relevant to questions of institutional design in public services.  
 
A central concept of the framework is institutions, defined in broad terms as “habits 
of thought” or the “common sense of the community” (Knoedler et al., 2007: xviii). 
Individuals are conceptualised as socially embedded in the culture and institutions 
which surround them. The knowledge individuals have at their disposal is also 
fallible, incomplete and their values, preferences and motives are partly moulded 
by their environments. These assumptions share similarities with Austrian 
economics (Lewis and Chamlee-Wright, 2008), but the frameworks reach very 
different conclusions about the appropriate roles and inter-relationships between 
state and markets.  
 
A central ‘institutionalist’ criticism of economic theory, including neoclassical 
economics and the Austrian School, is that it provides an ahistorical account of 
markets. This is somewhat surprising given the explicit attempt of Austrian 
economists to explain economic phenomena in historical terms vis-à-vis the 
concept of ‘spontaneous order’. However, as noted by Geoffrey Hodgson, this 
                                                           
44 The term ‘old’ institutionalism is taken to refer to Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi, the German 
Historical School (GHS) and American institutionalism. Contemporary adherents include Geoffrey 
Hodgson, John O’Neill, Wilfred Dolsfma and Robert MacMaster.  
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approach universalises a concept of homoeconomicus, for evolution is understood 
in terms of individual choice. Theoretically, this is problematic because individuals 
are explained in terms of such individuals and so on into infinite regress (Hodgson, 
2001: 146). But it is also important politically because, if market processes, in which 
individuals make choices in light of available alternatives, are themselves a product 
of history rather than its cause, the market becomes one economic institution 
among many. Hodgson suggests that it is the political preference of Austrians for 
the market system that has resulted in this problem: their desire to safeguard the 
market system has meant that the core features of the market place – most 
notably, homoeconomicus, private property and indeed markets – are assumed to 
exist since the dawn of humanity (Hodgson, 2001: 211)45. 
 
Institutionalists also criticise the individualist theory of value which underpins 
neoclassical economics and the Austrian School. Where these frameworks share a 
concept of consumer sovereignty, institutionalist economists have analysed how 
individual preferences and motivations are shaped by that society (Hodgson, 1989). 
What is more, while individuals may be socially embedded and operate in contexts 
of significant uncertainty and complexity, nevertheless they are capable of adopting 
a higher rationality and evaluating the status quo in terms of the community 
impersonally, in terms of a conflict between what is and what ought to be (Bush, 
1987: 1076). It is this form of rationality which is expressed in the political sphere 
and which has the potential to steer economic activities.  
 
Nevertheless, while the framework is more critical of markets than other economic 
frameworks, there is widespread agreement that central planning is untenable as 
an all-encompassing mode of coordination and that markets have a positive role to 
play in the economy. Geoffrey Hodgson argues that it is necessary to take into 
account what he calls the “impurity principle” when designing and evaluating 
institutions. All systems, according to Hodgson, depend in large part on impurities, 
whether they are elements passed down from history, such as remnants of 
feudalism in Europe; or whether they emerge and combine at the same time, such 
as the case of Britain’s capitalist and colonialist systems, which operated in unison 
during the 18th and 19th century. Hodgson argues that it is illegitimate to abstract 
impurities from the analysis: all development is a process of “making do” with the 
historical legacy of institutions and the successful design of institutions requires the 
toleration of impurities (Hodgson, 2001: 334). 
 
The “impurity principle”, when applied to the question of the appropriate roles and 
inter-relationships between state and market, implies that some form of mixed 
economy is required but it does not specify what form that would take, providing a 
theoretical guideline rather than a set of policy proposals (Hodgson, 2001: 335). 
Institutionalists have held different views on this question, ranging from models of 
“guild” socialism, consisting of state ownership, worker and consumer associations 
                                                           
45 More recent developments in institutionalist theory, such as Public Choice Theory, Transaction 
Cost Economics and other “new” institutionalisms, similarly fail to account for the historical 
emergence of markets. This is recognised by Oliver Williamson, who states “I assume, for 
expositional convenience, that ‘in the beginning there were markets’” (Ankarloo, 2002: 1). 
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and regulated markets for consumer items (Polanyi, 1924); to something 
approaching the welfare state settlement, with a mixed economy, a strong welfare 
state and some democratic participation in economic decision-making (Hodgson, 
2002).  
 
As has already been argued, there is a need to explore these questions through 
empirical research. Nevertheless, ‘old’ institutionalist critiques of markets highlight 
issues that can arise from an over-reliance on market mechanisms which other 
frameworks do not recognise and are important to take into account in governance 
evaluation. 
 
Critiques of the market system  
 
Karl Marx46 and Karl Polanyi provide significant insight into the topic of the 
appropriate relationship between the state and markets. Central to their thought is 
the concept of commodification, which in turn presupposes a concept of 
incommensurable value. As is well known, Marx begins his analysis of capitalism 
with the commodity. Throughout the history of mankind, production has been 
geared towards the production of objects of use-value. However, under capitalism, 
production takes the form of commodity production, where commodities are 
produced for sale on the market and thus have both a use-value and an exchange-
value. Thousands upon thousands of objects are produced which, though 
qualitatively different, are rendered commensurable via their exchange value 
assigned to them in market exchange. Each commodity’s exchange value enables it 
to be brought into quantitative relations with any other commodity on the 
market47.  
 
One of the main consequences of production for market exchange is what Marx 
calls ‘commodity fetishism’, whereby people no longer relate to each other directly 
as human beings but human relationships are expressed through commodities. The 
operation of the market renders producers, the relationships which organise the 
workplace and the conditions in which people work invisible. Labour is treated as a 
commodity like any other and exchange-value dominates over use-value. Profits are 
now the sole purpose of production and the remorseless drive for profits is satisfied 
either through the streamlining of production or extending the boundaries of 
capitalism, regardless of its impact for individuals and society (Prodnik, 2012: 278). 
 
A similar account is provided by Polanyi, whose critique of market capitalism 
centres upon the concept of ‘commodity fiction’. Where Marx had a particular 
                                                           
46 Karl Marx’s status as an institutionalist is disputed.  Some argue that his conceptual schema is 
ahistorical and overly rigid to be considered an institutionalist, whereas others view his account of the 
historical specificity of the market system as an example of institutionalism (O’Hara, 2000). It is for 
this reason that he has been included in this section. 
47 Where does that exchange value come from? While supply and demand does have a role in the 
short-term, the determining factor is what Marx calls “socially necessary labour time”, which refers to 
the average labour required to produce the commodity, given the average level of skill and 
technological development in society at that point in time. This constitutes the major value system in 
capitalist society (Foley, 2000). 
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concern with the commodification of labour, Polanyi emphasises the problem of 
reducing all objects to the status of commodities. Many objectives, including labour 
but also land and capital, are not produced for sale on the market and treating 
them as if they are commodities implies the total subordination of society and 
nature to the market logics. The concept “commodity fiction” highlights a 
theoretical failure of economists to appreciate the very definition of a commodity, 
which something that is made for sale on the market. 
 
Marx and Polanyi’s critique of commodification, like Hayek’s work, anticipates the 
postpositivist concept of incommensurable values, implying the inappropriateness 
of assigning an exchange value to human beings and other non-commodities, either 
for the purposes of market exchange or rational planning. But it also has 
implications for the twinned problems that are central part of governance 
challenges: the ‘motivational problem’ and the ‘knowledge problem’. 
 
Revisiting Issues of Knowledge and Motivation 
 
For Marx, capitalism differs from previous economic systems in part because 
production takes the form of commodity production and is underpinned by 
exploitative relations between the owners of capital – the capitalists – and the 
workers – the proletariat (Marx and Engels, 2003). But an additional differentiating 
characteristic is the division of labour under capitalism. Marx argues that all 
societies have included a “social division of labour”, which has its roots in the 
differences of sex and gender. As societies developed, this division of labour 
increased with the specialisation of labour, resulting in the creation of the craft 
industries. Yet capitalism is based on a “manufacturing division of labour” which 
differs “not only in degree, but also in kind”. The degree of specialisation of labour 
under capitalism is so extreme it results in “the lifelong annexation of the worker to 
a partial operation, and his complete subjection to capital” (Marx, 1990: 477). 
 
The development of this “manufacturing division of labour” has implications for the 
‘motivational problem’ of public policy. Indeed, for Marx, work is critical to the 
development of individuals, a full sense self and the formation of social 
relationships. Yet the specialisation of labour denies individuals meaningful work, 
resulting in workers’ alienation from their work, themselves and each other. 
Increasingly, workers work only for pecuniary rewards rather than other motives, 
such as an intrinsic desire to engage in creative labour or to work for the sake of the 
community (Sennett, 2009: 28). 
 
In a similar way, Polanyi also emphasises the historical uniqueness of the market 
system, but from the perspective of market exchange rather than production. 
Polanyi demonstrates that market exchange, in which two people exchange 
something for something in return (corresponding to the form A-B-A), is historically 
peripheral as a form of coordination. Throughout much of history, goods and 
services have either been exchanged on the basis of redistribution, characterised by 
the movement of goods to and from a strong centre, such as a feudal system or a 
strong administrative state (corresponding to the form B-A-C-A-D-A); or reciprocity 
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in so-called ‘gift’ economies, whereby exchanges are deferred (corresponding to A-
B-C-D-A) (Osti, 2007).  
 
Polanyi’s contribution to the ‘motivational problem’ stems from his view of the 
integrative functions that economic activities perform. Redistribution (B-A-C-A-D-A) 
and reciprocity (A-B-C-D-A) create lasting social relationships: either through 
coercion in the case of redistribution or pro-social activity in the case of reciprocity. 
In ‘gift’ economies, goods are provided to a member of a community by another 
member who in turn receives goods at a deferred time, either from the same 
person or another member of the community. These forms of coordination 
integrate individuals into society, providing individuals with distinct norms to follow 
if they are to be a member of the community.  
 
Market exchange (A-B-A) does not perform an integrative function because it leaves 
no lasting social relationships and unsettles the common identities, values and 
social norms that are necessary for the reproduction of society, having a 
“disintegrative” effect. As Janet Knoedler and colleagues put it:  
 
…market transactions are similar to so-called ‘blind barter’ where individuals in one 
social group exchange with members of another social group without ever actually 
meeting them. They place goods in a prescribed location and leave that place. They 
return to that place and see if there has been an acceptable return for their initial 
offering. If so, they take it and the transaction is complete. If the return for their 
offering is not acceptable, they do not take the counter-offer and their original 
offering is returned (or the original counter-offer is supplemented). Either way the 
transactors never meet and no social ties or connections are created (Knoedler et 
al., 2007: 115) 
 
Increasingly, individuals act in terms of their own wants and preferences, 
irrespective of standards of moral behaviour and the consequences for society 
(Polanyi, 2002: 163).  
 
While these critiques of the market system are mostly relevant to the ‘motivational 
problem’, Marx’s analysis of the “manufacturing division of labour” is also relevant 
to the ‘knowledge problem’. Subsequent Marxists have analysed the development 
of the factory system, characterised by standardised production, centralised 
decision-making and hierarchical controls over workers. A key factor in the shift was 
the emergence of the scientific management, spearheaded by Frederick Taylor. 
Scientific management sought to improve the efficiency of enterprises through the 
scientific analysis of work processes and the development of algorithms to instruct 
workers how to undertake job tasks. Taylor assigned a new role to management: 
 
…the burden of gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which in the past 
has been possessed by the workmen and then of classifying, tabulating, and 




Though Taylor believed his approach would benefit both capital and labour, 
Marxists have argued that the application of scientific management serves to 
convert high pay, high skill jobs into low pay, low skill jobs, removing employers’ 
reliance on the skills and knowledge of employees and ultimately serving the 
interests of capital over labour. Scientific management is said to constitute a 
fundamental practice of the capitalist system (Braverman, 1998; Cooper and Taylor, 
2000; Marglin, 1974).  
 
Why is this problematic? Marx’s analysis suggests that, besides facilitating 
exploitation and denying workers meaningful work, capitalist production has an 
uneasy relationship with the effective utilisation of knowledge, providing a possible 
rejoinder to Hayek’s account. This has been highlighted by recent commentary. 
Andrew Cumbers comments on the disparity between Hayek’s view of the market 
and the reality of actually existing market economies. The modern economy is 
constituted by extremely large corporations characterised by centralised decision-
making structures and often highly standardised production processes, some 
distance from “the devolved market utopia of innovation, knowledge discovery, 
diversity and experimentation that Hayek envisioned” (Cumbers, 2012: 68). 
 
The standardisation of work points to additional forms of market failure, including 
loses of the knowledge and skills attached to high skill jobs and effects of the low 
skill jobs which replace them: 
 
These myriad jobs offer so little opportunity for the exercise of either manual or 
mental skills that the very capacity for these skills atrophies (Murphy, 1993: 1) 
 
Yet it would be a mistake to suggest that it is only low pay jobs that are affected. 
New technologies enable the standardisation of the service industries and even so-
called ‘knowledge work’ through processes that Philip Brown and colleagues 
describe as Digital Taylorism (Brown et al., 2008: 11, see also Head, 2005): 
 
…Digital Taylorism takes the form of a power struggle within the middle classes, as 
these processes depend on reducing the autonomy and discretion of the majority of 
well qualified technical, managerial and professional employees. It encourages the 
segmentation of expertise based on ‘talent’, in ways that reserve the ‘permission to 
think’ to a small proportion of employees responsible for driving the business 
forward (Brown et al., 2008: 11) 
 
2.2 Appraising ‘Old’ Institutionalism 
 
‘Old’ institutionalism provides significant insights that that are necessary to take 
into account for evaluation and design of governance. The notion of the “impurity 
principle” warns against the reliance on any one governance mechanism, 
suggesting that the key to solving policy problems is establishing the right balance 
between different mechanisms. Additionally, problems may arise when 
policymakers attempt to “purify” systems, through the excessive reliance on a 
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particular mechanism (Hodgson, 2002: 334). As with a Hayekian perspective, this 
orientates policy evaluation to the exploration of unintended consequences of 
policy but it allows for unintended consequences to arise from an overuse of 
markets in public policy, as well as the use of hierarchical policy tools.  
 
As Marx and Polanyi demonstrate, the overuse of markets in society can result in a 
failure to realise significant political, social and environmental values. It can also 
complicate the knowledge and motivational dimensions of public policy. Marx’s 
analysis of the ‘specialisation of labour’ complements the argument that certain 
forms of knowledge and skills have public goods characteristics (see above), while 
the depletion of knowledge and skills via the application of scientific management 
is a form of market externality.  
 
The critique of Taylorism and scientific management is highly relevant to the topic 
of public service reform (Holmes and Evans, 2013). Besides the use of centralised 
forms of decision-making in performance management, NPM has also been linked 
to the creation of precarious jobs, the standardisation of work processes, work 
intensification and the incorporation of “technologies of surveillance” into the 
workplace (Patterson and Pinch, 1995: 1431; see also Chapman, 2012: 40; Hoggett, 
1994; Hoggett, 1991; Holmes and Evans, 2013). These processes may diminish the 
capacity of public services to solve complex policy problems. One case study of local 
government environmental services found that the application of NPM involved the 
standardisation and streamlining of work, the end of apprenticeship training 
schemes and the replacement of older, more experienced and more skilled workers 
with younger and less skilled workers. While this secured efficiency savings in the 
short-term, the new workforce was not equipped to respond to new policy 
objectives associated with climate change and sustainable development (Patterson 
and Theobald, 1996; see also Patterson and Pinch, 1995).  
 
The process of standardisation also seems to affecting professionalised public 
services such as education and health, where it is aided and abetted by Evidence-
Based Policy (EBP). Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, EBP is partly viewed as a way to 
lessen reliance on professional judgement. But it may also be facilitating the 
standardisation of services. For Angela Packwood, the application of EBP has 
facilitated a view of “professionalism as performativity, teaching as technicist 
delivery”; which stands in contradistinction to “professionalism as freedom to 
engage critically in debates regarding practices”, with teaching understood “as a 
reflexive, dialogic process” (Packwood, 2002: 267). Likewise, Leslie Chapman uses 
the term Digital Taylorism to describe New Public Management, implying 
increasingly standardised services for consumers, the deskilling of work and work 
intensification. EBP has partly facilitated this: 
 
EBP encourages the development of metrics or measurements which can be used to 
evaluate the efficacy of a particular intervention. This is an important part of Digital 
Taylorism: measurement is linked to evaluation, which is linked to standardisation 




While this suggests that at least some public sector employees experience declining 
pay and working conditions as a result of NPM reforms, it also implies that the 
objective of responsive, consumer-oriented public services may yet be elusive, as 
work is increasingly standardised and geared towards the production of goods and 
services that are defined at the centre.  
 
Similarly, the use of markets and managerialism may exacerbate the ‘motivational 
problem’ in public services. There is a significant literature which suggests that 
significant majorities of public sector workers and professionals are motivated by 
values of public service, civic duty, professionalism and social justice. Yet this stock 
of ‘public service motivation’ may have declined with the shift from employment 
relationships based on trust to the use of economic incentives (Andersen, 2009; 
Bellé and Ongaro, 2014; Francois, 2000). Both providers of services and services-
users themselves may be affected.  
 
Indeed, one unintended consequence of marketisation was anticipated by Richard 
Titmuss in his early criticism of the use of markets in the provision of welfare 
services. Writing in the 1970s, Titmuss used the example of blood donation to warn 
against marketisation. Having people donate blood as a civic duty, though no direct 
relations between people are established, creates a common resource open to the 
community that is there when people require it. Both the giver and the receiver 
accept this notion and both gain from the sense of being part of a community. 
Introducing payment, however, incorporates a transactional component to the 
relationship which compromises the sense that giving blood is a civic duty. The 
result is a diminution in the community’s moral horizon. People who did donate 
blood out of civic duty no longer donate. If stocks decline, the receivers of blood 
will now have to pay for it or have their family and friends give it up. Stocks may 
stay level due to increases in blood paid for in cash but monitoring systems are 
required because there is an incentive for people with problems with their blood to 
donate just to get paid (Titmuss, 1971).  
 
In Polanyian terms, this is precisely the dynamic of the switch from integrative 
forms of coordination, in the form of redistribution and reciprocity, to market 
exchange, which leaves no lasting social relationships and ties. Titmuss’ arguments 
suggest that marketisation can compromise core social and economic values 
associated with public services, providing a significant rejoinder to public choice 
arguments for the use of markets in the delivery of public services.  
 
3.1 Concluding Remarks  
 
The present section has examined heterodox economics and the different views 
within that field regarding the appropriate roles for and interrelationships between 
state and markets. This complemented the previous section, which did the same 
vis-à-vis neoclassical economics and its extensions. I have argued that empirical 
research is required to address evaluative questions of governance and identified 
various concepts that are important to take into account in the evaluation and 
design of governance. In particular, Friedrich Hayek’s pro-market conclusions aside, 
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his theorisation of coordination as a problem of the effective discovery and 
utilisation of knowledge presents a major challenge to any governance 
arrangement. In the next section, I develop an empirical approach for the 




Chapter 6: A Framework for the Evaluation of Policy 
and Governance 
My purpose in this present chapter is to summarise the preceding chapters and 
provide an outline of an evaluative approach suitable for the evaluation of policy 
and governance in complex policy areas. As we saw in chapter 1, there is extensive 
debate over the quality of public services and the appropriateness of different 
policy tools and organisational forms in their delivery. Yet questions remain over 
how to address these evaluative questions of public sector governance. In chapter 
3, I suggested that postpositivist philosophy and policy analysis have important 
relevant insights but there is scope to develop these approaches for the purposes 
of governance evaluation. To that end, chapter 4 and 5 have examined various 
theoretical perspectives in political economy which provide insights into the 
strengths and weaknesses of different institutional arrangements in the 
coordination of economic activity. 
 
In this chapter, I propose a postpositivist approach to evaluation which evaluates 
governance in terms of its capacity to facilitate coordination. Section 1 makes a 
case for a postpositivist focus on coordination. It begins by outlining what 
coordination entails in the context of the governance of public services, before 
setting out a postpositivist approach to the evaluation of coordination, involving an 
assessment of stakeholder ‘frames’.  
 
1.1 Governance and the Challenge of Coordination  
 
Before outlining an approach to governance evaluation, it is important to first 
consider what the challenges of governance actually entail. Chapter 2 introduced a 
distinction between policy and governance. Though the process of policy formation 
and implementation are complex, involving a complex web of decisions and actions, 
policy can nonetheless be usefully conceptualised as involving a decision to adopt a 
course of action in order to solve a problem. Thus, decisions over policies are 
somewhat singular or linear, involving choices between specific interventions, 
services and programmes which address problems. 
 
The concept of governance brings to the fore the multiple layers or scales through 
which particular polices are implemented. Decisions over governance are more 
complex than policy decisions: they pertain to the management of implementation 
and the design of overall institutional environment (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 16). 
 
How, then, might governance be evaluated? Governance can be evaluated in terms 
of its capacity to affect the coordination of actors. Chapter 1 explored the 
increasing prominence of the concept of coordination in the field of public 
administration amid heightened recognition of the complexity of policy problems. 
In public administration, the verb refers to a process through which actors at 
different scales combine to deliver public services. Similarly, the concept is central 
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to political economy, informing Friedrich Hayek’s praise of the market system as a 
superior coordinating mechanism than central planning. 
 
Indeed, Hayek’s conceptualisation of coordination is a useful starting point for the 
evaluation of governance (Greenwood, 2010; Greenwood, 2012). Coordination, for 
Hayek, is a process through which actors, operating in contexts of great uncertainty 
and complexity, obtain and act upon knowledge of ends and means dispersed 
throughout society. Consumers seek out and acquire knowledge of new consumer 
items which enable them to fulfil their ends, which may not have been immediately 
apparent to them before. Producers seek out and acquire knowledge of the most 
valued use of resources, given consumer demand. In the process, they utilise their 
own knowledge and expertise.  
 
Of course, Hayek had strong views about the superiority of the market system to 
affect coordination via market prices. However, while the Hayekian ‘knowledge 
problem’ clearly renders untenable an economy coordinated entirely on the basis 
of central planning, the neoclassical concept of market failures and the more 
fundamental criticisms of the market system of ‘old’ institutionalists suggest that 
the superiority of the market system has been overstated. Nevertheless, to address 
the ‘knowledge problem’ requires the development of governance arrangements 
which facilitate innovation and the successful utilisation of knowledge and 
expertise. 
 
Indeed, national policymakers confront a number of challenges in their efforts to 
facilitate coordination due to the considerable uncertainty and complexity in which 
they operate. They have to define political priorities and policy objectives in ways 
which reflect a rough approximation of stakeholder values. Furthermore, national 
policymakers have to acquire knowledge of the means through which these values 
are to be realised in practice. This will require making decisions about appropriate 
policy strategies and the governance arrangements through which policy is 
delivered. There is always the possibility that the wrong policies and governance 
arrangements are chosen, resulting in issues in the delivery of policy which frustrate 
the realisation of policy objectives. 
 
A central aspect of this challenge is to strike the right balance between centralised 
and decentralised forms of decision-making; i.e. the scale of decision-making. There 
is a need to ensure that actors at different levels of policy implementation have 
knowledge of the most valued use of resources. Although Evidence-Based Policy 
has emerged in recent years and has potential to address this problem, there are 
clear limitations to what alone evidence can achieve (see chapter 2). Excessive 
centralisation can restrain the scope of actors to fashion effective local solutions. 
Yet excessive decentralisation may result in local actors being unaware of effective 
policy options. Additionally, different stakeholder groups should have an 
appropriate degree of influence over local decision-making, whether professional, 




A further aspect of this challenge is to ensure that the appropriate incentives are in 
place to ensure that actors implementing policy are motivated to seek out and act 
upon the knowledge they require to deliver effective public services. It may be the 
case that the implementation of policy is undermined by public sector 
workers/professionals acting in their own interests or by corporate bodies acting in 
their commercial interests. Alternatively, the motivation of actors may be adversely 
affected by an overuse of economic incentives, as market mechanisms or excessive 
performance management reduce the ‘intrinsic’ or ‘pro-social’ motivations of 
actors. In this way, policymakers must attend to the different dimensions of the 
‘motivational problem’, as outlined in previous chapters.   
 
A still further aspect of this challenge is to ensure that transaction costs are kept to 
a minimum. As discussed in chapter 4, transaction costs do not refer to the quality 
of goods and services or the direct cost of production, but rather the costs attached 
to an exchange. Oliver Williamson has argued that market actors who desire a good 
or service face a “make or buy” decision: to either to ‘make’ it themselves (or, more 
accurately, to employ someone directly to ‘make’ it for them) or to ‘buy’ it from the 
market place. Either option is associated with transactions costs: direct 
employment can be cheaper than market transactions when the skills and 
technology required for the production of a good or service are specific to them 
and the transaction is frequently carried out because it cuts down on the costs of 
writing up contracts and monitoring completion. But direct employment can also be 
costly because extensive monitoring is required to ensure employees work in the 
interests of the employer. 
 
Just as firms confront this “make or buy” decision, so too do national policymakers. 
One of the challenges for national policymakers therefore, besides the issues of the 
scale of decision-making and incentives, is to ensure that transaction costs are 
minimised. It may be the case that hierarchical delivery through the public sector 
creates excessive management costs that would be exempt if goods and services 
were purchased on the market. But it might also be the case that consumers 
(whether commissioners or service-users) and producers incur excessive 
administrative costs in market or quasi-market contexts which would be 
unnecessary if production was organised internally.  
 
What methodological approach might be used to evaluate whether coordination is 
taking place? Chapter 2 explored the dominant approaches to the evaluation of 
policy and governance. Evaluations are typically quantitative and fail to provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of both policy and governance. A major issue with 
quantitative evaluation is the measurement of outcomes, which invariably only 
provide a partial account of performance. Furthermore, particularly at the level of 
governance, the complexity of the overall environment makes it difficult to 
conclusively attribute outcomes to a change in governance, such as the adoption of 
competitive tendering or performance management.  
 
An advance on these quantitative approaches are the evaluations of ‘networked 
governance’ discussed on page 48. The literature on networked governance 
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recognises the complexity of policy formation and implementation: knowledge is 
said to be partial and incomplete which necessitates governance arrangements that 
foster innovation and mutual learning. Furthermore, the literature recognises the 
importance and the complexity of the incentives problem: governance 
arrangements should facilitate collaboration between stakeholders (Agranoff, 
2003). 
 
However, where this literature seeks to evaluate networked governance, it adopts a 
process-orientation which focuses on identifying successful management strategies 
to manage the process of policy delivery.  Proxies such as commitment, trust and 
communication amongst network participants serve as indicators of performance 
(Kenis and Provan, 2009: 442). This is clearly problematic when we consider the 
criticism of contemporary public sector governance that collaboration has become 
an end in itself and has skewed attention away from working to achieve policy 
outcomes (Blackman, 2013; Travers, 2007). The possibility that emphasising 
processes can actually interfere in the delivery of policy suggests that evaluations 
should adopt an outcome-orientation to ensure policy strategies and governance 
arrangements have a discernibly positive effect on public service outcomes.  
 
Hence, to ascertain whether coordination is taking place requires a qualitative 
approach to evaluation which has an outcome-orientation. This entails a focus on 
stakeholder accounts of the precise details of policy and the decisions and choices 
made when selecting between policy strategies and the design of the overall 
governance arrangement. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 2, evaluations of 
‘networked governance’ do not specifically address evaluative questions of 
governance related to the scale of decision-making and incentives, focusing instead 
on network management.   
 
An outcome orientation is in-keeping with Hayek’s analysis of coordination: for 
though Hayek brings to the fore the complex processes of adaption and learning 
through which coordination is achieved in markets, he ultimately praises markets 
for realising outcomes and thus realising the values which motivate market 
participants. Furthermore, like contemporary commentators on ‘networked 
governance’, Hayek recognises that stakeholder values can be qualitatively distinct 
and are not reducible to monetary measurement, while technical knowledge is also 
dispersed and fragmented. This would suggest that a postpositivist perspective is 
required to evaluate whether or not coordination is taking place. A postpositivist 
evaluation of outcomes could explore and compare the values and understandings 
of stakeholders at different levels of governance and policy, from the national to 
the local. Such an approach would provide insight into the effectiveness of public 
sector governance, possibility identifying problems which frustrate the realisation 
of policy objectives. 
 
Indeed, as we saw in chapter 1, the topic of public service reform is highly 
contested. While the New Right were sceptical of the capacity of public 
bureaucracies to solve the twinned problems of knowledge and motivation, NPM 
reforms have themselves been criticised. NPM reforms can be evaluated in terms of 
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their capacity to affect coordination. To what extent do performance management 
protocols and quasi-markets enable or constrain the achievement of policy 
objectives by facilitating innovation and the successful utilisation of knowledge? To 
what extent, indeed, does Evidence-Based Policy provide information to actors 
regarding the most valued use of resources? To what extent does the overall 
incentive-environment elicit the desired motivation of actors? And to what extent 
are transaction costs kept to a minmum? In the next section, I outline a 
postpositivist approach that is specifically geared towards the evaluation of 
governance through a focus on coordination.  
 
1.2 Frame Analysis and Coordination  
 
Postpositivist policy analysis provides a number of methodological approaches that 
are suitable for the evaluation of governance. A variety of forms of ‘discourse’ or 
‘frame’ analysis exist, each of which recognise the potential of multiple 
interpretations of reality, value diversity and the fragmented nature of knowledge 
(Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014: 41). Frame analysis in particular has been developed 
specifically for the purposes of policy evaluation48. Like discourses, frames organise 
experience and provide something of a narrative that interprets the world, 
determining what is sayable. They are relatively durable, are grounded “in the 
institutions that sponsor them” (Schon and Rein, 1995: 29) and serve a political 
function, seeking to elicit particular responses from actors (Payne, 2001: 29). They 
contain both diagnostic and prognostic elements, identifying what is wrong and 
how problems might be solved (Lombardo et al., 2009: 141). Policy conflicts can be 
understood as “disputes among institutional actors who sponsor conflicting frames” 
(Schon and Rein, 1995: 29). The purpose of frame analysis is to identify and analyse 
different frames in policy conflicts, in order to gain an understanding of the policy 
problem and the debate (Peuhkuri, 2002: 158).  
 
However, frame analysis does have to be developed for the purposes of governance 
evaluation. As discussed in the previous section, to evaluate governance in terms of 
coordination requires an exploration of stakeholders’ appraisals of the precise 
details of policy and the effects governance. This differs from most postpositivist 
approaches which typically seek to elucidate the nature of contested, moral 
debates. Frank Fischer’s approach, for example, provides a useful approach to 
explore the nature of policy disputes at the stage of policy formation (see page 60). 
Yet to evaluate outcomes requires a more specific exploration of stakeholder 
appraisals of the choices and trade-offs involved in the delivery of policy and the 
design of governance. 
 
Furthermore, frames are ideal-types and the process of identifying and analysing 
them inevitably involves a degree of abstraction and simplification (Eckerberg and 
Nilsson, 2013: 59). On one level, this is useful because it provides insight into the 
                                                           
48 Though similar to ‘discourse analysis’, ‘frame analysis’ is more specific to policy analysis and 
evaluation, where discourse analysis is used both in policy analysis and a far wider range of purposes, 
including Foucauldian approaches, critical discourse analysis and cognitive linguistics (Hope, 2010)   
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nature of policy conflicts and debates. While this is important to gain an 
understanding of the nature and extent of agreement and disagreement between 
frames, it has a disadvantage of abstracting away from the precise details of the 
content of different frames, as well as the nuance and contestation within them. It 
is precisely this level of detail which is important to take into account in the 
evaluation of coordination. For this reason, the analysis should begin by identifying 
and analysing frames at an abstract level, before going onto a more detailed 
exploration of frames and also how stakeholders combine elements of different 
frames in their evaluations of policy and governance.  
 
There are three key dimensions that are necessary to take into account in the 
evaluation of governance:  
 
1. Values  
It is first necessary to explore the value component of stakeholder frames. This 
provides insight into the fundamental values and interests which motivate 
stakeholders. In turn, it is possible to ascertain the extent to which there is 
agreement on policy priorities and whether national policymakers have succeeded 
in defining political priorities in ways which reflect dispersed stakeholder values. As 
discussed in more detail below, the presence of shared values has important 
implications for evaluation. 
 
2. Knowledge  
It is also necessary to explore the knowledge component of stakeholder frames. 
Though the approach set out here is for the evaluation of governance, the 
effectiveness of governance is defined to a large extent by the quality of local 
decision-making and actions. It is therefore necessary to take into account both 
levels and consider the complex chains of means-ends relationships which interlink 
and interact across different scales of governance. Two specific kinds of knowledge 
are required for the evaluation of governance: 
 
 Knowledge of the substantive policy problem – this kind of knowledge 
pertains to the nature of the policy issue at hand and includes knowledge of 
possible solutions, i.e. the policy tools, interventions and services 
stakeholders believe are required to solve the problem at a local level. The 
analysis must examine how stakeholders frame the complex choices and 
uncertainties involved in decisions at this level.   
 
 Knowledge of the impacts of governance – this kind of knowledge pertains 
to the wider governance arrangements in place. The analysis must examine 
how stakeholders frame choices at the level of governance. They might have 
knowledge of the impact of centralised forms of decision-making, the 
effects of the incentives-environment on them and others or the transaction 
costs attached to a governance arrangement.  
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An analysis of these specific kinds of knowledge is important to consider because it 
provides insight into the efficiency of decision-making at different scales of policy 
and governance, providing a basis to evaluate whether policymakers have selected 
the right policy tools and governance arrangements to realise policy goals and 
objectives.  
 
3. Interests   
Finally, it is necessary to consider the interests which underpin frames. The concept 
of ‘interest’ is closely aligned to values, but it also concerns the concealed interests 
of actors in favouring certain options over others. Indeed, the values and 
knowledge content of stakeholder frames will be closely intertwined with their 
interests. Yet the process of uncovering interests is complicated because 
stakeholders are unlikely to speak frankly about the interest they have in particular 
policy positions. One possibility to overcome this problem is to infer stakeholder 
interests from the content of other stakeholder frames. Specifically, stakeholders’ 
knowledge of the effectiveness of governance (see above) may provide insight into 
the interests which underpin other stakeholder frames, whether professional 
interests or commercial interests. It is important to consider interests because it 
provides some insight into why stakeholders harbour the views they do.     
 
1.3 Evaluating the Coordinative Capacity of Governance  
 
Once frames have been identified and analysed across these dimensions, it is 
possible to evaluate the coordinative capacity of governance and policy by 
comparing and contrasting frames at different levels. A starting point must be 
‘policy’ frames at the national level, which can be identified in policy documents 
and the discourse of senior policymakers and incumbent politicians. Comparing and 
contrasting policy frames at this national level with those of other stakeholders can 
provide insights into excluded values or knowledge.  
 
Of course, it might be the case that stakeholders do not highlight any major issues, 
suggesting they share both a similar definition of the policy problem and an 
understanding of how it can be solved with national policymakers. Here, 
policymakers have defined appropriate goals and selected efficient means to 
achieve them. There are few options which would improve the effectiveness of 
governance, for coordination is taking place. However, given that policymakers 
operate in contexts of profound uncertainty and complexity, perfect coordination 
of this sort is unlikely. The diversity of society and the fragmentary nature of 
knowledge suggest that stakeholders will disagree with some aspect of governance 
or policy.  
 
Indeed, policy conflicts are likely and exploring their nature is important in the 
evaluation of governance. Policy conflicts are likely to take one of two forms. 
National policy frames may have excluded values that are significant to some 
individual or group. While this may be down to a lack of awareness on behalf of 
national policymakers, contestation over policy priorities most likely reflects real 
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political differences. As such, the issue is not of coordination but possibly divergent 
stakeholder values and interests. There are unlikely to be any solutions available 
that might ameliorate the conflict, at least in the immediate term. Where conflict of 
this nature is apparent, the analyst can identify the values at stake in the problem, 
so they might be discussed openly in the political sphere. Where national priorities 
have been defined in ways which clearly conflict with some stakeholder groups, 
questions must be asked about the legitimacy of policy processes; for it would 
appear that stakeholders have differential access to what John S. Dryzek and Hayley 
Stevenson call “empowered spaces”, where collective policy decisions are made 
(Dryzek and Stevenson, 2014: 131).  
 
Policy conflicts over values of this type are an inextricable characteristic of political 
processes and likely to arise in most disputes over governance. Still, a further 
category of conflict is where national policy frames have excluded some individual 
or groups’ knowledge. Here, stakeholders broadly share values but have contrasting 
understandings of how to realise them.  
 
Indeed, the attempts of national policymakers to facilitate coordination may result 
in unintended and undesirable consequences at a local level. Local actors might 
possess knowledge of policy solutions that are not widely known or criticise some 
aspect of governance for constraining them in the pursuit of their objectives, 
perhaps due to misaligned incentives or unnecessary transaction costs. Where 
values are shared, these issues can be defined as ‘coordination problems’, for policy 
and governance appears to be failing to utilise stakeholder knowledge in the pursuit 
of policy objectives. The presence of shared values has important implications for 
policy evaluation because there is scope for the analyst to draw out that local 
knowledge and propose alternative policies and arrangements if appropriate. In the 
process, stakeholders’ contrasting understandings may begin to converge if 
problems with specific policy tools and approaches are made apparent to them.  
 
2.1 Appraising the Approach  
 
The proposed approach seeks to evaluate governance and policy in terms of both 
the appropriateness of policy objectives and the efficiency of means to achieve 
them. As a postpositivist form of evaluation, the approach can complement 
‘positivist’ and ‘neoclassical’ forms of policy analysis by specifically orienting 
analysis to uncovering values and knowledge suppressed in governance processes 
and which may have been neglected by these forms of analysis. Moreover, the 
focus on stakeholders’ views on the effectiveness of policy and governance differs 
from the process-oriented evaluations of ‘networked governance’. Issues regarding 
processes may of course be highlighted by stakeholders, but these are relevant only 
where they are shown to frustrate the realisation of policy goals.  
 
Nevertheless, there are issues with the proposed approach that are important to 
consider. Most significantly, it is important to recognise that a fully objective 
account of stakeholders’ values, knowledge and interests is impossible to ever 
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obtain. While this is precisely why a detailed, postpositivist exploration of 
stakeholder frames is required in the first place, it also raises a number of issues. 
The process of identifying and analysing frames is subjective and care must be 
taken to ensure that frames accurately reflect the views of stakeholders. 
Additionally, there are issues regarding the accuracy and indeed integrity of 
stakeholders’ frames, for values, knowledge and interests are closely intertwined. 
Stakeholder frames may simply express their concealed interests in a particular 
solution to a policy problem. 
 
A key issue is that the expressed commitment of national policymakers to a value 
may not be sincere. Where some detrimental consequences of a policy decision are 
identified which appear to compromise a stated policy objective, this may simply 
reflect a conscious political decision at a national level to prioritise some other 
objective. While the extent of the undesirable effects may not have been known, 
the problem appears to be one of priorities rather than a lack of knowledge. This is 
significant because the issue is no longer a ‘coordination problem’, for coordination 
may indeed be occurring as intended just in a way that some stakeholders find 
objectionable. Nevertheless, while issues of this nature raise questions of the 
legitimacy of policy processes, in order to evaluate the effectiveness of governance 
it is necessary to bracket the intentions of national policymakers and thus assume 
that issues identified at a local level are indeed unintended consequences. 
 
The inverse of this problem is that stakeholder reports of unintended and 
undesirable consequence of policy may wilfully misrepresent the issue because it 
suits them and thus the problem may not represent a policy failure at all. As 
discussed above, stakeholders are unlikely to speak frankly about the interest they 
have in particular policy positions.  
 
The main strategy to overcome this problem is to consider multiple stakeholder 
frames. Stakeholder frames can be triangulated with other stakeholder frames in 
order to assess the veracity of particular accounts of local policy issues or the 
overall governance environment. Certain stakeholders may have a unique 
perspective vis-à-vis the claim of another. For example, consumers or service-users 
may be uniquely placed to account for the claims of providers of services. 
Additionally, though evidence is itself often disputed, stakeholders might have 
some particularly compelling evidence to back up their case, including relevant 
statistics or positivist forms of evaluation. In this way, quantitative research can 
provide useful background material for qualitative research (Alvesson and 
Skoldberg, 2009: 4). 
 
3.1 Concluding Remarks  
 
In this section, I have set out a proposal for a postpositivist approach to the 
evaluation of policy and governance in complex policy areas. The proposed 
approach is a detailed comparative analysis of stakeholders’ framings of the choices 
and uncertainties which exist at different levels of policy and governance. The 
identification of policy problems due to unintended consequences provides a 
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strong basis for evaluation and the proposal of policy options. For, if values are 
indeed shared, there is scope for stakeholders’ contrasting understandings of policy 
issues to converge where new solutions are identified which stand to more 
effectively realise shared objectives and goals.  
 
In the following sections, I further apply the proposed approach to the topic of NHS 
reform and in particular diabetes policy and governance. In chapter 7, I introduce 
the Government’s recent reforms of the health service, brought about by the 
Health and Social Care Act (2011). Though the passage of the Act was accompanied 
with unprecedented public and professional protest, the Government is committed 
to certain core principles associated with the health service, including universalism 
and free access to services. Additionally, policy documents recognise the 
importance of a number of widely shared values, such as efficiency, quality of care, 
patient-centred care and responsiveness (DoH, 2010; DoH, 2011b; DoH, 2012; DoH, 
2013). This apparent presence of shared values provides a basis upon which to 
evaluate the reforms.   
 
Following the introduction of the Government’s reforms, I explore the wider 
debates in health policy and governance, developing a set of frames. At the level of 
policy, I identify a ‘holistic’ frame and a ‘medical’ frame which exhibit different 
understandings of the substantive problem of health policy and which favour 
particular interventions and forms of care. At the level of governance, I identify five 
main frames which advocate distinct approaches to the organisation and 
governance of the service: a ‘market’ frame, a ‘managerialist’ frame, a ‘political’ 
frame, a ‘medical-professional’ frame and a ‘progressive’ frame.  
 
At this stage, my analysis of the different frames follows the logic of a typical frame 
or discourse analysis. The framings provide a useful starting point for understanding 
the different perspectives in debates in health policy and governance. But I also 
draw upon the frames in chapter 8 and chapter 9. In chapter 8, I examine the 
evidence on the various policy tools which have been used to enhance the 
performance of the health service, including Evidence-Based Medicine, 
performance management and marketisation.  Some of the framings have distinct 
positions on these policy tools which are identified and discussed in the analysis. 
Furthermore, I draw upon the frames in the analysis in the case study research. For 
stakeholders’ appraisals of policy and governance often resembled the frames. But I 
also go beyond the level of typical frame or discourse analyses in the case study to 
examine the content of stakeholders’ framings in detail in order to gain a fuller 
understanding of the choices and trade-offs which exist in designing policy and 




Chapter 7: The NHS and its Reform 1 – Introducing 
Governance and Policy Frames 
The creation of the National Health Service (NHS) remains one of the most 
ambitious reforms ever embarked on by a UK government: the National Health 
Service Act of 1946 sought the wholesale reform of the nation’s health services, 
bringing health services across the country under the control of the Department of 
Health and establishing rights of access to health services, free-at-the-point-of-use. 
The NHS would become a centrepiece of the postwar welfare state and it remains 
the core provider of health services in the UK today. Yet, as we saw in chapter 1, 
the NHS has been the subject of sometimes highly volatile debate. The past thirty 
years have witnessed extensive efforts to enhance its performance, involving a 
range of market and managerialist policy tools. 
 
My purpose in this chapter is to introduce the topic of NHS reform and identify the 
main frames of health governance and policy. It is possible to identify frames across 
two levels of debate: at the level of governance, where there is extensive debate 
over the use of markets and performance management in the health service; and at 
the level of policy, where there is debate about the services and forms of care 
provided by the health service. Most recently, there has been significant debate 
about the use of pharmacological therapies, following NICE’s decision to lower the 
threshold of heart attack risk at which patients are to be offered ‘statins’, a 
cholesterol-lowering drug. 
 
I begin by examining the Conservative/Coalition Government’s recent reforms of 
the health service, initiated by the 2011 Act. Following that, I identify and analyse 
the main frames of health governance and policy. In the final section, I compare 
and contrast the different frames across the two core questions of political 
economy; i.e. the appropriateness of markets in the health service and of different 
forms of centralisation and decentralisation. 
 
1.1 The Health and Social Care Act (2011)  
 
The Health and Social Care Act (2011) is widely held to have initiated the largest 
reorganisations of the health service’s history. Its passage also proved one of the 
most controversial pieces of legislation of the Conservative Party/Coalition 
government’s term in office, coinciding with widespread professional and public 
protest. A number of professional organisations declared their hostility to the Bill, 
including the Royal College of Nurses, the Royal College of General Practitioners, 
the Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Surgeons and the British 
Medical Association. The key health policy think-tanks the King’s Fund and Nuffield 
Trust warned of the consequences of the “sheer scale of change and potential 
disruption” (Timmins, 2012: 69). Critics highlighted how the reforms had not 
featured in the Conservative Party manifesto, but the electorate were repeatedly 
promised “no more top-down reorganisations”. Nicholas Timmins, Senior Fellow of 
the King’s Fund and former Public Policy Editor at the Financial Times, remarks in 
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his detailed analysis of the Act’s passage, that it is “widely regarded as a ‘car crash’ 
of both politics and policymaking” (Timmins, 2012: 5). 
 
Yet the Act has its supporters who emphasise continuity between the 
Conservative’s approach and previous attempts to reform the health service. 
Influential commentators such as Julian Le Grand, a former health advisor to Tony 
Blair, supported the Act (Le Grand, 2013). Likewise, Simon Stevens, another former 
health advisor to Tony Blair, then a president of the American health corporation 
United Health and now Chief Executive of the NHS, welcomed the reforms. In an 
article in the FT entitled ‘NHS Reform is a Risk Worth Taking’, Stevens writes that 
the New Labour’s market reforms had improved efficiency and quality and this 
would continue under the Conservative’s model, which represents a continuation 
of New Labour’s approach:   
 
While the risks are substantial, there are grounds for optimism. The proposals come 
10 years after Tony Blair, then prime minister, took the first steps down this path. 
What makes the coalition’s proposals so radical is not that they tear up that earlier 
plan. It is that they move decisively towards fulfilling it – in a way that Mr Blair was 
blocked from doing by internal opposition within his own ‘virtual coalition’ 
government (Stevens, 2010) 
 
What, then, are the key characteristics of the health service under the Health and 
Social Care Act? And how does the health service now differ from what it was under 
New Labour? 
 
Figure 1 below sets out the current shape of the health service alongside New 
Labour’s model. At the top of the service, there are to be fewer roles and 
responsibility for the Department of Health in directly managing and overseeing the 
health service. A new national organisation has been created, NHS England, which 
is in charge of the day-to-day management of the health service. An additional 
organisation has been created alongside NHS England, Public Health England, which 
is involved in the formation of national public health strategies and for ensuring the 
quality of public health services across the country. Below this tier, a new 
organisation has been created which is responsible for the commissioning of health 
services, Clinical-Commissioning Groups (CCGs). These replace New Labour’s 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which were larger and had responsibility for more 
people across a wider area (there are 211 CCGs, relative to 150 PCTs). New Labour’s 
Strategic Health Authorities, large regional bodies responsible for overseeing 
regions and implementing Department of Health policy, have also been dissolved, 
with many of their functions incorporated into NHS England.   
 
Local public health functions, which were once the responsibility of PCTs, are now 
under the control of local authorities, in what is a new role for local authorities in 
the health service. Through Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs), local authorities 
and CCGs are to determine the needs of local areas and commission services in 





The reforms represent an extension of previous efforts on behalf of the 
Conservatives and New Labour to construct a market in healthcare. The purchaser-
provider split, introduced first by the Conservatives in 1991 and sustained through 
the New Labour period, has been extended by the current reforms. Whereas PCTs 
had combined the purchasing and providing functions for certain services, in public 
health and in community services, CCGs are exclusively commissioning 
organisations. On the ‘provider’ side of the market, the Conservatives have 
extended New Labour’s Foundation Trust initiative, which provided managerial and 
financial freedoms to NHS hospitals. Furthermore, New Labour’s policy of 
promoting private sector involvement in the health service is to be extended, both 
in the provision and commissioning of services through involvement in the back 
office functions for CCGs49.  
 
Similarly, a number of organisations created by New Labour for the purposes of 
quality assurance and regulation remain in place. These include the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), whose role it is to approve “health 
technologies”, standardise treatments and inform clinical guidance/performance 
management protocols; Monitor, the economic regulator, whose role it is to ensure 
that local actors abide by competition rules; and the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC), the quality regulator, which regulates providers of care, including GP 
surgeries and NHS hospitals.  
 
The Conservative’s approach to performance management differs in important 
respects. In opposition, a central Conservative criticism of New Labour’s health 
policy related to its use of performance management. Where New Labour had 
purportedly relied upon the excessive use of process targets such as waiting list 
times and ‘disease-specific’ frameworks in the form of National Service Frameworks 
– which contained detailed quality standards for key conditions, such as heart 
disease, strokes and diabetes – the Conservative would take a broader approach 
which would focus on the achievement of actual health outcomes rather than 
process targets (Conservative Party, 2008). In office, this has translated into the 
development of various ‘Outcomes Frameworks’, which take their name from the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework developed by New Labour and used in the 
performance management of GP practices from 2001.  
 
Each year, the Department of Health provides NHS England with a Mandate which 
informs the development of an NHS Outcomes Framework and includes various 
performance indicators for NHS England to work toward. Under NHS England, CCGs 
are performance managed via the CCG Outcomes Indicator Set – which expands 
upon the Mandate – and local authorities are performance managed by Public 
Health England through the Public Health Outcomes Framework (PHOF). Finally, 
GPs in primary care continue to be performance managed through the Quality and 
                                                           
49 Under the NHS Plan of 2001, New Labour announced a “concordat” with the private sector and 
encouraged private sector involvement in the health service through the management of hospitals 
under Private-Finance Initiatives and the direct provision of care through Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISTCs), which provided basis elective treatments. The Conservative Party’s has 
extended the role of the private sector still further.   
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Outcomes Framework (QOF). The government claims that the Outcomes 
Frameworks represent a break from “top-down targets” (DoH, 2011a: 51):  
 
The whole system will be refocused around achieving positive health outcomes for 
the population, rather than focused on process targets and will not be used to 
performance manage local areas (DoH, 2011b: 10) 
 
1.2 Improving the Performance of the Health Service 
 
The system has been designed to enhance the performance across a broad range of 
criteria. The key organisational reform – the creation of CCGs – will purportedly 
improve the responsiveness of the service to patients and local areas because they 
are responsible for smaller numbers of people. Additionally, CCGs place GPs at the 
centre of the commissioning of healthcare and their creation will enable the 
achievement of a long-standing goal of policy, shared by New Labour and the 
Conservatives alike: the development of primary care. While primary care is more 
responsive to patients, it is also said to be more efficient. The care provided by NHS 
hospitals, by contrast, is often specialist-led and expensive. The reforms should 
facilitate the further development of the market in healthcare and thus improve 
quality of care and efficiency, through a combination of patient choice and a 
diversity of providers. Local authorities, too, will link the health service up with local 
government services and improve what is perceived to be lack of democratic 
accountability in the health service.  
 
At a policy level, the reforms are designed to facilitate certain services and forms of 
care. A key part of this is the further development of primary care and public 
health. Both of these moves are believed to be particularly important today due to 
the increased prevalence of long-term conditions and an ageing population, which 
necessitate a turn to prevention. In primary care, better management of long-term 
conditions will prevent complications from arising, thus improving health outcomes 
and reducing costly hospital admissions. Likewise, Public Health England will raise 
the profile of public health across the health service and more broadly, across other 
government departments. This is again particularly relevant due to the rise of 
lifestyle conditions: 
 
 Public Health England will be responsible for stopping people becoming ill in the 
first place (DoH, 2011: 36) 
 
Finally, the reforms are designed to facilitate a qualitative shift in the nature of 
care. Alluding to ‘holistic’ criticisms of ‘biomedical’ health care (see chapter 1), the 
development of primary care will facilitate ‘holistic’ and ‘patient-centred’ care, 
because GPs are the first point of call for patients and are therefore uniquely 
positioned to commission care around their needs and preferences. Furthermore, 
public health professionals, now operating in local authorities, will be closer to local 
politicians and the communities they serve, enabling the development of “holistic 
solutions to health and wellbeing” (DoH, 2011b: 4). The medical care provided by 
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the NHS will be complemented by “a 21st century local public health system, based 
on localism, democratic accountability and evidence” (DoH, 2012: 1). 
 
Nevertheless, the controversies which greeted the Health and Social Care Act 
(2011) continue, as does the use of market mechanisms in the health service more 
generally. The new Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has called for the repeal of the Act 
and an end to the ‘internal market’ in healthcare, a move welcomed by the British 
Medical Association (Roberts, 2015).   
 
2.1 Introducing Frames of Health Policy and Governance 
 
In this section, I identify the main frames of health policy and governance, some of 
which are reflected in the current reforms and some which are more oppositional. 
The frames were identified over the course of my background research and 
document analysis, which I undertook prior to undertaking the case study research 
in chapter 9. I have also drawn upon previous attempts to apply postpositivist 
analysis to health policy, most notably Kor Grit and Wilfred Dolsfma’s frames50 of 
healthcare reform in the Netherlands. Grit and Dolsfma identify four main frames: 
the ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘medical-professional’ and ‘caring’ frames (Grit and 
Dolfsma, 2002). In my analysis, I identify five main frames. I differentiate between a 
‘market’ and a ‘managerialist’ frame within a broader ‘economic’ frame and 
introduce a ‘progressive’ frame. I also identify frames at a policy level, most notably 
a ‘holistic’ frame and a ‘medical’ frame, which relate to services and treatments. 
Though I haven’t used Grit and Dolsfma’s category of the ‘caring’ frame, it 
resembles my ‘progressive’ frame and ‘holistic’ frame.  
 
I have drawn upon the work of John S. Dryzek and Helen Stevenson to develop a 
‘Coding Scheme’ which serves as an aid to the process of identifying frames. The 
Coding Scheme seeks to capture the essential characteristics of each frame. Each 
frame has a concept of an ideal health system which it seeks to establish, 
constructs certain objects and entities which feature in that ideal system, 
emphasises certain core values and favours specific governance arrangements or 
policy strategies to realise them (see box 1)51.  
 
Box 1 – Coding Scheme  
Ideal healthcare system 
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
Core values  
Governance/policy proposals 
                                                           
50 Grit and Dolsfma use the term ‘discourses’ but their analysis bears clear resemblance to analyses 
of frames. 
51 John S. Dryzek and Helen Stevenson develop and apply a ‘Coding Scheme’ to environmental 
policy and debates (Dryzek, 2013: 17; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014: 41). I keep their category ‘Basic 
entities whose existence is recognised or constructed’, but replace their category ‘Assumptions about 
natural relationships’ with ‘core values’. I also introduce the categories of ‘Core values’ and 




2.2 The Market Frame 
 
A key frame in health debates is the ‘market’ frame. Adherents of this frame 
include some health campaigners; politicians among the Conservative Party and 
New Labour; influential academics, such as Julian Le Grand and Alan Enthoven; 
commercial actors within the healthcare market, including health corporations and 
consultancy firms; and, finally, a range of think-tanks, including centre-left think-
tanks such as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (Ruane, 2010), centrist 
think-tanks such as Civitas and right-wing think-tanks such as Policy Studies and the 
Adam Smith Institute, which advocate for the use of markets in the health service 
(Wellings, 2012). 
 
A central value of the frame is consumer and patient choice. Patient choice is 
considered to be a value in its own right, for patients should have a right to choose 
what health services they receive. One of the problems with the original design of 
the NHS was the power it afforded the medical profession, who were free to 
determine what services patients were provided with. In this way, the frame does 
not have a strong preference for particular services or forms of care at a policy 
level, but rather emphasises that the choice of health services should be 
determined by patients.  
 
A further core value of the frame is efficiency, which is inextricably connected to 
patient choice. In the absence of market mechanisms, health professionals lack an 
incentive to search out and identify effective services and provide them efficiently. 
Introducing patient choice in the context of a plurality of providers should enhance 
efficiency both in terms of x-efficiency and allocative efficiency: greater 
competition will produce efficiency savings, while patient choice, or at least 
decentralising decision-making as close to patients as possible, will ensure that 
appropriate services are produced (Enthoven, 2000; Le Grand, 2003). 
 
The ‘market’ has been highly influential over policy and is clearly reflected in the 
Conservative/Coalition Government’s reforms, in the promotion of patient choice, 
the extension of the purchaser-provider split, increased provider competition and 
the continuation of Monitor’s role as the economic regulator. Nevertheless, there is 
a clear dividing line among certain adherents of the ‘market frame’. New Labour 
and the Conservative Party claim that the use of markets does not risk 
compromising core values associated with the health service, such as universalism, 
equity and comprehensive care. Though this is disputed (see below), the position 
implies an extensive role for policy in funding and regulating the healthcare 
‘market’. This position has been criticised by some pro-market commentators who 
argue that inefficiencies will remain unless more radical market reforms are 
adopted. The group ‘Doctor’s for Reform’, consisting of 500 hospital consultants 
and headed by Professor Karol Sikora, took out a full-page advertisement in the 
Times on the 25th of February 2004, issuing calls for market reforms that would 




The NHS as we know it has had its day. You can fiddle about with it and patch it up, 
but with an ageing population and high-tech healthcare, something has to give. 
Everything else we need today we can get very easily: air travel, holidays, cars. Why 
can’t we get healthcare that easily? The form of funding is the key. To change it is a 
radical step. Politicians are very nervous. But we have to do it if we want a system 
that is focused on the patient and open to innovative ideas (Phillips, 2008: 33) 
 
Proponents of privatisation argue that having patients directly pay for their care, 
either through the use of co-payments or insurance schemes, would provide 
genuine patient choice, improve efficiency and ensure that health professionals 
have to respond to patient choice. This may compromise the health service’s ideals 
of equity and universalism, but the government could still provide a safety net and 
the poor would benefit from the innovation and medical advances which markets 
would stimulate (Pincock, 2004).  
 
Outright privatisation would also ensure that patients are directly accountable for 
their health expenditures. Indeed, adherents of the market frame can also be 
critical of the choices of some individuals. Some people act irresponsibly and make 
choices that are detrimental to their health, causing unnecessary expense to the 
health system. The problem arises because, with health services provided free-at-
the-point-of-use, service-users are not financially accountable for their actions, 
suggesting a possible incentives problem arising in the absence of market 
mechanisms.  
 
In sum, the ‘market’ frame strongly favours the incorporation of markets into the 
health service. In economic terms, the frame clearly draws upon Austrian 
economics and Public Choice Theory which emphasise the superiority of markets 
over other forms of coordination. Markets are believed to be unique in their 
capacity to align incentives and provide signals of what is to be produced, through 
the exercise of consumer choice. The main characteristics of this specifically 
‘market’ frame are outlined in box 2.  
 
Box 2 – The Market Frame  
Ideal health care system 
A health care system that efficiently meets consumer demand 
 
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
Consumers with preferences   
The market in healthcare, pricing and payment mechanisms, market contracts 
Private providers and insurance companies  
Monitor (the economic regulator)  
 
Core values  
Quality of care 
Patient choice/individualism/consumerism 




Utilitarian ethics  
 
Governance/policy proposals 
Markets in healthcare improve efficiency by facilitating competition between 
providers of care 
Empowering consumers enables them to exert influence over providers and 
determine what health services are provided  
This interplay between supply and demand facilitates innovation  
 
2.3 The Managerialist Frame 
 
Besides the various market reforms that have taken place, the reform process has 
involved the incorporation into the health service of a range of managerialist 
mechanisms and a distinct framing can be identified in the arguments for the use of 
these mechanisms.  Adherents of this ‘managerialist’ frame suggest that problems 
in the health service stem from variations in standards and a lack of managerial 
accountability. To improve the system, fully developed performance management 
systems are required in order to provide guidance to health professionals and 
monitor their performance. Furthermore, the data collected through performance 
management can be used for a range of purposes, including choices of provider. In 
this way, managerialist mechanisms can be used as a complement to market 
processes.  
 
While the core values of this ‘managerialist’ frame are quality of care and efficiency, 
managerialism is also promoted as a way to ensure equality and universalism 
through the standardisation of services and an end to the ‘postcode’ lottery in care. 
During the 1990s, New Labour introduced a new, national system of clinical 
governance and regulation. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was 
created which would take charge of approving medical technologies and by 2005 all 
NHS organisations were required to follow the organisation’s recommendations 
(Gottwald and Lansdown, 2014).  
 
Additionally, performance management in the form of targets, star ratings and 
league tables became central to the governance of the health service and the 
system was underpinned by the Commission for Health Improvement, which 
become the Care Quality Commission as of 2009. Further centralising measures 
include National Service Frameworks (NSFs) which laid out treatments and pathway 
configurations for specific conditions and the Quality and Outcomes Framework for 
GPs, which linked pay to performance in line with centrally-defined targets. While 
the Conservative Party has moved away from NSFs and is adopting a policy of 
outcome rather than process evaluation in performance management, many of 
these centralising forces remain. The various Outcomes Frameworks are central to 




The use of managerialist mechanisms in the health service has a number of 
influences. The first is the Evidence-Based Medicine movement, which developed in 
Canada with the Cochrane Collaboration. EBM purportedly represented a “new 
paradigm” in healthcare, which sought to replace “tradition, anecdote and 
theoretical reasoning” in healthcare with evidence-based decision-making 
(Greenhalgh et al., 2014)52. The second is the marketisation of health services in the 
US during the 1980s and 1990s, which saw attempts to apply business process-
engineering to healthcare. In that country, the predominantly market system 
witnessed a huge increase in medical costs during the 1970s and 1980s, which was 
blamed on fee-for-service arrangements that incentivised physicians to carry out 
medical procedures. The government, employers and insurance companies sought 
ways to control costs, coming up with the concept of ‘managed care’: corporate 
entities would manage healthcare through a new structure – the Health 
Maintenance Organisation – which would enable patient pathways to be designed 
and monitored to ensure that the most efficient forms of care were provided 
(Kongstvedt, 2001: 3; see also Kirk, 1997).  
 
Proponents of ‘managed care’ identify a weakness in traditional health systems: an 
over-reliance on professional judgement. The development of information systems 
means that medical decisions can be made by computerised algorithms on the basis 
of “clinically significant subgroups” of patients. Quality is purportedly assured 
because the “fallible human judgement” of the physician gives way to “scientific 
judgement” (Head, 2005: 141).  
 
The development of these managerialist mechanisms is potentially significant 
because it suggests that the need for highly skilled medical professionals has been 
overstated and increasingly so. A 2012 article by the Economist entitled ‘Squeezing 
Out the Doctor’ reports increasingly widespread use of computer-based healthcare, 
promoted by global health corporations, McKinsey & Company and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation in the context of international development. The 
process will purportedly improve efficiency, quality and empower patients because 
the role of the physician is side-lined: 
 
Resources are slowly being reallocated. Nurses and other health workers will put 
their training to better use. Devices will bolster care in ways previously unthinkable. 
Doctors, meanwhile, will devote their skill to the complex tasks worthy of their 
highly trained abilities. Doctors may thus lose some of their old standing. But 
patients will clearly win (The Economist, 2012; see also Ehrbeck, 2010). 
 
In sum, as with the ‘market’ frame, the role of the medical profession is 
problematised but the solution to an excessive reliance on professional judgement 
is centralisation through the incorporation of performance management systems. 
In economic terms, the frame is influenced by Taylorism, neoclassical economics 
and public choice theory, emphasising the importance of centralised forms of 
                                                           
52 Though Evidence-Based Medicine has been critical to the development of managerialism, it does 
not necessarily equate to managerialism but it depends upon how research is implemented, as 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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decision-making, clear performance standards, incentives and monitoring 
mechanisms. Additionally, the frame similarly does not have a strong preference for 
particular services or forms of care at a policy level. But where the ‘market’ frame 
emphasises the importance of patient choice, the ‘managerialist’ frame emphasises 
the importance that all interventions and services should be clearly evidence-based 
(see box 3). 
 
Box 3 – the Managerialist Frame  
Ideal health care system 
A health care system that efficiently secures managerial objectives   
 
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
‘Clinically significant subgroups’ of patients 
Performance management systems and protocols 
QANGOs – National Institute for Clinical Excellence, The Care Quality Commission 
 
Core values 
Quality of care 
Efficiency  
Equality/social justice 
Managerial accountability  
 
Governance/policy proposals 
Performance management protocols improve performance by providing clear 
performance standards and incentives for health professionals  
Performance data provides patients, commissioners, managers and regulators 
with the information they require to make effective decisions  
Scientific and economic evaluation techniques can improve decision-making   
 
2.4 The Progressive/Holistic Frame 
 
As we saw in chapter 1, Third Way thinking has had some influence on health policy 
debates. During the 1990s, Third Way thinkers associated with centre-left think-
tanks such as Demos, IPPR and the New Economics Foundation criticised the 
marketisation of health service and advocated for its reform along more democratic 
lines, including the creation of democratic organisational forms and a reduction in 
performance management. Similarly, today, the Government has criticised what it 
views as New Labour’s excessive reliance on performance management, while its 
use of the term “social market” (DoH, 2010: 51) to describe its market reforms 
resembles Third Way discourse.  
 
The term ‘progressive’ frame can be used to describe these Third Way themes, 
which are clearly distinct from the content of the market and managerialist frames. 
This ‘progressive’ frame emphasises the importance of democratic values and 
citizen and patient involvement in decision-making. Though primarily concerned 
with the governance of health services, the ‘progressive’ frame is closely associated 
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with particular services and forms of care at a policy level: namely, holistic care. A 
distinct ‘holistic’ frame can be identified at a policy level which promotes a 
particular understanding of the subtantive problem of health policy: it is argued 
that ill-health is not just a problem of conditions and diseases, but a lack of 
empowerment, inequality and access to community resources. Rather than treat ill-
health,  health services should promote health in a positive sense. Once again, the 
‘holistic’ frame features in the Government’s reforms, as its reforms seek to 
facilitate the development of more holistic forms of care in public health and 
primary care.  
 
Adherents of this ‘holistic’ frame have advocated for a greater role of public health 
in the health service to tackle the “social determinants” of health, including social 
inequalities, the physical environment, social relationships and opportunity 
(Greenhalgh, 2009). Furthermore, while recognising that the role of the medical 
profession has been problematic, adherents of the ‘holistic’ frame do not promote 
patient choice but a qualitative change in the doctor-patient relationship through 
initiatives such as ‘patient-centred care’, ‘expert patient initiative’ and ‘co-
production’ in health (Hardy, 2004; Slay, 2013; NESTA, 2013). Improved 
relationships between doctors and patients are said to be important because 
patients are more likely to comply with treatment, overcoming part of the 
incentives-issue in healthcare. Additionally, the quality of health services improves 
because both the doctor and patient are “two experts”: 
 
When the contribution of each participant is recognised, the consultation becomes 
relationship centred, and the main purpose is to create a meeting that is 
informative, receptive, facilitative, medically functional and participatory (Realpe 
and Wallace, 2010: 12) 
 
Besides clearly featuring in the Government’s reforms, the frame is apparent in the 
controversy over NICE’s decision to reduce the threshold for the use of ‘statins’ in 
the treatment of obesity, with critics arguing the decision has effectivelly 
“medicalised” healthy people (Boseley, 2014b). While there is singificant debate 
within the medical profession over the use of pharmacological therapies in 
healthcare (Abramson et al., 2013; Godlee, 2014a; Godlee, 2014b), adherents of 
the ‘holistic’ frame promote exercise and health eating as a way to solve the 
problem of obesity, whether delivered at a public health or a primary care level. 
Such interventions purportedly improve medical outcomes through improved body 
fat and cholesterol profiles; but also facilitate holistic outcomes, such as wellbeing 
and empowerment (Bot and Unachukwu, 2014). 
 
In sum, the ‘progressive’ frame has strong implications for debates at the level of 
policy and governance. In economic terms, the emphasis on relationships aligns the 
frame with the ‘old’ institutionalism of thinkers such as Karl Polanyi. At the level of 
governance, the frame promotes local forms of accountability and democracy to 
align incentives and improve decision-making. At the level of policy, the frame 
promotes ‘holistic’ forms of care in primary care and public health. Decisions should 
be arrived at through deliberation between physicians, patients and local 
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communities, rather than planning on the basis of need, managerial directives or 
consumer choices (see box 4).  
 
Box 4 – the Progressive Frame  
Ideal healthcare system 
A locally-based healthcare system that provides patient-centred, ‘holistic’ care 
and public health 
 
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
Human beings with rights, needs and preferences/opinions  
Local communities and democratic organisations  
Relationships between physicians and patients  
Wider “social determinants” of health 
 
Core values  





Community involvement in healthcare ensures that organisations operate in the 
public interest and that local solutions are identified that meet local needs  
Patient-centred care is important because it improves patient compliance and 
patients are also a vital source of knowledge in the clinical encounter  
Holistic forms of care promote broader health outcomes such as wellbeing and 
empowerment 
 
2.5 The Medical-Professional/Medical Frame 
 
A further frame which can be identified in health policy debates is the ‘medical-
professional’ frame (Grit and Dolfsma, 2002). Indeed, a unique feature of the policy 
area is the presence of a relatively homogenous collective of actors which together 
make up the medical profession. Its adherents share a belief that professional 
judgement and skills are vital in the provision of care. Health professionals acquire 
knowledge and skills through years of training, after which they become fully-
fledged members of the profession. Only then can they deliver good quality health 
services. A corollary of this is that others lack the knowledge and skills to deliver 
healthcare. Patients lack knowledge of their conditions and thus require 
professional help, but so too can other stakeholders, such as managers and 
policymakers. In this way, the ‘medical-professional’ frame alludes to widespread 
information asymmetries in healthcare. 
 
The ‘medical-professional’ frame contrasts sharply with the above frames. 
Adherents of the ‘market’, ‘managerialist’ and ‘progressive’ frames in different 
ways seek to reduce reliance on professional judgement: encouraging consumer, 
evidence-based decision-making and patient empowerment respectively. Yet the 
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‘medical-professional’ frame provides a counterpoint. Its adherents point to 
problems which arise if professionalism is side-lined (Starr, 2009: 27). Indeed, given 
the complexity of healthcare, there is always a danger that patients, managers or 
clinical guidelines/computer algorithms make a wrong diagnosis and select a wrong 
treatment.   
 
Nevertheless, the frame is consistent with a range of governance and policy 
positions. At a policy level, it is closely associated the ‘medical’ understanding of 
illness and treatments which can itself be conceptualised as a ‘medical’ frame. The 
frame assumes that humans have needs, of which the preeminent need is health. 
Illness and disease pose threats to human life and the overarching purpose of 
health services is to extend life by treating and curing illnesses and disease (Wade, 
2009). Yet, while this ‘policy’ frame is closely associated with ‘medical-professional’ 
frame, medical services do not necessarily require professionals to deliver them; 
the key for the ‘medical-professional’ frame is that the medical profession retains a 
prominent position in the health service and are free to define and deliver medical 
services.   
 
The ‘medical-professional’ frame is not aligned with any particular type of care, 
whether public health, primary care or secondary care. Yet services and forms of 
care have to be clearly evidence-based and have demonstrable impacts upon 
individuals’ health. On this basis, the profession has found many ‘holistic’ forms of 
care wanting (Bakx, 1991). Nevertheless, though adherents of the ‘medical-
professional’ frame assert the importance of evidence, there is some concern 
within the profession that Evidence-Based Medicine is often implemented in such a 
way as to undermine professional judgement, resulting in poor quality care:  
 
Today EBM is a loaded gun at clinicians’ heads. ‘You better do as the evidence says’ 
it hisses, leaving no room for discretion or judgment. EBM is now the problem, 
fueling overdiagnosis and overtreatment (Goswami, 2014) 
 
Similarly, there is some concern over the emergence of the algorithm based models 
of care promoted by adherents of the ‘managerialist’ frame. Algorithms 
purportedly direct the “gaze” of physicians away from embodied patients to their 
“physiology and chemistry”, directing the “flow and purpose of an encounter that 
once unfolded organically according to the particular needs of the patient” 
(Loxterkamp, 2013). There is a danger that physicians, under pressure to make 
efficiency savings, will simply respond to computerised aids and no longer 
“understand the total dimensions of a patient’s needs” (Ludmerer, 2005: 384; see 
also Groopman, 2001).  
 
The combination of markets and managerialism is also said to have an uneasy 
relationship with the on-going development of medical knowledge. Medical training 
and practice requires on-the-job learning (Annandale, 1989; Navarro, 1988). Yet the 
process of marketisation, which has involved the creation of multiple organisations, 
has led to an increasing detachment of medical teaching and training from the 
delivery of care, while hospitals have outsourced many of the basic services that 
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are required for training purposes. Furthermore, the algorithm model of care has 
meant that patients are admitted to hospital with their diagnosis made and their 
treatment plans already determined, making it harder for “learners to acquire 
problem-solving skills”(Ludmerer, 2005: 358).  
 
Such hostility to markets and managerialism, though certainly not shared by all 
health professionals, is significant and resonates with Marxist criticisms of 
Taylorism and scientific management (Braverman, 1998). Medical work, like craft 
work, is viewed as a highly skilled activity which requires the full immersion of 
individuals into the profession which is understood along the lines of syndicate or 
guild (see box 5).  
 
Box 5 – The Medical-Professional Frame  
Ideal health care system 
A healthcare system which produces high quality care that is defined and 
delivered by professionals 
 
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
Patients with needs  
Medical professionals and professional bodies 
Healthcare treatments and procedures  
 
Core values  




Governance arrangements should be designed to ensure maximum autonomy 
and discretion among health professionals for only they possesses the knowledge 
and expertise necessary for the delivery of good quality care  
The desire to do a good job is sufficient to ensure health professionals work in 
their patients’ interest  
Scientific evaluation techniques can aid decision-making but should not replace 
professional judgement  
 
2.6 The Political Frame 
 
The final frame I identify is the ‘political’ frame. This frame is shared by health 
campaigners, health professionals and political actors who assert the rights of 
individuals to healthcare and defend the original design of the health service. The 
original model, which lasted between 1948 and 1989 when the ‘internal market’ 
was created, is said to be uniquely capable of realising universal, public health 
ideals. However, the model has been systematically undermined by repeated 
marketisation policies enacted by first the Conservatives, then New Labour and 
now the Conservative/Coalition Government. It is argued that these attempts of 
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the main political parties to construct a market in healthcare is not evidence-based 
and does not have a democratic mandate (Leys and Player, 2011; Pollock, 2005).  
 
Adherents of the frame include members of the National Health Action Party 
(NHAP), a single-issue party set up by Dr Richard Taylor and Dr Clive Peedell in the 
aftermath of the Health and Social Care Act to “save the NHS”. Other key figures 
include Julian Tudor Hart, a retired GP and prominent health campaigner, Allyson 
Pollock, professor of public health research at Queen Mary University of London, 
and Colin Leys, of Goldsmith’s College. Pollock and many other researchers also 
contribute to the academic journal Radical Statistics, which has provided detailed 
statistical analyses and critiques of Conservative and New Labour policy on the NHS 
since the 1980s (Macfarlane, 2014; Radical Statistics, 1989). Furthermore, a number 
of activist websites and blogs publish regular critiques of NHS policy, including 38 
Degrees and False Economy. The ‘political’ frame sets the terms of discussions at 
public meetings and is apparent in the formal and informal publications of these 
individuals and groups.  
 
Central to the ‘political’ frame is a belief that access to the highest quality 
healthcare should be guaranteed as a right. Campaigners draw upon language of 
‘needs’ and ‘rights’: human beings ‘need’ healthcare, regardless of whether they 
have a preference for it or have the money to buy it. Because of this, the state 
ought to provide citizens with healthcare as a right (Anand and Wailoo, 2000). It is 
the responsibility of political actors to provide citizens with comprehensive care of 
the highest quality care over the life-course. As a right, care is to be provided 
universally and free-at-the-point-of-use, embodying other values such as equality 
and social solidarity.  
 
Establishing care as a right is also said to be uniquely efficient because it means that 
health organisations operate solely for the purposes of providing healthcare rather 
than having to compete for contracts, charge patients or contact insurance bodies 
to collect fees. In this way, an entire tier of non-medical personnel is rendered 
superfluous by direct public administration (Hart, 2006: 205). It is this which is 
taken to explain the relatively low health expenditures on the NHS relative to the 
American market model or mixed European systems:  
 
No other Western country could match its costs, largely because no other country 
had so radically eliminated market mechanisms within the system (Pollock, 2005a) 
 
This point anticipates Transaction Cost Economics and the concept that some goods 
and services are too complex to be delivered through market mechanisms, 
requiring extensive administrative and contractual activity. However, the efficiency 
potential of the public sector is also said to stem from the very different 
motivations present in healthcare ‘markets’, including professional and altruistic 
orientations (Brindle, 2007). Some accounts correspond to Karl Polanyi’s notion of a 
‘gift economy’. Julian Tudor Hart suggests the health service can have a “civilising 
influence” on society, connecting people who pay for it, use it and work in it 




Finally, adherents of the frame emphasise the importance of developed systems of 
data collection in decision-making. While this resembles the ‘managerialist’ frame, 
the content and purpose of data collection systems differ for the two frames. 
Whereas for the ‘managerialist’ frame data is collected for the purposes of 
performance management, for the ‘political’ frame it is collected for the purposes 
of planning services and for holding governments to account (Macfarlane, 1994; 
Radical Statistics, 1989). 
 
The Critique of Marketisation and Privatisation  
 
A central feature of the ‘political’ frame is its critique of the marketisation and 
privatisation of the NHS, which are viewed as intimately connected. Privatisation, 
referring not only to the use of private providers to deliver health services but to 
charges for services, is said to be inevitable because of the inefficiency of market 
mechanisms in healthcare. Where the original NHS was hierarchically integrated, 
marketisation has involved the introduction of a purchaser-provider split and 
creation of financially and legally separate organisations within the health service 
which operate on a competitive basis. While adherents of the ‘market’ frame 
promote these reforms on efficiency-based grounds, for adherents of the ‘political’ 
frame the process has greatly increased inefficiency and ultimately taken money 
away from patient-care. The market system, for its critics, is “an unaffordable 
ideological luxury” (Paton, 2014a). 
 
While some services, such as dentistry, geriatric care and adult social care, have 
already been privatised (Ruane, 1997), the continued development of the market 
system under the Health and Social Care Act (2011) is said to pave the way for 
further privatisation, as legal duties upon the Secretary of State to provide 
comprehensive services have been removed (Pollock and Price, 2013a).  
 
A further issue is the structure of the commissioning bodies now in charge of a 
large proportion of the NHS budget, Clinical-Commissioning Groups (see above). It 
is argued that CCGs are incompatible with the values and objectives of a national 
health service. Whereas PCTs, their forerunners, operated on a geographical-basis – 
and were legally responsible for the citizens residing in their areas – CCGs are 
responsible only for their members, who become members by virtue of their 
membership of GP practices. This poses the question of what is to happen to 
people who are not members of a GP practice. Homeless people, migrants and 
anyone else who are not in the system may find it difficult to access health services. 
Additionally, new found freedoms to determine how resources are spent will result 
in decisions being made on cost considerations and older people or people with 
complex conditions may find it increasingly difficult to access care (Pollock and 
Price, 2013b). Far from facilitating patient choice, the bill facilitates “provider 
choice of patients … to pick and choose the profitable cases and discard the rest” 
(Pollock, 2014). What is more, the process of marketisation has unsettled systems 
of data collection such that the scale of the health problems resulting from the 




In sum, the ‘political’ frame is strongly committed to public administration and 
ownership, viewing the arrangement as uniquely capable of realising core values 
associated with the health service, including quality of care, equity, efficiency and 
comprehensive coverage. Marketisation has compromised these core values and 
makes it almost inevitable that access to good quality health care will be 
determined more and more by the ability of people to pay due to the inefficiency of 
markets in healthcare and increased financial pressures (Ali and Pollock, 2015). 
Nevertheless, though hostile to markets, the frame is less concerned with other 
questions of governance, such as the role of performance management. Like the 
market and managerialist frames, moreover, the frame is not concerned with the 
relative balance between medical and holistic care at a policy level. However, its 
adherents do argue that NHS Hospitals are being undermined by market policies 
and emphasise the importance of publicly-owned and administered hospitals in the 
provision of care (see box 6). 
 
Box 6 – the Political Frame  
Ideal healthcare system 
Entirely public healthcare system, with services provided free-at-the-point-of-use 
 
Basic entities whose existence is recognised or constructed 
The State/Department of Health  
Citizens and populations with rights and needs 
 
Core values  
Human rights  
Equality and social solidarity  




Public ownership and administration is uniquely capable of delivering efficient 
and effective healthcare through savings on administration and marketing  
Pro-social motivations and sense of professionalism ensure that the healthcare 
system operates effectively in the absence of market mechanisms 
Nationally-based data sets provide the information that is required to plan 
services and hold decision-makers to account  
 
3.1 Comparing and Contrasting the Framings  
 
Where the above section identified and analysed various frames in health policy 
debates, the current section compares and contrasts them. I utilise the two figures 





Figure 1 presents a diagram of different forms of ownership and administration. 
The frames support different points of the Figure. As we saw, the ‘political’ frame is 
strongly aligned with domain 1, claiming that only direct public ownership and 
administration can realise both efficiency and equity. The reform process has 
incorporated the use of market mechanisms, whether via the commercialisation of 
public organisations or the direct use of the private sector, taking the health service 
firmly into domain (2) of the diagram. Additionally, Foundation Trusts, which 
remain in the public sector, have enlarged freedoms to sell services to private 




Source: adapted from Klein, 1984 
 
The ‘market’, ‘managerialist’ and ‘progressive’ frames have influenced and justified 
the direction of policy from (1) to (2) and (3). Though managerialism could be 
practiced in an entirely public sector context – and thus is not aligned with a 
domain in the graph – it is a combination of the ‘market’ and ‘managerialist’ frames 
that have informed the claim that  markets can be governed for public aims and 
objectives. The use of markets – and the use of mutuals and social enterprises, for 
the ‘progressive’ frame – is said to improve the performance of the system in terms 
of a range of efficiency and patient-centred criteria, while at the same time 
safeguarding the organisation’s founding ideals.  
 
The assumption that marketisation is compatible with public health ideals is fiercely 
challenged by adherents of the ‘political’ frame. They view marketisation as a 
process, with privatisation an end result of the process. First provider and 
commissioner units are set up to operate in a commercial basis – (2) and (3) – and 
then the privatisation of finance follows (4), in part due to the inefficiencies of 
markets in healthcare. Though some services will always be available for free, 
particularly those where there is a clear economic case for the NHS to provide 
them; access to free and comprehensive care is no longer a right and access to the 
highest quality of care will only be available for those who can pay for them. The 




A further debate is apparent regarding the scale of decision-making and the use of 
different forms of incentives, which arise whatever ownership arrangements are in 




The current system corresponds mostly to point C, in a combination of the 
‘managerialist’ and ‘market’ frames: clinical guidelines are set centrally and a 
variety of managerial and market incentives are deployed in order to facilitate 
performance. Of course, not all decisions are made centrally. Current arrangements 
exhibit elements of point C and A: professionals operate in a managed context but 
there remains some scope for professional judgement and expertise. Furthermore, 
through patient choice, some decisions have been decentralised to patients, point 
D on the Figure. However, as we saw, some adherents of the ‘market’ frame 
criticise the extent that current arrangements can facilitate patient choice, calling 
for more outright privatisation. These criticisms are countered, in different ways, by 
adherents of the ‘medical-professional’ and ‘progressive’ frames, who question 
whether patient choice is appropriate in healthcare.  
 
The ‘medical-professional’ frame is mostly aligned with point B of the figure, which 
corresponds to the original design of the health system, whereby decisions are 
decentralised in a professional context53. The frame is associated with a critique of 
patient choice and managerialism, for interfering with professional judgement and 
expertise. In similar ways, the ‘progressive’ frame favours decentralisation, arguing 
                                                           
53 That decision-making can be decentralised in public sector contexts is not always recognised. 
Often, the original NHS is criticised as being a highly centralised, bureaucratic organisation, but 
policy is in many respects more centralised today than it has ever been (Harrison et al., 2002). Even 
critics of privatisation equate decentralisation in healthcare with privatisation, as if lessoning central 
policy control automatically equates to a removal of government responsibility for the healthcare 
needs of the population (Mills et al., 1990; Saltman et al., 2006). In fact, due to the absence of 
insurance companies, public systems appear to afford health professionals the most autonomy in their 
work and are thus highly decentralised in this sense (Light, 2003). 
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that patients (supported by medical professionals) and local communities should be 
free to define the health services they receive. Yet there remains a question mark 
over the precise governance arrangements through which the ‘holistic’ and 
‘patient-centred’ care sought by progressives may be achieved. 
 
4.1 Concluding Remarks  
 
The present chapter outlined the Conservative/Coalition Government’s recent 
reforms of the health service, before going onto identify the various frames in 
health debates on health policy and governance. The Government’s reforms seek to 
improve the performance of the health service, exhibiting a range of market, 
managerialist and progressive elements. One objective is to facilitate more ‘holistic’ 
forms of care by decentralising decision-making to GPs in primary care and local 
authorities in public health. However, as we have seen, the use of markets 
continues to be contentious and NICE’s decision to lower the threshold at which 
people are offered statins has invited criticisms that pharmacological therapies are 
overused by the health service. Questions remain over the appropriateness of the 
Government’s combination of policy tools. While the final chapter evaluates the 
Government’s reforms through a focus on diabetes, it is necessary first to examine 




Chapter 8: The NHS and its Reform 2 – Evaluation and 
Evidence in NHS reform 
The level of contestation in debates on the topic of NHS reform necessitates a 
thorough examination of the evidence. My purpose in the present chapter is to 
explore the evidence on the various policy tools and governance approaches 
deployed to enhance the performance of the health service. In the process, I 
critically analyse the forms of evaluation which feature in health policy and 
governance, further making a case for a postpositivist focus on coordination. But I 
also arrive at some tentative answers to the questions posed by the debates in the 
previous chapter. 
 
At a governance level, clinical governance and performance management appear to 
have clear potential to improve performance, on the proviso that guidelines and 
performance indicators have been defined correctly and that professionals have the 
requisite resources to implement them. Nevertheless, this only begs the question of 
how guidelines and indicators have been defined and the appropriateness of the 
evidence used in the process. A key issue is the increasing dominance of Evidence-
Based Medicine. I explore criticisms of Evidence-Based Medicine which suggest that 
decisions will be distorted if made on the basis of the evidence alone. There is 
significant concern that dominant methods of appraisal overstate the value of 
drugs, or pharmacological therapies. 
 
The benefits of marketisation are far more uncertain. A number of literature 
reviews suggest that the market reform of the health service has had few 
discernible benefits and few discernible costs. Nevertheless, there is strong 
evidence for the claim of adherents of the ‘political’ frame that hierarchically-
integrated public health systems have a special claim on efficiency and equity due 
to savings from administration and contractual activity. Yet questions remain 
regarding the precise organisation and governance of health services. There is a 
need for more detailed, qualitative and postpositivist research in the evaluation of 
policy and governance.  
 
The first section presents the dominant model of health policy and governance 
evaluation in ‘health technology research’ and ‘health services research’ 
respectively. The second section explores the debates over the quality of health 
technology research, where a number of criticisms are explored which suggest 
dominant methods have the potential to distort decision-making. Some of these 
criticisms are themselves firmly evidence-based, while others take the form of 
theoretical critiques.  
 
The third section explores the evidence on clinical guidance and performance 
management, while the fourth section explores the evidence on marketisation.  
Evaluations in health service research are typically quantitative and focus on x-
efficiency. But this leaves open crucial evaluative questions, namely the quality of 
local level services.  
123 
 
1.1 Evaluation in Health Policy and Governance    
 
Dominant forms of evaluation in health policy and governance are notably 
‘positivist’ and ‘neoclassical’, operating upon similar lines as policy evaluation in 
other areas of policy outlined in chapter 2 and 3. The literature is split between 
health services research and health technology research, which correspond to the 
distinction between governance and policy respectively. Health technology 
research evaluates health interventions such as diagnostic techniques, preventative 
measures such as screening, pharmacological therapies or surgical procedures. 
Health services research, in contrast,  evaluates broader policy tools, such as service 
reorganisations, competition, central guidelines and performance management 
protocols (McPake et al., 2006: 1).  
 
Health technology research is the most developed of the two and is indeed an 
integral component of the Evidence-Based Medicine movement. As in other areas 
of policy, the Randomised-Control Trial (RCT) is considered the “gold standard” of 
primary research and is situated at the top of the an evidence “pyramid” (Ho et al., 
2008) or “hierarchy” (Habour and Miller, 2001). Yet even superior to this is the 
systematic review, which synthesises data from multiple research studies, ideally 
RCTs, in order to provide a more comprehensive evaluation than could ever be the 
case with a single research study. The Cochrane Collaboration provides highly 
influential systematic reviews on health interventions which are used in medical 
and policy decisions (Sackett and Wennberg, 1997). 
 
Nevertheless, these scientific forms of evaluation provide only a partial account of 
the effectiveness of an intervention. The data is typically on health outcomes in a 
quantitative sense, such as mortality and survival rates or disease specific-effects, 
such as a symptom of a disease.  
 
To ascertain whether an intervention is appropriate or desirable requires a 
consideration of its wider cost and benefits. To that end, an influential approach 
has emerged which combines different forms of data to provide a more 
comprehensive evaluation than the typical RCT provides. While clinical data is 
drawn up to ascertain the quantity of life which treatments provide, surveys of 
patients are used to ascertain their effects on quality of life. Patients with a 
condition are asked to indicate where they perceive themselves to be on a utility 
scale between a point below zero, zero and one, where below zero represents a 
situation that is worse than death, zero represents death and one represents 
perfect health. Through this procedure, all conditions, whether mental or physical, 
can be assigned a utility rating, which in turn can be used to evaluate the 
contribution of treatments to quality of life, significantly broadening the criteria 
used in the evaluation of treatments: 
 
By moving away from a purely biological model, the overall concept of health is 
enriched and a need arises to focus on areas such as the individual's ability to 
operate in society, disability, access to health services or the individuals’ subjective 




The combination of the two data sets is used to construct a single measure which 
can be used to compare different treatment options, Quality-Adjusted-Life Years 
(QALY). If clinical data suggests that a treatment contributes ten years of extra life 
but the quality of those extra years scores a 0.5 utility rating, then the treatment 
contributes 5 QALYs. Furthermore, the QALY rating of a treatment can be divided 
by its cost to establish the price of each QALY, providing a further point of 
comparison. The evaluation of treatments in this way enables decisions to take into 
account a variety of criteria, including efficiency, the quality of care (from a medical 
perspective) and the quality of life (from the patient perspective) (Jones, 2012; 
Whitehead and Ali, 2010).  
 
RCTs, systematic reviews and QALY evaluation constitute the main approaches to 
evaluation in health technology research. Yet it is recognised that health policy 
environments are complex and multifaceted, involving patients, health 
professionals, organisations, care pathways, payment systems and governance. The 
expected benefits attached to a treatment may not occur if services are poorly 
designed or medical staff do not have the requisite resources or training. It is here 
where health technology research is complemented by health services research 
(McPake et al., 2006: 1). 
 
Once again, the Cochrane Collaboration has been influential in the development of 
health services research through its Effective Practice and Organisation of Care 
(EPOC) group, which provides guidance for the appraisal of research studies in the 
field (Higgins and Green, 2008). As in other forms of governance evaluation (see 
chapter 2), health services research does not involve Randomised-Control Trials but 
rather forms of observational study. Furthermore, the emphasis is on activities and 
processes rather than outcomes. In certain respects, this is complementary: where 
health technology research evaluates health interventions across a range of health 
and economic criteria, health services research explores the efficiency of health 
services to produce those very interventions (McPake et al., 2006).  
 
However, as discussed in the next section, there is significant concern over the 
quality of the evidence-base at the level of health technology research. Without an 
evaluation of the quality of services and forms of care at this level, evaluations in 
health services research could provide a skewed account of the performance of 
health services in general. Indeed, Kabir Sheikh and colleagues criticise the focus on 
efficiency in health services research, calling it the evaluation of “predetermined 
programmatic solutions” (Sheikh et al., 2011: 4; see also Gilson et al., 2011). In 
what follows, I examine debate over the quality of health services research; the 




2.1 Debates in Health Technology Research  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, clinical governance emerged during the mid-
1990s along with Evidence-based Medicine (EBM). Through the development of 
evidence-based quality standards and performance management protocols, NICE 
would put an end to “postcode prescribing” and spread the adoption of “best 
practices” (NICE, 2008a). However, though this seems innocuous, EBM has 
attracted some fierce criticisms. Some decisions made by NICE on evidence-based 
grounds have provided controversial, most notably the recent controversy 
following NICE’s decision to lower the threshold at which people are offered statins. 
There are a number of criticisms of Evidence-Based Medicine which align with the 
different frames introduced in the previous section. 
 
Indeed, for adherents of the ‘market’ frame, only patient choice or patient choice 
of physician – who in turn choose on their patients’ behalf – should determine what 
types of services and forms of care should be available (Moreira, 2013: 66). This 
‘market’ view opposes the ‘managerialist’ view that the development of evidence-
based guidelines and performance management protocols stands to improve the 
quality of care for patients by ensuring that all professionals adhere to high quality 
performance standards. Others meditate between these two positions, 
emphasising problems with current forms of Evidence-Based Medicine but 
recognising also the need for evidence in decisions.   
 
The Political Frame  
 
Some critics highlight problems with the evidence that is available in the public 
domain. In ways that resonate with the ‘political’ frame, these critics argue that the 
pharmaceutical control of medical research and investment represent significant 
problems for the development of clinical guidelines. Writing in the popular press, 
Ben Goldacre, a practicing GP and campaigner on public health issues, argues that 
pharmaceutical corporations distort and manipulate the research agenda 
(Goldacre, 2009). Likewise, Trisha Greenhalgh, a prominent analyst of EBM in 
academia, has argued that the evidence-based “quality mark” may have been 
“misappropriated and distorted by vested interests” (Greenhalgh et al., 2014: 1).  
 
According to these critics, problems arise because pharmaceuticals are free to 
define what constitutes an illness and determine what treatments are tested, the 
methods used to test them and the outcomes that are measured (Greenhalgh et al, 
2014). Some of the consequences of this are discussed in more detail below, where 
various ‘medical’ and ‘progressive’ criticisms of EBM are explored. A further issue 
relates to the governance of the research process. Following lobbying campaigns 
during the 1970s, pharmaceuticals are not obliged to publish research studies and 
have a clear incentive to withhold negative findings or engage in fraud and 
misconduct when undertaking studies, whether altering, fabricating or omitting 




A number of studies have explored these problems, including comprehensive 
systematic reviews of all of the research carried out on the topic. The research 
findings overwhelmingly suggest that whether or not the pharmaceutical industry 
undertakes or funds research has a significant effect on its quality and/or the 
availability of research findings (Bekelman et al., 2003; Bourgeois et al., 2010;  
Heres et al., 2006; Lexchin et al., 2003). One case study of anti-psychotic drugs 
found that industry-backed publications reported positive results 90% of the time. 
Many publications reached contradictory conclusions when drugs favoured by one 
company were assessed by other companies in head-to-head studies54, resulting in 
an anomaly whereby Drug A (olanzapine) beat Drug B (risperidone), Drug B 
(risperidone) beat Drug C (quetiapine) and Drug C (quetiapine) beat Drug A 
(olanzapine) (Heres et al., 2006).  
 
Further studies have explored the extent that ‘negative’ publications are withheld 
by pharmaceutical companies. In one study the trials of new antidepressant drugs 
registered to the Food and Drug Administration agency in the US were examined, 
finding them to be quite evenly positive and negative: of a total of 74 trials, 36 had 
negative results and 38 had positive results. However, only 3 of the negative results 
were eventually published, in comparison to all but one of the positive results. 
Furthermore, 11 of the negative results were written up and published as “if the 
drug had been a success”, resulting in 3 published negative results and 48 published 
positive results (Goldacre, 2009: 19; see also Turner et al., 2008).  
 
This research implies the presence of a significant information-asymmetry between 
the pharmaceuticals and both physicians and policymakers. Other accounts have 
highlighted the influence of pharmaceutical companies over drug-approval agencies 
and their use of advertising and marketing to influence physicians, the budget for 
which vastly outweighs investment in medical research. A number of policies have 
been proposed to solve this problem, including the nationalisation of the 
pharmaceuticals (Ali and Pollock, 2015); greater involvement of the NHS, as a public 
body, in medical research; or changes to the regulations governing the research 
process to require that all studies are published (Goldacre, 2009)55. 
 
The Medical-Professional/Medical Frame 
 
A further set of criticisms is aligned with the medical profession. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, though many health professionals support the use and practice of 
Evidence-Based Medicine, there are increasingly vocal criticisms of what is 
perceived to be a suppression of professional judgement and expertise.  
Some evidence for the need for professional judgement and expertise in medical 
decision-making comes from the analysis of RCTs themselves. In a paper entitled 
                                                           
54 The development of medical knowledge has meant that traditional treatments are increasingly 
outdated. So-called “second-generation” drugs are increasingly tested against traditional treatments 
and each other in head-to-head studies.   
55 Even the quality of systematic reviews of RCTs, considered to be the ultimate form of evidence by 
the orthodoxy, will be compromised by the bias in favour of positive studies because health 
treatments will receive exaggerated scores (Moher et al., 1998). The quality of economic evaluations 
is also dependent on the quality of the clinical data which underpin them (Cohen et al., 2008).   
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‘Complexity and Contradiction in Clinical Trial Research’, Ralph Horwitz examined 
200 RCTs on 36 topics where contradictory results had been reported. These had 
been put down to methodological deficiencies of the trials or the size of the sample 
sizes. Yet Horwitz found that many of the contradictory results were not down to 
methodological deficiencies, but rather the complexity of healthcare itself. Often, 
slightly different treatments were admitted or different outcomes were analysed. 
Furthermore, some trials had different eligibility criteria and patients could have 
different characteristics and states of health. Contradictory results therefore had 
little to do with methodological rigour but reflect the complex reality of treatments 
in healthcare. For Horwitz, this implies the need for “enhanced flexibility” when 
interpreting and applying data from RCTs to ensure its clinical relevance and 
applicability (Horwitz, 1987). 
 
The implications of Horwitz’s research for EBM are quite profound. Even assuming 
that the best evidence is available, clinical guidelines may still promote the wrong 
treatments due to the idiosyncrasies of each individual case. In healthcare, 
treatments combine with a host of factors which ensure that outcomes are always 
to a certain unpredictable:  
 
…there is uncertainty as to whether any benefits gained (in experiments) can be 
extrapolated to ‘usual’ patients (of all ages, both genders, differing severity of 
disease, having diverse risk factors, assorted co-morbidities or varied socio-
economic status) (Blackwood, 2010: 513) 
 
This does not necessarily entail a rejection of Evidence-Based Medicine but 
necessitates flexibility in the design of clinical guidelines and certainly performance 
management protocols, which risks closing down the scope for professional 
judgement. Nawab Qizilbash praises the evidence-based medicine movement 
where it supports professionals, but highlights the “grey zones of practice” where 
the evidence is incomplete, contradictory or irrelevant to specific cases. Under such 
circumstances, there is no substitute for clinical reasoning, with its “reliance on 
experience, analogy and extrapolation” (Qizilbash et al., 2008: 5; see also 
Groopman, 2001; Head, 2005; Meldrum, 2000)56. 
 
Where these concerns mostly relate to the extrapolation of research findings from 
clinical trials to practical environments, there is also some relevant methodological 
debate regarding ‘preventative medicine’. Indeed, with the development of medical 
knowledge, medical advances no longer entail the eradication of diseases, or even 
significant advances in their management, as with the case of insulin for diabetes or 
                                                           
56 In philosophical terms, these arguments resonate with realist criticisms of positivist understandings 
of science. Realists emphasise the artificial nature of scientific experimentation and the simplicity of 
positivist conceptions of causality, which proceed along the lines of David Hume’s law: A caused B 
so when A occurs B occurs. For realists, scientific experiments are akin to “closed systems” which 
enable researchers to control and manipulate variables in order to establish cause/effect relationships. 
Yet these relationships may not arise in the “open systems” of the real world because additional 
mechanisms can complicate them, preventing the cause from activating the effect. For realists, 
scientific hypotheses that have been verified in experiments do not pertain to positivist laws but refer 
to tendencies which may or may not occur in the real world (Bhaskar, 2008). 
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antiretroviral therapy for HIV. Increasingly, preventative medicine is advocated in 
order to identify and manage conditions and diseases in their infancy. Proponents 
argue the approach will improve health outcomes and save money in the context of 
increasing lifestyle conditions and an aging populations (Russell, 1993). 
 
However, critics argue that medical care is reaching a nadir. The only new therapies 
are pharmacological therapies which are replacement treatments, with clinical 
trials evaluating which treatment out of different treatments (as with the case of 
head-to-head studies), or which combination of treatments, produces minor health 
gains. Only marginal gains can be expected in the prevention and management of 
conditions, in what is a “near saturated therapeutic field” (Greenhalgh et al., 2014: 
2).  
 
There are two versions of this criticism. Advocates of ‘holistic’ care, discussed in 
more detail below, argue that the so-called ‘biomedical model’ of healthcare has 
become a victim of its own success, prompting the need for alternative forms of 
care (Duerden et al., 2013). But some medical professionals are also critical of the 
use of drugs in preventative medicine. Writing from a medical perspective, Dr David 
Sackett criticises what he calls the “arrogance of preventative medicine” which has 
as its target “symptomless individuals”. This, according to Sackett, is entirely 
different to “curative” medicine which is delivered to “symptomatic patients who 
seek healthcare”:  
 
…the 2 disciplines are absolutely and fundamentally different in their obligations 
and implied promises to the individuals whose lives they modify (Sackett, 2002: 363) 
 
A key controversy over preventative medicine is the use of increasingly precise 
outcome measures in clinical trials. Health interventions can be evaluated across a 
range of health outcomes, including the so-called ‘hard endpoints’ of mortality and 
survival rates, as well as the more precise and detailed measures of disease-specific 
outcomes and clinical effects. An even more precise measure of outcome is 
biomarkers or surrogate outcome measures, which are risk factors for 
complications. The rise of long-term conditions has meant that surrogate outcomes 
are increasingly central to healthcare: examples include cholesterol levels in heart 
disease, blood pressure levels in hypertension and blood glucose levels in diabetes.  
 
In preventative medicine, treatments are often evaluated in terms of their effects 
on surrogate outcomes alone. It is argued that evaluations across ‘hard endpoints’ 
are unnecessary, taking many years to complete at great cost and ultimately 
resulting in poor quality health care because existing and less effective drugs and 
treatments will continue to be prescribed. Furthermore, many drugs – particularly 
those developed from older generations of drugs – have a well-established 
molecular structure and mechanism of action. With a clear theoretical 
understanding of the causal chain between intervention and health gains in the 
long-term, it is less important for clinical trials to evaluate treatments in terms of 
hard endpoints and researchers can instead focus on disease-specific outcomes and 




However, the evaluation of treatments in terms of surrogate outcomes alone has 
caused significant controversy amongst the medical profession for the simple 
reason that improvements across surrogates do not necessarily translate into 
improved health outcomes. Some drugs and treatments that improve surrogate 
outcomes are poorly correlated with actual health outcomes, even detrimental to 
them (D’Agostino, 2000; Fleming and DeMets, 1996; Psaty et al., 1999). There have 
been some high profile cases where drugs have been approved on the basis of 
surrogate evaluations alone, only to be withdrawn from the market when 
subsequent research has shown them to be harmful (box 1).   
 
Box 1 – The Use of Surrogates in Medical Research 
Drug  Outcomes  
Estrogen-
progestin  
Initially marketed as a preventative drug for coronary heart 
disease (CHD) amongst postmenopausal women because of 
its positive effect on lipoprotein levels – a surrogate for CHD 
– a subsequent research trial found that the drug did not 
reduce coronary events in the long-term and increased 
thromboembolic events and gallbladder disease (Hulley et 
al., 1998). 
Doxazosin Doxazosin was marketed as a possible solution for 
hypertension because of its capacity to lower blood pressure 
levels. But a subsequent research trial linked the drug to 
increased stroke and cardiovascular disease (Psaty and 
Pahor, 2000). 
Rosiglitazone  Rosiglitazone was marketed for the use in Type 2 diabetes 
because of its capacity to reduce HbA1c – a measure of 
blood glucose which is a surrogate for diabetes 
complications. However, the drug was banned in Europe and 
limited in the US when a subsequent research trial linked it 
to increased cardiovascular mortality (Nissen and Wolski, 
2007). 
 
The criticism of the use of surrogates is not restricted to health technology research 
but is also relevant to their use in the commercial marketing of drugs and 
performance management protocols, where they are increasingly used as 
indicators of health service outcomes and influence the remuneration of health 
professionals (Greenhalgh, 1997; Weston, 2008). The issue is a central controversy 
in diabetes care where blood glucose is used in the evaluation of policy at all levels 
of decision-making, as discussed in the next chapter.  
 
The Progressive/Holistic Frame 
 
The ‘progressive’ and ‘holistic’ frames are also present in the debate on the quality 
of health technology research in general and the use of pharmacological therapies 
in particular. Part of the problem with pharmacological therapies is that drugs are 
approved for treatment for singular conditions and diseases, both in terms of their 
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cost and health effects. But the effects of different combinations of drugs are rarely 
evaluated, either scientifically or economically. In the context of aging populations 
and comorbidities, which are increasingly the norm, the result is polypharmacy, 
whereby individuals are provided with multiple drugs for the different conditions 
they have. But drugs have side-effects and these are likely to increase when 
multiple drugs are used, resulting in health complications and increased cost 
(Duerden et al., 2013; Munger, 2010). 
 
While this would imply that dominant forms of appraisal overstate the value of 
pharmacological therapies, advocates of ‘holistic’ care argue that lifestyle 
interventions, such as diet and exercise, Alternative and Complementary Medicine 
(CAM) and holistic forms of public health are disadvantaged by dominant forms of 
economic and scientific appraisal.  
 
Part of the problem is that medical research side-lines patient expectations and 
experiences of care. In scientific experiments, ‘blinding’ procedures seek to reduce 
the impact of patient expectations because patients do not know if they are taking 
a drug or a placebo. Placebos, for their part, are deployed negatively, as a stand in 
for no-effect (Gensini et al., 2005). Additionally, scientific experiments are 
standardised in order to control the effects of atypical patient characteristics, 
doctor-patient relationships and medical environments, such that outcomes can be 
attributed to treatments alone.  
 
Yet these factors have a significant effect on treatment outcomes. How people 
perceive their treatments significantly effects how they respond, both 
psychologically and physiologically (Barrett et al., 2006: 181). Holistic interventions 
such as diet and exercise required significant input from patients. While highly 
motivated people can significantly change around their obesity and Type 2 diabetes 
through diet and exercise alone, scientific forms of evaluation will not pick up upon 
this because they are designed to factor out the subjectivity of patients. 
Additionally, the emphasis on quantification will not capture the full benefits of 
holistic interventions between outcomes are “often indirect and may be 
intangible”: 
 
This would include, for example, fulfilling one’s potential in life, and increasing 
personal confidence and self-esteem. Qualitative research with patients who have 
used some form of CAM suggests that they may experience an array of less tangible 
beneﬁts, such as a sense of personal empowerment, greater control of one’s 
condition, enhanced ‘energy’ and opportunities to explore a broader range of 
‘causes’ of ill health. Such aspects of health gain are harder to capture through 
quantitative measures (Hollinghurst et al., 2008: 48)57 
 
                                                           
57 Alternative methods have been developed, called “pragmatic trials”. These combine quantitative 
and qualitative methods and explore what works, under what circumstances and for different types of 




A similar debate is apparent in public health. The field itself is divided into ‘medical’ 
public health and ‘holistic’ public health. Marni Sommer and colleagues describe a 
100 year “struggle to define the mandate for public health – a struggle that has 
consumed the field since the early years of the twentieth century” and which poses 
a question of method: “the question of whether public health, as a science, can also 
promote fundamental social, economic and political reforms” (Sommer and Parker, 
2013: 21). For adherents of ‘medical’ public health, interventions must be clearly 
evidence-based and have a clear impact on individuals’ health. Broader forms of 
public health intervention purportedly “stray too far from sober assessment of 
scientific facts and runs the risk of constituting naked political advocacy”, which 
ultimately undermines the credibility of the profession and its influence over policy 
(Goldberg, 2012; see also Rothstein, 2002).  
 
For adherents of ‘holistic’ public health, in contrast, the turn to science has resulted 
in a retreat from political issues which affect health, such as poverty, inequality, 
sexism and racism (Fairchild et al., 2010: 58). Furthermore, health is affected by a 
range of “physical, social, cultural and historical aspects of context” (McLaren and 
Hawe, 2005). To tackle these factors requires multiple interventions, but RCTs are 
unable to accommodate this complexity and ultimately reinforce an individual 
approach (Baum, 1998).  
 
The criticisms of Evidence-Based Medicine and in particular health technology 
research presented in this chapter are significant because they suggest that medical 
and policy decisions may be distorted to the extent that they rely on evidence 
alone. The ‘political’ frame emphasises the incentives which pharmaceuticals have 
in withholding negative trial data and only publishing data which paints their 
products in a positive light. In different ways, the ‘medical-professional’ frame and 
‘progressive’ frame question the capacity of dominant methods of evaluation to 
provide a fair and comprehensive evaluation of all policy options. There is 
widespread concern that pharmacological therapies are overused in contemporary 
medical practice and part of the problem appears to be dominant forms of scientific 
and economic evaluation. Professor George Lewith has argued that the dominance 
of Evidence-Based Medicine represents an “institutional bias” in the NHS in favour 
of pharmacological therapy (HC, 2013: 4; see also Jenkins, 2001).  
 
3.1 Debates in Health Services Research  
 
The significant problems with dominant approaches to health technology appraisal 
underline the importance of in-depth qualitative research into stakeholders’ 
framings of the choices between different policy options, services and treatments 
available at a local level. But the level of detail that is required is lacking in health 
technology research and health services research also does not address this 
question of the appropriateness of interventions; rather, it assumes that the 
content of clinical guidelines and performance management protocols have been 
defined correctly. In what follows, I explore evaluations in health services research 






3.2 The Evidence on Clinical Guidance  
 
One strand of evaluations in health services research is ‘Translation Science’ or 
‘Implementation Science’ which compares the activities of health professionals, 
healthcare organisations and even entire health systems with the best practices 
embedded in clinical guidelines. This purportedly enables the identification of 
variations or “evidence-practice gaps” which expose healthcare systems to 
“unnecessary expenditure resulting in significant opportunity costs” (Grimshaw et 
al., 2012: 1; see also Grol, 2001). Thus, Trevor Sheldon and colleagues evaluate the 
impact of NICE guidance through a prospective observational study which is entirely 
process-based, focusing on the quality of prescribing before and after their 
publication (Sheldon et al., 2004). The NICE website itself includes an entire section 
on similar ‘implementation reports’, including research carried out by NICE and 
stakeholder organisations that assess compliance with NICE guidelines and health 
technology evaluations (HSCIC, 2013; RCS, 2013). 
 
Overwhelmingly, the literature paints a positive view of clinical governance. Clinical 
guidelines in particular appear to be a useful policy tool to enhance the 
performance of individual practitioners and healthcare organisations. However, it is 
recognised that for guidelines to be implemented they need to be appropriately 
funded (such that implementers do not incur costs), clearly evidence-based and 
resonate with the views of health professionals on the ground (Grimshaw and 
Russell, 1993; Grimshaw, 2004; Scott, 2007). Yet there is scope to explore why 
health professions do not always implement guidelines. That the views of 
professionals can conflict with central guidelines prompts questions regarding the 
precise definition of the guidelines. A more in-depth analysis of stakeholders’ 
frames at a local level is required as a complement to these largely quantitative 
studies, particularly when considering the limitations of health technology appraisal 
discussed above.  
 
3.3 The Evidence on Performance Management  
 
Similarly, evaluations of performance management are generally positive of its 
potential to improve the performance of health services. Nicholas Mays provides a 
comprehensive evaluation of performance management in England and observes a 
consensus that the approach can improve performance, provided certain 
conditions are met:    
 
(M)ost experts in performance improvement in public services argue that carefully 
chosen, incentivised targets are a useful part of the performance management 
repertoire when used well (e.g. when sanctions and rewards are proportionate) 





Interestingly, this extends to both process and outcome measures (Mays, 2006: 21), 
suggesting that criticisms of process-oriented performance management of the 
Conservative Party may be misplaced. 
 
The caveat that performance management indicators have to be “carefully chosen” 
highlights the epistemological challenge of acquiring the requisite information to 
define the indicators. As has been noted previously, there is a significant literature 
on the unintended and undesirable consequences of performance management in 
health services research (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2006; Ann et al., 2009; 
Propper et al., 2008). Yet even here the emphasis is on refining the approach rather 
than rejecting it outright (Bevan and Hood, 2006: 533), suggesting the 
epistemological challenge is not insurmountable.  
 
Nevertheless, given that indicators may not always be appropriate, detailed 
empirical research is required to establish whether the correct indicators have been 
choice. This is more important than in the case of clinical guidelines. For 
performance management is linked to incentives such that professionals can be 
financially penalised for working in the interests of patients if policymakers have 
selected an inappropriate indicator. Yet the quantitative, x-efficiency forms of 
evaluation do not provide a level of detail that is required to address this question 
of the appropriateness of performance indicators.  
 
An example of this issue is provided by Melanie Calvert and colleagues, who 
evaluate the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF)58. In a retrospective study, 
Calvert and colleagues evaluate the QOF by assessing its impact on the quality of 
diabetes services, where data is available on various activities, processes and 
‘surrogate’ outcome measures related to diabetes care: most notably, checks for 
blood glucose and achievement on blood glucose levels (a ‘surrogate’ outcome, for 
reductions in blood glucose are assumed to translate into health gain). The initiative 
is found to have had a positive impact, producing gains across these process and 
intermediate outcome measures (Calvert et al., 2009).  
 
However, the performance measures included in the study are precisely the 
measures contained within the QOF. While it appears the QOF was successful in 
achieving the implementation of the chosen indicators, it remains to be seen 
whether they are appropriate and whether they have actually contributed to health 
outcomes. Indeed, as discussed in the case study chapter, the use of blood glucose 
as a surrogate outcome measure in diabetes care is highly contested, with some 
arguing that targeted glucose control puts patients at risk (Richter et al., 2011).  
The issue arises in other areas of performance management. A central performance 
indicator in secondary care is waiting lists. Waiting lists perform a major function in 
publicly funded health services in which access is rationed on the basis of queues 
rather than ability to pay. They provide information about who has been waiting 
and for how long. This could potentially be used to support local decision-making: 
                                                           
58 The QOF is a performance management initiative introduced by New Labour which includes a 
number of performance indicators in different disease and condition areas. The initiative continues to 
provide GP practices with a significant proportion of their resources. 
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in combination with information on patient need, health professionals might draw 
upon the information to decide across a variety of medical and patient-oriented 
criteria (experience, responsiveness, etc.) who is to be treated and when (Edwards 
et al., 2003). Yet the use of waiting lists as a performance management indicator 
closes down the scope for the exercise of professional judgement in this way. 
Waiting lists alone are assumed to indicate performance, but this potentially 
compromises other dimensions of quality (Bradfield, 2008).  
 
Evaluations of the use of waiting times in performance management are 
overwhelmingly positive. Devolution in the UK provided researchers with a natural 
experiment to evaluate the effects of targets: post-1997 all nations suspended 
marketisation policies, but policymakers in Scotland and Wales sought to enhance 
performance through partnership working and England adopted a regime of 
targets. With data on waiting times and other aspects of performance collected by 
all nations, researchers have been able to deploy econometric techniques in 
retrospective studies to explore relationships between the different policy 
approaches and performance across the UK. These studies suggest that targets are 
an effective policy tool to reduce waiting times (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 2005; Besley 
et al., 2009; Hauck and Street, 2007; Propper et al., 2008). Striking differences  
reductions in waiting times are reported across the home nations, which declined 
dramatically in England between 1996 and 2002 but not in other nations, even 
though all had a similar increases in expenditures (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 2005). 
 
The use of comparative methods in this context, where such different policy tools 
have been used in what was once a UK-wide service, potentially overcomes the 
problem of causation in health services research: improvements in waiting times in 
England can be reasonably put down to targets because improvements were not 
forthcoming in the countries which did not adopt them. Nevertheless, there remain 
issues to consider with the studies. As with any form of retrospective study, it is 
possible that researchers have selected and analysed data in ways which favour 
their view of the policy. Still, this may not be as much of an issue as it is with 
evaluations of marketisation policies, which are far more controversial and where 
retrospective studies have been fiercely criticised in public and political debate (see 
below). 
 
A key issue is whether quantitative evaluations of governance, which rely upon 
performance management data, will accurately capture performance. There is the 
possibility that local actors may have engaged in ‘gaming’ and have manipulated 
performance data, thus exaggerating performance levels. Gwyn Bevan and 
Christopher Hood find a number of discrepancies between official data sets and 
patient surveys: in 2002/03, official data sets suggest that 90% of patients were 
seen in less than four hours in 139 out of 158 acute trusts, but only 69% of patients 
actually reported that experience. The same level of discrepancy was recorded the 
following year, implying that at least some of the reported improvement in waiting 
times is down to manipulated data rather than service improvements (Bevan and 




Furthermore, quantitative approaches are unlikely to pick up any unintended and 
undesirable consequences which arise in the actual delivery of care. Indeed, one 
target required that all patients were seen within four hours of admittance into 
A&E Departments. There are reports this resulted in long queues outside of 
hospitals, with patients admitted only when hospitals were confident the target 
could be met, and ultimately poor quality care due to delays in response times to 
seriously ill cases (Bevan and Hood, 2006: 530). This issue underlines the 
importance of considering local stakeholder appraisals of the effects of the overall 
incentive environment in order to ascertain the full impacts of policy and the 
choices and trade-offs involved in its implementation.  
 
3.4 The Evidence on Marketisation   
 
The creation of a marketised system of healthcare has been accompanied with 
fierce public, political and professional debate, indeed more so than clinical 
governance and performance management. The past thirty years has seen the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split, the use of market contracting and 
prices, competition within the health service and increasing use of the private 
sector. The current section explores the evidence on these market-oriented 
reforms. 
 
To date, an extensive array of evaluations has been carried out on the different 
dimensions of the reforms. Though there is far too many to explore in any detail, a 
number of literature reviews are available which collate, evaluate and summarise 
the vast amount of material that is available. These reach remarkably similar 
conclusions. Reviews of the ‘internal market’ found that neither the predictions of 
pro-market commentators nor the concerns of their critics appear to be 
substantiated by the evidence: equity was not compromised and market failures 
did not appear on a grand scale despite the introduction of economic incentives 
into the system. Yet neither were the expected efficiency gains forthcoming; 
productivity remained broadly similar and health services were not transformed. 
Furthermore, any efficiency gains that did arise have to be set aside an increase in 
administrative costs involved in setting up and managing the market, i.e. 
transaction costs (Le Grand, 1998; Mays et al., 2000). 
 
Likewise, the King’s Fund review of New Labour’s market reforms concluded that 
the most obvious “negative effects” predicted by critics had not materialised but 
there had only been a “small, sometimes imperceptible, impact in the desired 
directions” (Dixon et al., 2011: 159). Other reviews are more damning, suggesting 
that New Labour’s market reforms resulted in a deterioration in the non-
quantifiable aspects of performance alongside unprecedented increases in 
resources (Paton, 2014: 3; Fotaki et al., 2013). A literature review carried out of the 
entirety of market reforms by the think-tank Civitas concluded with the observation 
that the NHS may have found itself in a “lose-lose situation”: “taking on the extra 
costs of competition without yet experiencing the benefits” (Brereton and 




Despite this ambiguous picture, some evidenced emerged during the passage of the 
Health and Social Care Act which suggested marketisation had improved the 
performance of the health service. During the Act’s passage, Zack Cooper and 
colleagues at the London School of Economics published a working paper (Cooper 
et al., 2012) and a commentary piece (Cooper, 2012) which summarised a number 
of studies which purportedly demonstrated that New Labour’s market reforms had 
improved performance across a range of criteria. Conservative politicians 
repeatedly cited the findings of the research, with the Prime Minister stating that 
“competition is one way we can make things work better for patients. This isn’t 
ideological theory. A study published by the London School of Economics found 
hospitals in areas with more choice had lower death rates” (Greener et al., 2012). 
Yet the studies proved highly controversial and there is reason to be cautious when 
interpreting the findings.  
 
Cooper and colleagues develop economic models based upon data collected in 
practical medical settings, a form of retrospective observational study. One issue 
with retrospective studies is that the terms of the study are not defined 
prospectively, resulting in a lack of transparency. On a topic as controversial and 
contested as the marketisation of the NHS, this lack of transparency is problematic 
because there is the possibility that researchers have selected and analysed data in 
a way which supports their preferred reading of the problem. Even assuming 
benevolence on behalf of the researchers, research findings are likely to be 
accepted or rejected along partisan lines. Critics of government policy did indeed 
claim that Cooper and colleagues had engaged in “data dredging”: selecting and 
manipulating data until a case could be made for marketisation (Pollock et al., 
2011b).  
 
A further issue is the question of whether economic modelling is sufficient to assign 
causality in complex policy environments. Evaluations of performance management 
were gifted with a natural experiment whereby previously homogenous health 
systems diverged, with England alone adopting targets. Evaluations of New 
Labour’s market reforms do not enjoy such a clear point of comparison. The Cooper 
studies suggest that marketisation has improved efficiency, equity and quality (in 
terms of mortality rates). Yet there is a danger that relationships between the 
changes to governance and the indicators are statistical rather than causal.  
The Cooper study on equity does recognise difficulties in assigning causality, noting 
that attributing the results to a particular reform – whether patient choice, provider 
competition or expanded capacity – is “impossible”; what can only be said for 
certain was that the combination of New Labour’s reforms did not harm equity 
(Cooper et al., 2009). Elsewhere, Cooper sites another policy tool that might have 
caused the outcome: New Labour’s use of targets (Cooper, 2012: 3). Yet these 
significant caveats are only briefly noted in the commentary piece which makes a 
case for a significantly enhanced role for markets in the health system and was 




Similar concerns can be made about the Cooper study on quality. There, choice and 
competition policy was evaluated in terms of its impact on 30-day mortality rates 
for patients diagnosed with an acute myocardial infarction (AMI). This is potentially 
significant because it goes beyond the process-orientation of much of the literature 
to evaluate the effect of the governance change on actual health outcomes. The 
study adopts a “cross-sectional” approach which compares the AMI rates of 
hospitals in areas with high numbers of providers relative to areas with fewer 
numbers of providers. This should enable the authors to assign causality because 
different areas experience different levels of competition but all areas are affected 
by targets and extended capacity. If improvements can be identified in areas with 
high numbers of providers – and thus competition is high – they can be reasonably 
attributed to choice and competition policy (Cooper et al, 2011: 229).  
 
However, once again, the study does not explore whether the reforms had actually 
facilitated patient choice or altered the destination of patients. Other studies have 
shown that patient choice was limited under New Labour’s reforms. Many patients 
were not offered choice at all and those who were often chose on the basis of 
advice from their GPs, which would suggest that the influence of patient choice as a 
factor influencing performance is limited (Clarke et al., 2007). Furthermore, people 
who are suffering from a heart attack are not offered choice such that 
improvements in AMI mortality rates are likely to be unrelated to choice and 
competition policy (Mordoh, 2011: 30). The then tsar of cardiovascular conditions, 
Sir Roger Boyle, called the choice of AMI rates “bizarre”: 
 
AMI is a medical emergency: patients can’t choose where to have their heart attack 
or where to be treated. It is bizarre to choose a condition where choice by consumer 
can have virtually no effect (Greener et al., 2012) 
 
In their criticism of the study, Allyson Pollock and colleagues identify an alternative 
factor which may have produced the reported improvement in areas with high 
numbers of provider. During the study period, the medical treatment 
‘Percutaneous Coronary Intervention’ was introduced which has better outcomes 
than previous treatments. This new medical technology requires specialist input 
and is therefore more prevalent in urban areas where there is more specialist 
expertise. Urban areas are also the areas with high numbers of providers. This 
uneven distribution of skills and new medical technologies may account for the 
statistical association between competition and improvements in AMI mortality 
rates (Pollock et al., 2011b). Clearly, there are strong reasons to be cautious when 
interpreting the Cooper study as evidence for the effectiveness of marketisation.  
 
Further issues arise due to the quantitative nature of the studies. Even assuming 
that the performance of hospitals has improved across these criteria, there remains 
a question-mark over the wider effects of the introduction of economic incentives. 
Some critics claim the creation of Foundation Trusts has frustrated collaboration 
within local health economies, as hospitals operate in accordance with their own 
financial interests (Ham and Smith, 2010). Additionally, there is need to consider 
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the effects of marketisation on wider relevant values, such as patient-centred 
criteria and universalism.  
 
The Cooper studies do feature patient choice and equity, which are said to have 
improved following New Labour’s reforms. The study on equity, for instance, claims 
that competition incentivises professionals to be more responsive to all patients:  
 
What choice does is level the playing field – even in systems with no choice people 
who can navigate the system finds ways to do this. Introducing choice offers more 
opportunities to those who were excluded from this (Cooper, 2012: 4) 
 
However, as we saw in the previous section, the appropriateness of patient choice 
is contested as a value and some studies suggest that patient choice of provider is a 
relatively unimportant criterion for service-users: choices tend to be made on the 
basis of geography rather than quality of care and some patients do like the option 
of choice, preferring instead to rely on professional judgement (Clarke et al., 2007; 
Needham, 2007). Additionally, there is a question-mark over the operationalisation 
of the value of equity in the study.  
 
Indeed, prior to New Labour’s reforms, the study suggests that waiting times for 
three elective operations – hip and knee replacements and cataract repair – was 
positively related to deprivation: in 1997 people from lower socio-economic groups 
had a longer wait than people from higher socio-economic groups. By 2007 the 
relationship was less pronounced and in some case patients from the most 
deprived percentile were waiting less time than patients from the most advantaged 
percentile. The findings, according to Cooper, demonstrated that those who had 
“feared” New Labour’s reforms would “lead to inequity” were proved wrong; for, 
“if anything, it had decreased” (Cooper et al., 2009: 1).  
 
However, while access to basic, elective surgery is important in any health service, 
the debate at a political level concerns the objective associated with the NHS to 
provide comprehensive healthcare over the life course, free-at-the-point-of-use. It 
remains to be seen whether marketisation does or does not compromise this 
fundamental objective of the health service.  
 
3.5 Transaction Costs: The Economic Case for Public Health Systems  
 
An additional weakness of x-efficiency studies of this sort is that they do not 
consider the wider costs of administering market mechanisms in the health service. 
Indeed, this issue of transaction costs is a major source of contention in debates on 
the NHS. Adherents of the ‘political’ frame identify possible savings from 
transaction costs in their case for an entirely public sector health service.  
The evidence on transaction costs suggests that public health systems are more 
efficient than market health systems. Analysis of OECD data by George Schieber 
and Jean-Pierre Poullier shows that in 1987, prior to the introduction of the 
‘internal market’, the UK had one of the lowest expenditures on healthcare in the 
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OECD (19th out of 22) at 6.1% of GDP. Furthermore, the country had one of the 
highest public health expenditures (4th out of 22). In comparison, the US had the 
highest expenditure (1st out of 22) at 11.2% and the lowest public health 
expenditure (22nd out of 22). Yet on outcome measures such as infant mortality and 
life expectancy the systems performed at a similar level (Schieber and Poullier, 
1989). More up-to-date analysis reveals a similar picture, putting the NHS first in 
terms of cost-effectiveness relative to both the US and mixed private and public 
systems in Germany and France (Pritchard and Wallace, 2011). 
 
The full extent of transaction costs under market systems is revealed in studies in 
the US, where the issue features in political debates regarding the relative benefits 
of public and private systems. Steffie Woolhander and colleagues compare the 
transaction costs of the American system, characterised by multiple payers (the 
government, employers, insurance companies and individuals) and a mixture of 
providers (both public and private), with the Canadian system, characterised by a 
single payer (the government) and a mixture of providers. In the US, administrative 
costs amounted to a total of $294.3 billion in the United States in 1999, accounting 
for 31 percent of all health care expenditures. In Canada, the comparative figures 
were $9.4 billion and 16.7 percent respectively (Woolhandler et al., 2003: 772).  
 
There is clearly a strong economic case for public health systems, which is 
interesting given that efficiency is also a core value of the ‘market’ frame. It is 
possible that two sources of efficiency exist: a market-based one that achieves 
efficiency through competition and a public sector-based one which achieves 
efficiency through rational planning and savings on transactions costs. Whereas 
marketisation results in streamlined organisations, public administration appears to 
improve the efficiency of the system as a whole.  
 
That there is a strong economic case for public health systems is significant in light 
of current efforts to achieve efficiency savings. Adherents of the ‘political’ frame 
have consistently argued that inefficiencies in the health service are down to the 
marketisation of the health service. Administration costs under the original model 
were between 4 and 6% (Pollock, 2005: 30). Studies suggest that such costs have 
increased during the process of market reform (Tuohy, 1999: 171; Marini and 
Street, 2007). Yet the Department of Health does not collect comprehensive data 
on the issue, prompting a recent Health Committee inquiry to allege that the 
Department is deliberately obscuring the costs of market contracting: 
 
We are dismayed that the Department has not provided us with clear and consistent 
data on transaction costs; the suspicion must remain that the DH does not want the 
full story to be revealed. We were appalled that four of the most senior civil servants 
in the Department of Health were unable to give us accurate figures for staffing 
levels and costs dedicated to commissioning and billing in PCTs and provider NHS 
Trusts (Health Committee, 2011: 3) 
 
Nevertheless, given the links between marketisation and increased transaction 
costs, there is a clear danger that transaction costs will continue to increase under 
141 
 
the Government’s current reforms, which create an even greater number of 
commissioning and provider organisations (chapter 7). The costs of marketisation, 
coupled with pressures to achieve efficiency savings, make it likely that the amount 
of services available on the NHS will decline. Some commentators observe a trend 
towards a two-tier health system, involving basic coverage for all while access to 
the highest quality of care is rationed via the market (Cortez, 2008; Fotaki, 2007).  
 
This is clearly significant because it suggests that marketisation is incompatible with 
universal and comprehensive coverage, suggesting a significant trade-off is 
apparent in the choices made at the level of governance. Nevertheless, while the 
on-going development of the market system may well compromise the 
performance of the health service relative to these criteria, it remains to be seen 
whether public health systems perform across other criteria. In different ways, the 
‘market’, ‘managerialist’ and ‘progressive’ criticise outright public administration. 
Part of the problem appears to be the power and influence which public 
administration in healthcare has historically afforded the medical profession (Light, 
2003). It might be the case that marketisation, while increasing administrative costs 
and thus inefficiency, may bring about gains across other criteria such as 
accountability (Donaldson, 1998) and the responsiveness of services to patients 
(Danzon, 1992;  Gauthier et al., 1992).  
 
Indeed, though marketisation may well increase transaction costs, it may also have 
produced other benefits. Increases in transaction costs should not be dismissed 
out-of-hand because “some administrative effort is required and desirable in a well-
functioning system” (Kahn et al., 2005: 1630). Ultimately, more detailed research is 
required to explore the performance of the health service across multiple criteria.  
 
3.6 Theoretically-Informed and Qualitative Research  
 
Besides the quantitative research explored up to now, there is a range of 
theoretically-informed and case study research which engages with this question of 
the appropriate role of markets in the health service. Much of this research focuses 
on the ‘motivational problem’ in public policy and is polarised into public choice 
and institutionalist variants which reach very different conclusions.  
 
During the mid-1980s, a highly influential piece was published by the American 
academic Alan Enthoven. Enthoven identified a number of skewed incentives which 
arise in the absence of market mechanisms: consultants and GPs, he wrote, are 
“politically powerful and have no desire to yield their autonomy”, nurses and other 
staff are “heavily unionised” and paid on the basis of national agreements, citizens 
fight to save local services despite this being counter the “public interest” and 
politicians face “powerful disincentives” to bring about service improvements 
because gains will not be immediately forthcoming. Furthermore, individuals and 
organisations have no incentive to work efficiently but are penalised for doing so. 
Hospitals which performed highly receive greater numbers of patients such that 
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inefficiencies are inevitable because poor performers are not punished and high 
performers are not rewarded: 
 
In a rational economic model, those whose quality of service attracts more patients 
would get paid (for doing the extra work) a negotiated amount that they agree 
makes the effort worthwhile (Enthoven, 1985: 14) 
 
Other analysts have applied a similar approach. Carol Propper, in her analysis of the 
incentives facilitated by the ‘internal market’, argued that efficiency remained 
elusive because providers do not have a financial stake in their performance and 
patients do not have the requisite information or power to make informed choices 
(Propper, 1995). Similarly, Peter Smith identified issues with the “gate keeping” 
model, whereby care is rationed through waiting lists and GPs refer patients to 
specialists. The model purportedly fails to provide GPs with an incentive to make 
cost conscious decisions or respond to increases in waiting lists (Smith, 2000). 
 
These accounts highlight potential sources of inefficiencies which arise in the 
absence of market incentives. While the original model may have saved on 
transaction costs, it appears to have been rife with inefficiency. By implication, 
mimicking market mechanisms may improve its performance, in keeping with the 
‘market’ frame. Nevertheless, as a form of governance evaluation, these studies are 
problematic because they proceed by highlighting the absence of economic 
incentives on the assumption that it must translate into inefficiency. This approach 
has a “speculative flavour”, as Propper concedes (Propper, 1995). 
 
A very different perspective is provided by qualitative research informed by 
institutional economics. An ESRC research programme in 1995 on contracts and 
markets in the NHS produced a plethora of studies and published articles 
(Glennerster, 1997) and the research has continued into the 2000s at the London 
School of Hygiene59.  
 
Overwhelmingly, this research is critical of the use of markets in the health service, 
suggesting they exacerbate motivational issues. In an early study of community 
services, Rob Flynn and colleagues provided extensive empirical detail regarding the 
difficulties involved in introducing market mechanisms into the health service. The 
purchaser/provider split severed links between ‘planners’ and professionals who 
had previously collaborated, shared knowledge and worked out together what 
should be provided and how. The complexity and uncertainties of healthcare were 
managed through ‘clan-like’ relationships. But the ‘internal market’ severed 
relationships between individuals and organisations, creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
mentality (Flynn et al., 1996). Similarly, research by Pauline Allen found that the 
contracts were often incomplete, with health professionals providing discretionary 
                                                           
59 This literature is similar to the extensive research carried out in HR and organisation psychology, 
which emphasises the importance to performance of organisational culture and values (Scott et al., 
2003). But, unlike the HR literature, the focus is on the effect of broader social structures through 
qualitative research into local interpretations and perceptions of national policies and their 
implications for performance (Jones et al., 2013). 
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effort beyond contractual obligations, despite the corresponding belief of 
‘purchasers’ that contracts were complete (Allen et al., 2002; see also Ferlie, 1994).  
 
The greater use of market contracts and economic incentives may have a negative 
impact on performance because it is possible that collaboration, trust and pro-
social motivation decline. Yet it is also anticipated that health professionals react in 
unpredictable ways to marketisation. David Hughes and colleagues apply Karl 
Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” which predicts corrective attempts on 
behalf of actors exposed to market forces to restore social cohesion and 
relationships. This is taken to explain a dynamic that has accompanied market 
reform, whereby health professionals have often worked around market 
mechanisms and spurned legal requirements to compete in favour of collaboration 
(Hughes et al., 2013; see also Fougere, 2001; Hughes et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2013; 
Light, 2001).  
 
As a form of governance evaluation, these studies represent an improvement on 
public choice analyses of the ‘motivational problem’. The studies involve in-depth 
qualitative research of professional perceptions of the effectiveness of national 
policies and the overall incentive environment. However, the focus on professional 
perspectives alone is problematic for other stakeholders, whether patients, 
managers or national policymakers, will also have insight into the effectiveness of 
governance and policy that is important to take into account. 
 
Nevertheless, the differences between public choice and institutionalist accounts 
are stark and point to a fundamental discrepancy in the interpretation of 
relationships between health professionals. As we saw, marketisation has had an 
ambiguous impact on the performance of the health service: neither the concerns 
of the critics nor the predictions of pro-market commentators appear to have 
proved correct.  
 
A public choice explanation of this ambiguous effect of markets might point to the 
presence of ‘sticky’ relationships as a hindrance to the reforms, preventing the full 
realisation of the benefits of competition. Rather than engage in innovation and 
reform health services, health professionals have relied upon established ways of 
working and existing relationships, exacerbating the kinds of government failure 
identified by pro-market commentators.  
 
However, the institutional research discussed here provides an alternative account 
of the issue, suggesting it is market reform which is the problem. It is possible that 
health professionals, guided by professional norms and values, resisted the 
temptation to engage in the strategic behaviour associated with markets, thus 
preventing the concerns of the critics from arising. Yet this normatively-guided 
behaviour, stemming as it does from membership of a wider community and 
shared understandings of how care should be delivered, may prove a precious 
resource. Marketisation may compromise it if taken further, severing relationships 




The public choice explanation is, of course, the dominant pro-market interpretation 
of the limited success of marketisation to date and underpins calls for greater 
market reform. However, as we have seen, the evidence for this position is 
ambiguous.  
 
4.1 Concluding Remarks  
 
The current chapter has examined the evidence and debate surrounding major 
policy tools that have been applied to improve the performance of the health 
service, including Evidence-Based Medicine, performance management and 
marketisation. It has identified some major issues in the research, including 
widespread concern with the overuse of pharmacological therapy and a trade-off 
between marketisation and values of equity, universalism and comprehensive 
coverage. It has also continued to build a case for a postpositivist evaluation of 
policy and governance. In the next section, I evaluate the Government’s reforms of 




Chapter 9: An Empirical Investigation of Diabetes 
Governance and Policy 
Diabetes is widely regarded as one of the most significant public health challenges 
of the 21st century (Farooqi, 2012). My purpose in this case study is to evaluate 
diabetes policy and governance following the Conservative/Coalition Government’s 
reforms set out in the Health and Social Care Act (2011). I utilise the framework set 
out in chapter 6, which made a case for evaluating governance through a focus on 
coordination.  
 
The case study is based on in-depth interviews with diabetes stakeholders at 
different levels of governance and across the diabetes pathway. I analyse the 
empirical data in terms of ‘frames’, drawing upon the frames set out in chapter 7. 
There, I identified key framings of health policy and governance which capture the 
main dimensions of the debates, including a ‘medical’ and a ‘holistic’ frame at the 
level of policy and a ‘market’ frame, ‘managerialist’ frame, ‘medical-professional’ 
frame, ‘progressive’ frame and ‘political’ frame at the level of governance. 
Stakeholders often expressed these wider framings in their appraisals of diabetes 
policy and governance. I identify the frames throughout the analysis and draw out 
their implications for debates in diabetes. However, I also go beyond typical 
discourse and frame analysis to explore the nuances and detail of stakeholder 
frames. 
 
The analysis begins by setting out the Government’s diabetes strategy, which is 
informed by its wider reforms of the health service set out in chapter 7. This serves 
to identify the values and objectives which the Government has prioritised, as well 
as the policy strategies and governance approaches that have been selected to 
realise them. Following that, I explore stakeholder frames at different stages of the 
policy process, identifying areas of potential and areas of concern, where it appears 
that values and knowledge are supressed by current policy and governance 
arrangements.  
 
Indeed, while my analysis certainty reveals some areas of potential following the 
reforms, it also reveals some significant ‘coordination problems’. One type of 
problem is failures of centralised forms of decision-making. For example, there is 
significant concern at a local level over the appropriateness of key targets in public 
health and primary care, namely mandation of the NHS Health Check and targeted 
glucose control. Despite the Government’s commitment to ‘holistic’ care, current 
policy and governance arrangements appear to be facilitating an overly medical 
approach to diabetes geared towards the control of blood glucose, whether at the 
level of the population or the individual. 
 
A further type of problem is failures of local decision-making, where attempts to 
reconfigure local services around primary care have resulted in poor quality care in 
some areas, resulting in a rise in diabetes-related complications and costly hospital 
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admissions. Furthermore, specialist posts are on the decline in hospitals despite 
evidence to suggest they are cost-effective.  
 
A still further type of problem is increases in transaction costs following the 
Conservative/Coalition Government’s recent reforms. Organisational barriers 
between local authorities and CCGs, as well as CCGs and NHS Hospitals, appear to 
frustrate collaboration between organisations and work against the development of 
integrated pathways of care.  
 
Finally, while the reforms enhance the responsiveness of services to patients in 
some respects, in others they do not. The use of economic incentives in primary 
care appears to be detrimental to patient trust in GPs, the doctor-patient 
relationship and patient choice. The methodological approach, involving a detailed 
exploration of stakeholder frames at different stages of the policy process, has 
been able to pick up upon these examples of coordination problems.  
 
I conclude by making a case for decentralisation in some areas of policy and 
centralisation in others. Decentralising decisions over the NHS Health Check and 
targets for glucose control would provide local actors with more scope to fashion 
their own solutions to diabetes. However, the Government’s creation of CCGs, 
which involves decentralisation in a market context, appears to frustrate the 
realisation of values that are widely considered important in healthcare. There is a 
case for larger organisations which combine commissioning and provisioning 
functions and which have greater resources and expertise at their disposal. 
 
Section 1 presents the methodology of the chapter, explaining the methods 
through which I apply the evaluative framework outlined in chapter 6.  
 
Section 2 sets the policy context, introducing the Conservative/Coalition 
Government’s diabetes strategy. I also outline significant criticisms of the 
Government’s strategy voiced by the National Audit Office, the Public Accounts 
Committee and Diabetes UK, which exhibit aspects of the ‘managerialist’ frame. 
This sets the scene for the subsequent inquiry.   
 
Section 3 presents the findings of the frame analysis. I begin by exploring different 
framings of diabetes at the level of policy. I focus on stakeholder’s knowledge of 
diabetes as a substantive policy problem and how they frame choices between 
different types of intervention and forms of care. In the process, I identify two 
policy decisions that are particularly controversial: the mandation of the NHS 
Health Check and targeted blood glucose control in primary care. 
 
Section 4 then explores framings of diabetes governance in more detail. I focus 
attention on two central aspects of the Government’s reforms: the new public 





Section 5 revisits the debate over the Government’s strategy outlined in section 2 
and addresses the core evaluative questions of public sector governance: namely 
the appropriate balance between centralisation and decentralisation and the use of 
markets in the provision of diabetes care. I conclude by assessing the 




1.1 Methodology  
 
The section utilises the case study method in social research. There are multiple 
definitions of the case study and a range of approaches exist. Positivist case studies 
seek to investigate singular aspects of a social event to develop or test explanations 
that may be generalisable to other events (Levy, 2008: 2; see also George and 
Bennett, 2005). Alternatively, interpretivist case studies pertain to a larger unit of 
study and investigate phenomena in real life contexts through a focus on 
stakeholders’ understandings (Zucker, 2009: 2). Of these two options, the approach 
adopted here corresponds more with the interpretivist case study method, but it 
also seeks to evaluate different stakeholder viewpoints and quantitative data is 
drawn upon in the research. Edith Balbach has used the phrase “evaluative case 
study” to characterise mixed methods approaches to evaluation (Balbach, 1999). 
 
The actual ‘unit of analysis’ of the research is contemporary diabetes policy and 
governance. As we saw in chapter 7, the Health and Social Care Act (2011) 
constituted a major transformation of the health service, having a significant impact 
on diabetes policy and governance. My purpose in the case study is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of contemporary diabetes policy and governance following these 
changes, through in-depth interviews with diabetes stakeholders. Though 
evaluative case studies are  particularly suitable for the evaluation of policy in 
complex environments (Balbach, 1999: 4), case studies have well-known 
limitations. The findings of case study research are not generalisable to other cases 
(Pierce, 2008: 53). In this case, any positive or negative outcomes identified in 
diabetes may not arise in other health policy areas, such as cancer or cardiovascular 
disease.  
 
The empirical research involved extensive research and document analysis prior to 
the interviews, in order to gain some understanding of diabetes and relevant issues 
and debates around it. Following that, the empirical research included a total of 25 
in-depth stakeholder interviews and a number of participant observations at 
professional events and public meetings/protests, between February 2013 and 
September 2015. For the interviews, the sampling process involved a combination 
of opportunistic sampling, by contacting diabetes stakeholders I identified on the 
internet, nomination and ‘snowballing’ (Pierce, 2008: 92). The Research & 
Development Manager of one CCG was able to put me in contact with diabetes 
stakeholders in a local health economy, while some of my interviewees put me in 
contact with other stakeholders.  
 
Non-probability sampling of this type poses further problems to generalisation. For 
it is possible that interviewees are not representative of their respective groups 
(Pierce, 2008: 93). For this reason, I sought to interview a range of stakeholders, 
including people from similar backgrounds. Of the different specialist groups in 
healthcare, I achieved an initial target of four public health professionals, four GPs 
and four diabetes specialists. Additionally, I spoke to representatives of all the 
major organisations involved in the diabetes pathway (NHS England, Public Health 
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England, Monitor, Clinical-Commissioning Groups, local authorities, Foundation 
Trusts and general practices).  
 
One issue I encountered were barriers to interviewing service-users. In order to 
carry out research with NHS patients, it is necessary to go through a lengthy 
accreditation process. Due to time constraints, I opted to interview patient 
representatives instead, interviewing people from diabetes charities, Diabetes 
Voice and LINK, an organisation which represents patients. Some of the 
interviewees (including health professionals and patient representatives) also had 
diabetes and spoke of their experiences of using NHS services as a service-user.  
 
The theoretical framework for the evaluation has already been set out in detail in 
chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. I have argued that to evaluate policy and governance in 
terms of coordination requires an analysis of multiple stakeholder frames and the 
values, knowledge and interests contained within them. In the empirical research, I 
was interested in stakeholders’ understanding of the problem of diabetes, their 
views on the quality of local services and the effectiveness of the overall 
governance arrangements.   
 
Prior to the interviews, participants were provided with an information sheet and a 
consent form to sign which was subsequently kept in a secure setting60. At the start 
of each interview, I explained the project and made it clear that I do not have any 
medical training or experience of the NHS. Often, interviewees discussed complex 
medical or policy issues which I lacked prior knowledge of and I soon realised that 
making my relative ignorance of the topics known was important because it made it 
easier to ask interviewees to explain issues in detail. This proved an effective 
strategy. Some interviewees appear to enjoy the opportunity of speaking freely 
about the issues they face. One diabetes specialist consultant, in an interview which 
lasted 1 hr and 40 minutes, likened the interview to a reverse medical encounter. A 
further interviewee approved of my approach, making the analogy of my starting 
position with that of someone newly diagnosed with diabetes: 
 
You say you have no medical training but I’m sure you are becoming quite an 
expert. I’m sure you will agree you have the same starting point as those being 
diagnosed with type 2 diabetes (T2DM), trying to make sense of the condition can 
be quite difficult!61 
 
In the interviews, I wanted to gain as fuller an understanding of stakeholder 
perspectives as possible. I adopted the SWOT methodology, asking stakeholders for 
their analysis of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of current 
policy and governance arrangements. This unstructured approach was useful 
because it meant stakeholders often identified issues which I had not 
countenanced before. But I also had some set questions I developed through my 
prior reading and document analysis which I asked all stakeholders.  
 
                                                           
60 See Appendix  
61 Health campaigner and researcher, 13/04/2015 (see Appendix) 
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At the level of policy, I was particularly interested in the appropriate balance 
between ‘medical’ and ‘holistic’ care and I asked each stakeholder whether they 
“agree with the statement that the NHS is getting the right balance in diabetes care 
between lifestyle interventions and medical interventions”. At the level of 
governance, I was interested in the effectiveness of the Government’s overall 
strategy, including the various Outcome Frameworks, the key organisational 
reforms – most notably, the creation of CCGs and the new role for local authorities 
in the pathway – and the use of markets and the private sector. I was also 
interested in stakeholder views of the evidence underpinning diabetes policies. As 
we saw in the previous section, the centrality of Evidence-Based Medicine to 
decision-making is controversial and this extends into diabetes policy.  
 
Prior to the interviews, I made it clear to all interviewees their names would not be 
mentioned in research outputs, only their roles in diabetes and/or the type of 
organisation they work for. Offering anonymity to interviewees in this way has 
positives and negatives: on the plus side, interviewees might speak out openly 
about policy problems but a possible negative is that they are no longer publicly 
accountable for their views and may exaggerate issues in ways which benefit them. 
Nevertheless, anonymity was a precondition of involvement for some stakeholders 
and I decided it was necessary to fully anonymise the data for the sake of 
consistency. Some interviewees were interviewed twice if they were deemed to be 
particularly important and agreed to a second interview. I also exchange emails 




2.1 Policy Context: Decentralisation or Centralisation? 
 
For many commentators, diabetes is the “the disease of our times” (Farooqi, 2012: 
286). Terms such as “explosion” (Diabetes UK, 2008), “epidemic” (Lam and LeRoith, 
2012) and “national crisis” (Diabetes UK, 2015) are widely used in the discourse. 
Statistics demonstrate vast increases in the prevalence of the condition. Each year, 
the diabetes charity Diabetes UK publishes its ‘State of the Nation’ reports which 
provide detailed analyses of the problem, coupled with policy advice on how best 
to deal with it (Diabetes UK, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015). The opening 
sentence of its 2015 report provides a typical warning of the impending epidemic: 
 
If it was announced that a new condition had emerged that was doubling in 
prevalence every 17 years, and 13 million people were already directly affected or at 
serious risk, this would be seen as an epidemic and a national crisis (Diabetes UK, 
2015: 3) 
 
In diabetes, policymakers, health professionals and health campaigners/charities 
alike mostly adhere to Diabetes UK’s account of the challenge we face: diabetes is 
serious, objective, accurately reflected in the statistics and in need of a policy 
response. Some stakeholders were more critical, arguing the problem has been 
exaggerated and reflects the ‘medicalisation’ of health problems. Nevertheless, 
stakeholder frames contained a broadly shared commitment to the health of 
people with diabetes and were informed by a number of core evaluative criteria, 
most notably quality of care, access to care, efficiency and responsiveness. Where 
there is disagreement is over the precise detail of strategies for policy and 
governance.  
 
The Government’s diabetes strategy is influenced by its wider changes to the health 
service introduced by the Health and Social Care Act (see chapter 7), involving a 
revised form of performance management, along with investment and reform in 
primary care and public health. It is useful to consider the contrast between the 
Government’s approach and New Labour’s approach, which involved diabetes-
specific clinical governance.  
 
1. Steering through the Outcomes Frameworks  
A centre piece of the Conservative Party’s approach to the NHS is a revised form of 
performance management. In diabetes, this marks a change in direction from New 
Labour’s approach. Under New Labour, the most significant policy driver was the 
National Service Framework (NSF) for diabetes published in 2001, which set out 
guidelines and quality standards62. This was informed by additional NICE guidance 
which covers the entire pathway, from public health to primary care to secondary 
care. Furthermore, major national surveys were commissioned to gain an 
                                                           
62 Besides diabetes, there were NSFs for cancer, coronary heart disease, kidney disease, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, strokes, long-term conditions, mental health and care for old aged 




understanding of the problem and the quality of NHS services63 and, in 2006, NHS 
Diabetes was created to aid the implementation of the NSF.  
 
The Conservative/Coalition Government has sought to move away from disease-
specific guidance and performance management. A key argument against New 
Labour’s NSFs was that resources were expended on the major ‘killers’ to the 
detriment of other areas64. While NICE guidance on diabetes and the national 
diabetes surveys remain, the NSF for diabetes has finished and NHS Diabetes has 
been incorporated into an organisation attached to NHS England, NHS Improving 
Quality, whose task it is to improve the health service’s performance in general. 
There are plans to decentralise performance management further by reducing the 
significance of the New Labour’s Quality and Outcomes Framework as a proportion 
of GP practice income, while also allowing CCGs to develop their own performance 
management protocols. 
 
While the Outcomes Frameworks are a managerialist mechanism, the emphasis on 
decentralisation is consistent with a range of the frames introduced in chapter 7, 
including the ‘progressive’ frame, ‘market’ frame and ‘medical-professional’ frame. 
 
2. Investment and Reform in Public Health 
A further dimension to the Conservative’s diabetes strategy is increased investment 
to public health. This is part of a wider shift towards the prevention of conditions 
and diseases, which is deemed to be particularly important in the context of 
increases of lifestyle conditions, an aging population and pressures on public 
expenditures. As part of the package of reforms associated with the Health and 
Social Care Bill (2011), the Conservative/Coalition government created a new 
national quango and increased funds to public health, in a response to a perceived 
neglect of this type of intervention by New Labour. Additionally, local authorities 
have taken over public health at a local level. The government has also placed a ring 
fence on local authority public health budgets (in order to prevent local authorities 
from spending it on other local services) and has mandated certain services, such as 
sexual health services and the NHS Health Check, a national screening programme 
for diabetes and other conditions.  
 
Yet it is also anticipated that the new approach will drive a qualitative change in 
public health. Public health professionals, now operating in local authorities, will be 
closer to local officials and the communities they serve, enabling the development 
of local solutions which tackle the economic and social “determinants” of health, 
                                                           
63 The major survey is the annual National Diabetes Audit (NDA) which reports on key indicators 
from primary and secondary care settings and is the largest annual clinical audit in the world. 
Additionally, the National Diabetes In-Patient Audit (NaDIA) is carried out by diabetes teams in 
hospitals on a randomly selected day, providing a snap shot of the quality of diabetes care offered by 
hospitals.  
64 Senior policy advisor to New Labour, 28/02/2014 
153 
 
reduce inequalities and facilitate “holistic solutions to health and wellbeing” (DoH, 
2011b: 4; see also DoH, 2011a)65: 
 
First and foremost, one of the really powerful things about these reforms is bringing 
GPs into contact with local politicians. I have heard up and down the country of 
conversations taking place. Very often these people had never met one another and 
for the first time they are engaging about place and about the needs of people in 
that place … We should not underestimate the power of that (O'Brien in PAC, 2012) 
 
This clearly resembles the ‘progressive’ frame, which emphasises the importance of 
local democratic processes and the involvement of citizens in decisions regarding 
healthcare. Furthermore, the Government anticipates that its reforms will facilitate 
a qualitative change in the nature of the services provided by the health service, in 
ways which reflect the ‘holistic’ frame.  
 
3. Investment and Reform in Primary Care 
A further key policy initiative is the development of primary care – a longstanding 
but as yet unrealised objective of both New Labour and the Conservatives. As the 
first point of call for patients, GPs are believed to be best placed to design services 
around their needs and preferences. Furthermore, with an ageing population and 
the increase in long-term conditions, healthcare is increasingly about the 
management of conditions in order to prevent complications from arising, further 
increasing the importance of primary care. The development of primary care, in this 
context, will improve health outcomes, efficiency (in part through the avoidance of 
costly hospital admissions) and facilitate more ‘holistic’ and ‘patient-centred’ care. 
The aim is to embed a principle of “shared decision-making”: “no decision about me 
without me” (DoH, 2010: 13). 
 
To that end, the new Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) place GPs at the 
forefront of the commissioning of health services. Additionally, patient choice will 
be facilitated by the continued expansion of the market in healthcare through the 
further development of market pricing and increased provider diversity (DoH, 2010: 
26). The approach is expected to facilitate the emergence of new forms of care in 
primary care and reduce the reliance of the health service on secondary care 
delivered in NHS hospitals.  
 
As with the Government’s reforms to public health, it is anticipated that reforms to 
primary care will facilitate the development of more holistic forms of healthcare. 
Furthermore, a key aspect of this is the greater use of market mechanisms which 
will provide greater choice for patients and improve efficiency, in keeping with the 
                                                           
65 This is in keeping with New Labour’s strategy – see “Our Healthier Nation” (DoH, 1998) and 
“Choosing Health” (DoH, 2004) – and the Wanless Review (Wanless, 2004). Under New Labour, 
specific attention was also paid to the “postcode lottery” in healthcare which implies people in some 
areas of the country have access to higher quality services than other areas of the country (Department 
of Health, 2001).   
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‘market’ frame. Nevertheless, the combination of these different policy tools and 
approaches has proved controversial.  
 
2.2 Initial Concerns  
 
Just after the passage of the Health and Social Care Act, the National Audit Office 
published a report into diabetes services which criticised the “depressingly poor” 
state of diabetes care in England, with “low achievement of treatment standards 
and a high number of avoidable deaths” (NAO, 2012: 8). This prompted a Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) inquiry which resulted in an equally damning report 
(PAC, 2012). 
 
One of the key indicators cited by the NAO was a failure of Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs) to deliver the essential services for diabetes patients, outlined in New 
Labour’s NSF for diabetes in 2001. The NSF outlined 9 key care processes that each 
individual with diabetes should have as part of an annual check-up (see box 1). 
 
Box 1 – 9 Key Care Processes for Diabetes 
Blood glucose level measurement (HbA1c) 
Blood pressure measurement  
Cholesterol level measurement  
Retinal screening  
Foot and leg check  
Kidney function testing (urine)  
Kidney function testing (blood)  
Weight check  
Smoking status check 
Source: Department of Health, 2001 
 
Despite the centrality of the 9 key care processes to the NSF and inclusion of many 
of the indicators in the Quality and Outcomes Framework, the NAO reported poor 
implementation and a clear ‘postcode lottery’: PCTs ranged from 6 to 69% in 
completion rates. Furthermore, over the period between 2006 and 2011, there had 
been a reported increase in “unnecessary complications”: retinopathy increased by 
64%, stroke by 87%, kidney failure by 77%, cardiac failure by 104%, angina by 54% 
and amputations by 46%. The NHS was also said to be failing to prevent or manage 
the prevalence of diabetes. Only half of the NHS Health Checks expected to be 
offered in 2011–12 have been offered and a number of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
in England had not carried out any Checks whatsoever (NAO, 2012). These failings 
in diabetes services had allegedly resulted in “excess deaths” of up to 24,000 
people a year, who need not have died if the condition were managed more 
effectively (PAC, 2012). 
 
At the time of publication, considerable debate was taking place over why the NHS 
was performing so poorly and whether the Conservative/Coalition’s strategy would 
improve the situation. Diabetes UK, NAO and PAC put the poor performance down 
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to a lack of central coordination and increasing fragmentation at a local level. 
Diabetes UK in particular has consistently called for diabetes-specific clinical 
governance, consisting of clinical guidance and incentives. Although New Labour 
did have an NSF for diabetes, this purportedly failed to improve the quality of 
diabetes services because it was not incentivised like the other NSFs. Diabetes 
campaigners voiced concerns that attention may be lost because the Outcomes 
Frameworks are broader and diabetes is included as just one of many 
cardiovascular conditions: 
 
We’re really worried that within the new systems there’s this dilution of very specific 
issues at the very highest level at the DH and NHS Commissioning Board (NHS 
England) and that can only have a knock on effect66 
 
Diabetes UK also raised concern about the increased use of the private sector 
across the pathway. Dame Barbara Young, Chief Executive of Diabetes UK, warned 
of “fragmentation of integrated services and networks of care, as elements are 
provided by different providers” (Diabetes UK, 2011b). These arguments resonate 
with the ‘managerialist’ and ‘political’ frames, which emphasise the important of 
clear performance standards and public ownership and administration in the 
delivery of care. They go against the grain of policy which, as we saw, involves 
performance management through broader Outcomes Frameworks and the greater 
use of markets.  
 
Yet the interpretation of the poor performance revealed by the NAO and PAC 
reports offered by Diabetes UK differs markedly from that of other stakeholders. At 
the inquiry of the PAC, senior policymakers argued against a more specific focus on 
diabetes, reiterating the core features of the Government’s diabetes strategy. 
Specific clinical governance was not required because that would skew attention 
away from other diseases and conditions, while targets of broader health 
outcomes, though not specific to diabetes, are clearly relevant:  
 
The Outcomes Framework and the improvement areas is a very new idea. We are 
trying to set a more comprehensive framework that allows for every locality to ask, 
‘What is it that we need to address here to reduce avoidable mortality?’ In some 
localities, the thing that they can do most significantly is to tackle diabetes, but 
every locality will have diabetes … I find it very hard to see how it would not be 
relevant to that fundamental outcome (O'Brien in PAC, 2012) 
 
Sir David Nicholson, in response to a question about what policies would improve 
the quality of care, health outcomes and efficiency, replied:  
 
We believe that the investment in community, primary care and preventive services 
needs to be increased and that the amount of money spent on hospital care needs 
to go down (Nicholson in PAC, 2012) 
 
                                                           
66 Senior representative of advocacy organisation, 22/03/2013  
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This debate touches upon key evaluative questions of governance, most notably 
the appropriateness of centralised forms of decision-making and performance 
management. Similarly, Diabetes UK’s concern about the impact of marketisation 
prompts questions of the appropriate role of markets and the private sector in the 
provision of care. In what follows, I address these questions through a detailed 






3.1 Investment and Reform in Public Health and Primary Care 
 
While the Government’s proposed reforms raise evaluative questions of 
governance regarding the appropriateness of the proposed Outcomes Frameworks 
and various organisational reforms, they also touch upon issues of policy. Indeed, a 
core dimension of the Government’s diabetes strategy is greater investment in 
public health and primary care. The current section explores debates about the 
appropriateness of different types of intervention and forms of care, although 
issues of governance also feature.  
 
Among health professionals, there is widespread agreement that the Government’s 
strategy is broadly correct. Preventing people from getting diabetes through public 
health interventions in the first place, or improving the management of diabetes in 
primary care, is likely to improve a range of health and economic outcomes. 
However, there are also some significant criticisms of the strategy. Adherents of the 
‘market’ frame criticise the proposals for the greater regulation of unhealthy food 
and drink. Additionally, there is extensive debate over the appropriateness of 
different types of intervention and forms of care. Adherents of the ‘holistic’ frame 
criticise the quality of diabetes services, arguing that pharmacological therapies are 
overused and are detrimental to patients. Among health professionals, there is also 
some concern over the use of pharmacological therapies which reflects wider 
debate within the profession regarding the value of preventative medicine (see 
chapter 7). Despite a purported commitment to ‘holistic’ care, the Government’s 
strategy appears to be reinforcing a medical approach to diabetes. There is a strong 
case to revise certain targets in public health and primary care.  
 
I begin by setting out the difference between the ‘medical’ and ‘holistic’ frames in 
diabetes, before going onto explore issues in public health and primary care in 
more detail. 
 
3.2 ‘Medical’ and ‘Holistic’ Frames of the Problem of Diabetes  
 
As discussed in chapter 7, there is significant debate in health policy between 
advocates of ‘medical’ care and ‘holistic’ care. This debate extends into diabetes. As 
we saw, the ‘medical’ frame exhibits a particular understanding of health and ill-
health, orienting health services to the extension of life through the treatment of 
illness and disease. In diabetes, this is viewed as synonymous with the control of 
blood glucose. 
 
Indeed, the term ‘diabetes’ itself refers to a group of diseases characterised by 
raised blood glucose, or ‘hyperglycaemia’, caused by an absence of, deficiency in or 
lack of sensitivity to insulin – a hormone which regulates glucose levels. After each 
meal, the body breaks down sugars and carbohydrates into glucose which is 
released into the blood for energy. When functioning normally, the pancreas 
produces insulin in order to regulate levels of glucose, but when the pancreas fails 
to produce insulin, or when the body’s sensitivity to it is reduced, high levels of 
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blood glucose build up in the blood. If unnoticed or poorly managed, 
hyperglycaemia can be complex to treat and lead to serious complications, reduced 
quality of life and life expectancy (Tan and Cheah, 1990). 
 
For this reason, the ‘medical’ frame advocates interventions geared towards the 
control of blood glucose. In public health, this entails strategies to detect so-called 
‘pre-diabetes’ – a condition of raised blood glucose – through screening initiatives 
such as the NHS Health Check; and in primary care, strategies to control blood 
glucose levels in individual patients, often pharmacological therapies. Intensive 
blood glucose control is justified by large-scale, randomised clinical trials which 
demonstrate a correlation between blood glucose and health outcomes (see box 2).  
 
Box 2: The UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) 
A pivotal moment in diabetes care was the UK Prospective Diabetes Study 
(UKPDS), a major multicentre randomised clinical trial involving 5,102 patients 
that ran between 1977 and 1997 (with on-going follow up examinations). The 
study confirmed what had only been suspected before: that raised blood glucose 
increases the risk of diabetes-related complications and clinical strategies to 
control blood glucose reduce such risk. This, in turn, has had a profound impact 
on diabetes care, orienting medical and policy efforts to the control of blood 
glucose (King et al., 1999). 
 
Though the ‘holistic’ frame does not question the essential pathophysiology of 
diabetes as a condition of raised blood glucose, it nevertheless broadens out the 
definition of the problem of diabetes to include lifestyle factors, psychology and 
wider “social” determinants of health: diabetes is as much a problem of unhealthy 
lifestyles, inequality and a lack of community resources, as it is raised blood 
glucose. Adherents of the ‘holistic’ frame argue that medical treatments alone will 
ultimately fail to improve health outcomes (Wait, 2011).  
 
As with the ‘medical’ frame, the ‘holistic’ frame favours certain forms of 
interventions over others, emphasising the importance of lifestyle interventions in 
public health and primary care which promote exercise and health eating. There are 
variants of medical and holistic care in public health and primary care, with 
significant debate about the appropriate balance between them.   
 
Among health professionals, there are differences of opinion regarding this 
question of the balance between holistic and medical care. GPs and specialists 
generally harboured a ‘medical’ understanding of diabetes, favouring the NHS 
Health Check as a way to identify cases of ‘pre-diabetes’ and the tight control of 
blood glucose in primary care. Yet there were also GPs and specialists who were 
critical of an alleged overuse of pharmacological therapies. Furthermore, while 
public health professionals shared an appreciation of both ‘medical’ and ‘holistic’ 
forms of healthcare, they were similarly critical of an overuse of pharmacological 
therapies. The debate is significant and relevant to decisions at both the level of 




3.3 The Case for Greater Investment in Public Health  
 
The case for greater investment in public health hinges upon evidence which 
suggest an exponential increase of Type 2 diabetes cases. 13 million people are 
“affected or at risk” (Diabetes UK, 2015: 3) and 1 in 7 adults has ‘pre-diabetes’ 
(Chatterton et al., 2012). It is argued that only can prevention through public health 
improve health and economic outcomes. Among health professionals, there is 
widespread agreement with this strategy. A typical argument is provided by a NHS 
England civil servant, who cited what she believes is the most pressing area of 
concern in diabetes today: 
 
The area of most concern is the increasing prevalence of diabetes, year on year. 
Forget about how we are treating those who have been diagnosed. The pool of 
people is just going up and up. It’s increasing in prevalence every year and then we 
also have increasing onset of diabetes at a much younger age … I was absolutely 
astonished when I came across 12-year old, 13-year old children developing Type 2 
diabetes. That was unheard of twenty years ago. It was always Type 1 diabetes, 
early onset, and then you had Type 2 diabetes. It was always 45 plus. But that age 
of onset is just getting younger and younger. What was an adult disease is now 
affecting people in the prime of life  
 
If left unchecked, the increasingly prevalence of diabetes will result in adverse 
health outcomes and great expense to the health service: 
 
…the complications of diabetes are gross … We’re talking about an impact on their 
lives, on their work lives, on their, everything67 
 
One GP spoke of an explosion of diabetes cases which was putting pressure on 
doctors and nurses in primary care, with broad implications: 
 
…you can see it right through the system to pressure on A&E and hospitals68 
 
Stakeholders also agreed that much of the increase in diabetes is down to 
increasingly unhealthy and sedentary lifestyles, which necessitates investment in 
public health because of its capacity to prevent/manage lifestyle diseases. The NHS 
England civil servant once more:  
 
It’s (public health) not done in a systematic way. There’s always the debate in 
Britain about how much does the state intervene, how much the state should stop 
lard being sold or hydrogenated fats being put into pastry … Take smoking. We 
know smoking harms, so why not do the same with fats? “Why not have a 
curriculum in schools that introduces activity as part of studies and education? Why 
not prevent schools from selling playing fields? There is room for legislation, there is 
                                                           
67 Civil servant, NHS England, 17/02/14  
68 GP and practice lead for diabetes, 30/09/2014  
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room for education, there is definitely room for making sure that schools play a part 
in not just educating the child but also educating the parents69  
 
Implicit in these calls for greater investment is a moral argument which highlights 
the importance of public health interventions for the health of individuals. This 
moral argument is also interlaced with a number of economic themes, implying the 
presence of market failure (see chapter 4). 
 
Public goods and externalities – the call for investment in public health services that 
are currently lacking implies that individuals are unwilling or unable to invest in 
them on their own accord. Many of the examples cited by the NHS England civil 
servant, such as education and the availability of exercise facilities (school playing 
fields), have public good characteristics, as have other services designed to combat 
diabetes and obesity, such as advertising and social marketing campaigns. 
Furthermore, the wider costs attached to unhealthy lifestyles implies the presence 
of externalities. The widespread availability of low cost, unhealthy food in effect 
lowers the cost to individuals of leading an unhealthy lifestyle, while the poor 
design of the social environment – such as out-of-town shopping malls – increases 
the cost to individuals of healthy activity. Again, this is implied by the civil servant’s 
call for greater regulation of unhealthy food stuffs, the cost of which, like smoking, 
is not captured in the price which consumers pay for the product. The same might 
be said for the technologies that have contributed to sedentary lifestyles, such as 
cars, televisions and video games. 
 
Information asymmetries – the call for investment in public health also interpolates 
consumers as lacking the requisite knowledge of choices and their consequences. It 
is implied that consumers are ignorant of the precise content of the food they eat 
and what it is doing to them. They may also be unaware of the dangers of being 
overweight and what food they should eat to reduce their body weight and their 
likelihood of developing Type 2 diabetes. Specifically in diabetes, the shift to 
prevention is justified on an information asymmetry, whereby people at risk of 
diabetes, or people with undiagnosed diabetes, are ignorant of their raised blood 
glucose levels, as well as the dangers it can bring. This is also true of people with a 
significant proportion of the population with ‘pre-diabetes’70. Likewise, many 
health campaigners criticise corporate advertising and marketing that promotes the 
consumption of unhealthy food stuffs, in an example of “supplier-induced demand” 
– a corollary of the information asymmetry concept. 
 
In keeping with the ‘medical-professional’ frame, these arguments afford a 
potentially significant role for public health professionals to define and deliver a 
range of possible public health interventions. The assumption is that professionals 
can make informed choices where consumers have failed.  
 
                                                           
69 Civil servant, NHS England, 17/02/14  
70 A Diabetes UK campaign was entitled ‘Diabetes: Beware the Silent Assassin’  (Diabetes UK, 2008) 
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However, as the NHS England civil servant recognises, there is significant public and 
political resistance to the regulation of the consumption of unhealthy food and 
drinks: “There’s always the debate in Britain about how much does the state 
intervene” 71. Indeed, public health is often criticised in the terms of the ‘market’ 
frame for interfering in individual freedom and consumer choice. Additionally, 
critics question the assumption that public health professionals can make more 
informed choices than consumers, highlighting what is a potentially significant form 
of government failure:  
 
The major cause of the obesity epidemic is our public health dietary advice. The 
introduction (1977 USA, 1983 UK) of advice telling us to ‘base our meals on starchy 
foods’ (foods that we previously held to be uniquely fattening) has made us fat and 
sick (Harcombe, 2013) 
 
If prior attempts to improve the population’s health through public health 
messages have contributed to the obesity and diabetes “epidemic”, let alone 
caused it, this warns against the excessive use of public health interventions in the 
regulation of food and drink; the epistemological challenge of defining what is a 
quality food is complex. Furthermore, these kind of public health interventions 
clearly touch upon significant values pertaining to the balance between individual 
freedom and state intervention, suggesting a need for public and political debate to 
establish just how far public health policy should regulate consumption patterns. 
 
A further significant issue is whether the scale of the public health challenge is 
overstated by the statistics. This issue taps into a wider problem of the use of 
surrogate outcomes in health policy (see chapter 8). In diabetes, blood glucose is 
the main surrogate outcome and is central to the planning of services and the 
diagnosis and treatment of cases. However, there are significant question marks 
over whether medical strategies geared towards the control of blood glucose 
translate into improved health outcomes (Richter et al., 2011). Indeed, this is a 
central argument of proponents of ‘holistic’ care but it is also made by some 
specialists, who criticise the turn to prevention in medical care.  
 
In public health, critics argue that some of the reported increases in diabetes cases 
may be down to changing diagnostic thresholds and that the category ‘pre-
diabetes’ does not have clinical value (see box 3)72. 
 
Box 3 – Uncertainties over Diagnostic Criteria and the Concept of ‘Pre-Diabetes’ 
Extensive debate has taken place in diabetes over diagnostic criteria. 
Traditionally, a diabetes diagnosis required tests for fasting blood glucose which, 
though the most accurate of tests, is also the most cumbersome, requiring that 
patients fast for 2 hrs prior to the test. An alternative is standing glucose which, 
though less accurate, is easier to administer because it does not require that 
patients change their diet. The preferred option is a HbA1c test – a reading of 
blood glucose. This test is the newest of the three and the most technical, 
                                                           
71 Civil servant, NHS England, 17/02/14  
72 Similar arguments are made in obesity policy (Lobstein, 2006). 
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deemed inappropriate for developing countries which do not have the requisite 
training and technology. Nevertheless, it is easy to administer, reasonably 
accurate and corresponds with wider diabetes governance and policy in which 
HbA1c is the main surrogate outcome. 
 
However, there is uncertainty over what the diagnostic criteria should be for 
diabetes. Diagnostic criteria for diabetes are defined by analysing clinical data to 
establish points at which the likelihood of developing complications significantly 
increases relative to the population. Yet such a point could only be established 
for diabetic retinopathy, a condition of the eyes which is caused by high levels of 
blood glucose. Criteria for cardiovascular complications, which are more common 
among people with diabetes, have never been established. Furthermore, there is 
a lack of consistency of diagnostic criteria for diabetic retinopathy for each test, 
HbA1c, fasting glucose and standing blood glucose. Each one identifies different 
numbers of people as being diabetic and each one can result in ‘false positives’ 
(people falsely identified as not having diabetes) and ‘false negatives’ (people 
falsely identified as having diabetes). Exactly what constitutes a state of ‘pre-
diabetes’ is even more uncertain. Once again, each test has a ‘pre-diabetes’ 
threshold but there is even greater inconsistency in the number of people 
diagnosed as ‘pre-diabetic’, with the HbA1c test diagnosing fewer people than 
the other two (Gale, 2013).  
 
The American Diabetes Association caused some controversy when it broke with 
WHO recommendations to revise HbA1c diagnostic criteria in an attempt to 
standardise the numbers diagnosed. But this only widened the pool of potential 
cases. Inconsistency between the three tests, combined with the issue of false 
negatives, means that significant proportions of the global population would be 
diagnosed as “significantly at risk” of diabetes if the new diagnostic thresholds 
were implemented in full. Yet the links between pre-diabetes, diabetes and 
diabetes-related complications have not been established (Ford et al., 2010: 
1316). A significant number of people diagnosed with ‘pre-diabetes’ may not go 
onto develop the condition or suffer any complication (Gale, 2013).  
 
 
The problem of diabetes and in particular ‘pre-diabetes’ appears to a certain extent 
socially constructed. Though this does not negate the seriousness of unhealthy and 
sedentary lifestyles, it does however have some implications for debates about the 
choice of services and forms of care in public health policy.  
 
3.4 The ‘Holistic’ Frame and the NHS Health Check  
 
Adherents of the ‘holistic’ frame argue that lifestyle interventions are required to 
solve the problem of diabetes. This includes initiatives which promote exercise and 
healthy lifestyles, such as taxes on transport and investment in cycle lanes and 
school playing fields. These interventions, it is argued, are beneficial because they 
have a broad range of positive effects on society, whereas individualised forms of 
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public health intervention only benefit individuals. Furthermore, ‘holistic’ 
interventions are framed as providing opportunities for people to live healthy 
lifestyles and are not just about regulating consumer choices73.  
 
Debate between adherents of ‘medical’ and ‘holistic’ frames are particularly acute 
regarding the NHS Health Check, a screening initiative which tests for diabetes and 
‘pre-diabetes’. The issue is closely relevant to governance because the NHS Health 
Check is mandatory for local authorities to implement.  
 
The case for screening is based on the assumption that the early detection of ‘pre-
diabetes’ might prompt people to change their lifestyle. Or, with an earlier 
diagnosis, people who have developed the condition in full could initiate treatment 
at an earlier stage of their illness. In normal circumstances, people are diagnosed 
with diabetes via tests after they present to doctors with symptoms or experience 
an episode of diabetic ketoacidosis74. Earlier diagnosis and treatment might reduce 
the risk of harmful complications and costs to health services75. The Check is 
promoted by Diabetes UK and has support among some health professionals and 
campaigners: 
 
Everyone between 40 and 75 should get a NHS Health Check. There are 7 million 
people in this country at high risk and early diagnosis would compel them to reduce 
their risk of developing diabetes. That would be ideal: to stop that 7 million from 
getting it … the earlier you can diagnose somebody, the more likely they will be able 
to manage their condition well. They don’t go on to develop the complications, like 
blindness and amputation, kidney failure and premature death76 
 
A further justification for the Check is that the evidence-base for other forms of 
public health is considered less robust. The Co-Chair of one CCG viewed it as central 
to the CCG’s diabetes strategy and highlights the lack of alternatives to screening 
and interventions in primary care:  
 
It’s expensive and difficult. The evidence isn’t there. We haven’t got the industrial 
scale interventions that are required and we don’t have the socioeconomic 
interventions either, whether it’s taxes on food or driving to encourage people to act 
differently or cycle lanes and the like. Unless we can do it any other way, that’s the 
only way77 
 
                                                           
73 Health campaigner and researcher, 13/04/2015  
74 Diabetic ketoacidosis can require hospitalisation and is caused by low levels of blood glucose. 
People with diabetes can experience both high and low levels of blood glucose, caused by impaired 
insulin levels. When low, the body obtains its energy from fats which can result in a build-up of acid 
in the blood and can in turn cause blackouts and even death in extreme cases. A minority of people 
become aware of their diabetes through an episode of diabetic ketoacidosis.  
75 For this reason, NICE Guidance advocates screening over the age of 40 or with significant risk 
factors, including anyone whose BMI is greater than 23 kg/m2 and anyone who is over the age of 25 
and of South Asian or Chinese descent (NICE, 2012). 
76 Senior representative of advocacy organisation, 22/03/13  
77 Co-chair of CCG and local GP, 24/12/2014 
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However, in line with the wider debate over the use of surrogates in diabetes care, 
the assumption that the early detection of ‘pre-diabetes’ improves health 
outcomes is disputed. A diabetes specialist argued that the treatment of fully-
developed diabetes already makes assumptions about the importance of blood 
glucose control which are magnified when it comes to ‘pre-diabetes’: 
 
They are asking people to screen for, diagnose and treat a risk-factor for a risk-
factor78  
 
Similarly, proponents of ‘holistic’ care argue that the Check represents an 
individualised form of intervention which medicalises the problem of diabetes and 
potentially exposes people to unnecessary and harmful pharmacological therapies 
in primary care79.  
 
Among public health professionals, there is also some scepticism over the Check. 
One public health professional argued the Check tells patients and physicians very 
little that they don’t already know. If people lead unhealthy lifestyles, are obese 
and smoke, then by their 40s or 50s it is likely they will have health problems. This 
does not require confirmation through a Check. Furthermore, the Check is 
purportedly taken up by the “worried well”: healthy people, who are concerned 
about their health, are already frequent users of primary care services and would 
have gone for a check-up with the first onset of diabetes symptoms, with or 
without the Check in place80.  
 
Another public health professional called for a more nuanced implementation of 
the approach. The Check is purportedly most suitable when used to engage with 
marginalised groups who do not frequent primary care services, where a medical 
diagnosis can be first-step to connect people up with health services:    
 
I’m not certain about the value of a universal 40-74 age group health check. I would 
say keep the mandate but it would be nice to get permission to target those who 
most need it, vulnerable groups, the travelling community, the ones who are at risk 
… That’s a much more decent use of resources than population-level stuff81 
 
These accounts are clearly significant because they reveal a major difference 
between the knowledge of people actually implementing the Check and those who 
advocate for its universal application. Additionally, although public health 
professionals recognise the importance of both medical and holistic healthcare, 
there was some concern that current policy and governance is facilitating an overly 
medical approach.  
 
A major issue is the evidence which is informing policy in this area. A Director of 
Public Health argued that the evidence reinforces “the status quo in diabetes 
                                                           
78 Diabetes specialist, 04/12/2014  
79 Health campaigner and researcher, 13/04/2015  
80 Public health professional, 27/04/2015 
81 Director of public health, 13/05/2015 
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around lifestyle behaviour change, the disease model way of the world … At a 
national level it’s still a NHS medical model driven by a conversation about 
evidence”82. This is a direct rejoinder to those who question the evidence-base 
underpinning holistic forms of care (see above). As we saw in chapter 8, advocates 
of the ‘holistic’ frame argue that dominant forms of economic and scientific 
appraisal do not capture the full benefits of lifestyle interventions or the full costs 
of pharmacological therapies. As such, there may be a case to relax positivist 
criteria as to what constitutes good quality evidence in this policy area. Yet even 
here there is significant debate about the evidence underpinning screening 
initiatives. There is indeed some concern in the academic literature that evaluations 
do not capture the full extent of the costs of screening (see box 4).   
 
Box 4 – Appraising the Evidence on Screening for Pre-Diabetes   
Evaluations of screening take the form of economic modelling which model 
possible future outcomes attached to different approaches to screening (at 
various ages and frequencies) (see, for example, JAMA, 1999; Chen et al., 2001; 
Hoerger et al., 2004; Goyder and Irwig, 2000)83. Yet economic modelling is widely 
considered to be inferior to scientific experiments in the evaluation of the 
efficacy of interventions.  
 
Chapter 2 introduced two key questions to policy evaluation: ‘Can/does it work?’ 
And ‘Is it worth it?’ In relation to the first issue, the economic models used in the 
evaluation of screening incorporate data from the UKPDS and other clinical trials 
to model future outcomes. However, clinical trials in diabetes have typically 
involved relatively healthy populations, indeed healthier than the typical diabetes 
patient (Wallace, 1999). As such, what ‘works’ in the model, may not have the 
same level of benefit in actual medical practice, where people are unhealthier 
(Richter et al., 2011). (This issue is explored in more detail in the next section, 
where it arises in the evaluation of the use of pharmacological therapies). 
 
The economic models address the second question – ‘Is it worth it?’ – by 
calculating the costs and benefits of different approaches to screening, in terms 
of their cost, possible monetary contributions from the added life and the 
quantity and quality of that added life (i.e. QALYs) (Waugh et al., 2007). One such 
study found that screening was most cost effective if initiated between 30 and 45 
years of age to all population groups and repeated every 3 to 5 years (Kahn et al., 
2010: 1365). However, evaluations of screening typically only factor in the 
disutilities of diabetes-complications, not the disutilities associated with 
pharmacological therapy (see next section) or screening itself84. There are 
                                                           
82 Director of public health, 13/05/2015 
83 This is due to the fact that there is such a time-lag between screening and outcomes that it would 
be difficult to design a scientific experiments and control all relevant variables (Kahn et al., 2010: 
1373). 
84 For example, in their model, Richard Kahn and colleagues only assign disutilities to diabetes 
complications. Diagnosis through screening scores 0 on the disutility scale – i.e. it has no negative 
impact on individuals’ quality of life – compared to traditional diagnosis, made via tests following 
presenting symptoms to a doctor, scores -0.035. Likewise, the disutilities of medical treatments 
(discussed in more detail in the next section) are not factored in (Kahn et al., 2010: 1366).  
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concerns that economic modelling in diabetes care, not only overstates health 
gains, but also understates costs associated with health interventions, including 
economic costs (Desai et al., 2012) and harms to patients (Huang et al., 2007). 
 
Furthermore, screening has been linked to psychological harms on diagnosis 
(Kralik et al., 2001; Stewart-Brown and Farmer, 1997) and unanticipated health 
problems, by correctly giving people the all clear when they may have significant 
risk factors for other conditions. One study found that some people with risk 
factors for diabetes were sent home “feeling reassured about diabetes but 
unaware of their increased risk of mortality”, making it less likely that they would 
adopt healthier lifestyles. That group ended up with a higher level of 
cardiovascular disease as the group that had been identified as diabetic 
(Spijkerman et al., 2002). 
 
 
3.5 Pharmacological Therapies in Primary Care  
 
In public health, the debate between the ‘holistic’ and ‘medical’ frames centres 
upon the use of pharmacological therapies. Indeed, oral glycaemic drugs and insulin 
are well established in diabetes care and have a significant evidence-base. NICE 
guidance for Type 2 diabetes includes decision maps which involve the sequential 
addition of drugs as their effectiveness gradually declines, starting with oral 
glycaemic drugs and then onto insulin (NICE, 2008b). However, there is concern 
that pharmacological therapies are overused and critics argue that lifestyle 
interventions, including changes to exercise routines and diets, are safer and more 
effective (Wait, 2011). 
 
Among GP, many supported the use of pharmacological therapy in primary care, 
suggesting there is no genuine alternative: 
 
I would love to say that changing lifestyle interventions would work. In the 
population I see trying to change people’s lifestyles is incredibly difficult. Even 
though you explain to people what to do time and time again they will come back 
not having changed anything lifestyle wise. It almost becomes an excuse: ‘oh, I can 
take a tablet rather than doing anything physical’. Lots of people I see have had 
complex problems for a while, they’ve had impaired glucose for a long time before 
they get to me. They’re usually overweight, very sedentary, they eat the wrong 
things. A lot of them come from the Indian subcontinent and simply trying to get 
them to cook with less oil, you feel like you’re banging your head against a brick 
wall. You know they’ll be back in a couple of months anyway. You might have 
started them on the medical treatment anyway85  
 
In this passage, there is a sense that lifestyle interventions are the ideal solution but 
unrealistic. There is also recognition of the unique motivational problem in 
                                                           
85 GP and practice diabetes lead, 30/09/2014 
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healthcare: how to get patients to comply with medical treatments. The availability 
of pharmacological therapies reduces the incentive for patients to change lifestyles 
and in any case it makes medical sense to initiate treatment at an early stage.  
A further argument for the use of pharmacological therapy stems from the absence 
of an evidence-based alternative. One GP defended the use of pharmacological 
therapy in part because the evidence underpinning lifestyle interventions is weak: 
 
It’s a bit of an interesting debate whether you’re medicalising somebody or in fact 
given them an effective intervention because lifestyle interventions are not effective 
generally. First of all, we don’t really offer it all the time because we haven’t got the 
capacity for all to see a dietician or go on an exercise program. Very few people 
picked up with pre-diabetes have any sort of intervention. Then the evidence is that 
a lot of the interventions, unless they’re highly intensive, as the research studies 
were, they won’t be effective anyway. Metformin (a type of diabetes drug) is 
probably more effective. The data isn’t pure on that. But I suspect that people with 
pre-diabetes probably wouldn’t take their tablets anyway. You have to be pretty 
highly motivated to take a tablet every day, wouldn’t you?86 
 
However, there were GPs who were critical of the use of pharmacological 
therapies. Some erred to the ‘holistic’ frame in their appraisals of policy. One GP, 
when asked if the NHS is “getting the right balance in diabetes care between 
lifestyle interventions and medical interventions in diabetes care”, replied: 
 
No, but maybe I’m just old-fashioned. So NICE has lowered the threshold to offer 
people statins and it feels they’re just throwing drugs at a problem when we could 
do lifestyle interventions, take them seriously. We’ve got a well educated population 
and an anxious population who read in the news about what all these drugs can do 
to them, so not everybody wants them. But some people do just want to take a pill. 
Just take a pill. It’s easy. But the problem is then someone doesn’t need to address 
their lifestyles. In diabetes it’s taking drugs to reduce HbA1c and reduce blood 
pressure. It’s a similar dynamic. And then you have the problem once you start with 
the sulfonylureas and thiazolidinediones (types of diabetes drug) people gain in 
weight, then you have to take drugs to control that. It can be a downward spiral87 
 
In this passage, the GP favours lifestyle interventions and highlights risks attached 
to pharmacological therapy. Once again, the availability of drugs exacerbates the 
motivational problem because it provides patients with an easy option for their 
diabetes.  
 
Others are more critical, arguing that the use of pharmacological therapies puts 
patients in danger. Indeed, as in other areas of preventative medicine, there is 
some debate within the medical profession about the medical value of 
pharmacological therapies. A diabetes specialist spoke of the need of a consent 
                                                           
86 Co-chair of CCG and local GP, 24/12/2014 
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form for patients to sign to ensure they have had the benefits and risks of 
pharmacological agents clearly explained to them before therapy is initiated: 
 
You as a physician are initiating a life-long treatment of a drug that causes disutility 
and risk, hypoglycaemia, but also having to prick your fingers, give injections, once, 
twice, four times a day and so on. Why should there not be an informed consent 
form? … You’ll have to take that for the rest of your life. In other words, someone 
who feels well and you are treating speculatively to reduce the risk of a future 
event88 
 
Here, the motivational problem is placed on the providers of care who are failing to 
inform patients of possible risks and overusing pharmacological therapies.  
 
3.6 The Quality and Outcomes Framework  
 
The controversy over pharmacological therapy in primary care is closely related to 
on-going debate about the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Diabetes has 
the most performance indicators in the QOF out of all medical conditions. The 
majority of these are process indicators, which outline various activities which GPs 
have to provide to people with diabetes, including most of the 9 key care processes 
for diabetes (see box 1, above). However, following concerns that the QOF had 
facilitated a ‘tick-box’ approach to healthcare, additional intermediate or surrogate 
outcome measures were included, including blood glucose (HbA1c), blood pressure 
and cholesterol. Besides having to undertake blood checks for these measures, GPs 
have to record the readings and the data is used as a surrogate indicator of health 
outcomes89. Furthermore, GPs are remunerated when they achieve surrogate 
targets, on the assumption that improved improvement across the surrogates will 
translate into health gain. 
 
Among GPs and specialists, there is some widespread agreement that the QOF has 
improved the quality of diabetes care in primary care (Farooqi, 2012). The 9 key 
care processes are considered the basic essentials of diabetes care, serving to alert 
patients and health professionals to early signs of complications.  
 
However, the surrogate outcome measures are more controversial. There is 
uncertainty over what target is appropriate in diabetes care. The original QOF 
target was set at a HbA1c reading of 6.5% mmol, which is also the diagnostic 
threshold for diabetes. This was revised to 7.5% in 2011 when a number of clinical 
trials reported that intensive glucose control strategies increase the risk of heart 
attacks in some categories of patients (Boussageon et al., 2011; Hemmingsen et al., 
2011).  
 
                                                           
88 Diabetes specialist, 04/12/2014  
89 See chapter 6 for a discussion on the various uses of surrogate outcomes in healthcare and 
controversies surrounding their use    
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Some GPs and specialists support the new target. One GP and practice lead for 
diabetes, who also favoured pharmacological interventions in primary care, argued 
that the current QOF target of 7.5% is “about right”: 
 
What I’ve been taught is that by getting HbA1c down to 7 as quickly as possible is 
beneficial for their long-term health. With our newly diagnosed cases that’s what 
we do, aggressively if possible early on … I think that is an appropriate target. When 
it was lower, which is was not long ago, I think that was inappropriate. But they’ve 
relaxed it to 7.5 and it is about right, actually90 
 
Others are more critical, arguing that a 7.5 target is difficult for achieve for patients 
and unfair for GPs, who are performance managed on an outcome they do not 
control: 
 
It takes a tremendous amount of work and with some patients it can be an 
achievement to get the HbA1c level down to 9. And you’ve put all this effort in only 
to be penalised. It can be frustrating … A lot of times people engage with it but do it 
half-heartedly so your hard work isn’t rewarded. The whole thing takes a lot of time. 
There’s diagnosis and a process of drug and life-style changes. There’s time in each 
step91 
 
Others were more understanding of patients, highlighting the challenges involved 
in meeting the target, especially in the context of their busy lives: 
 
Diabetes affects every aspect of what you do, especially if you go on insulin. You’ve 
got so many factors to work in your daily life that it’s just horrendous to imagine 
how you can be well controlled at every time. It’s impossible because it takes such 
dedication to get the average below 7.5. It sometimes happens in short periods 
when someone is pregnant. It’s ‘I’ve got this nine months to keep it controlled. I can 
do that’. Then when their baby is born their HbA1c hits the ceiling because the baby 
is the priority and it’s not looking after itself. So you can see why it’s difficult. It’s 
about trying to provide support and not be driven by numbers but quality of life that 
goes alongside those numbers as well through the up and down process that is 
diabetes. And sometimes it’s easy and sometimes it’s hard. But you’ve still got to be 
there to say, well, what can I do to help?92 
 
Another GP alluded to the ‘holistic’ frame in their appraisal of the target:  
 
The system seems to encourage a short-term fix … we’re on hamster cage and just 
have to do things in such a short-time scale. Lifestyle interventions take a long-time, 
you need to explain a lot in detail, make a case for people to change their lifestyles 
                                                           
90 GP and practice diabetes lead, 30/09/2014 
91 GP, 13/09/2014 
92 Diabetes specialist nurse, 07/02/2014 
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when maybe they don’t want to. And in any case prescribing drugs is a quick easy fix 
to meet the QOF targets93 
 
These accounts reveal some of the complexity involved in the management of 
diabetes in primary care, with treatment decisions and health outcomes affected by 
a range of factors, including central policy, patient compliance and the complexity 
of the condition itself. Clearly, the target is difficult to achieve for patients and 
there are signs that it may put strain on the doctor-patient relationship when 
patients do not achieve it: this is “frustrating … A lot of times people engage with it 
but do it half-heartedly so your hard work isn’t rewarded”94. 
 
However, even though 7.5 is a difficult target to achieve, GPs and specialists alike 
appear to agree that it is a worthwhile goal, however difficult it is for patients. Yet 
some prominent diabetes academics, most notably Professor John S. Yudkin in the 
UK and Victor Montori in the US, have disputed even this claim. In a series of 
publications, Yudkin and Montori criticise what they call the “glucocentric” 
paradigm of care (Yudkin, 2012: 1), involving the intensive control of blood glucose, 
which they argue may not improve health outcomes in some patients and 
constitutes a significant strain on resources. Tight blood glucose control is 
purportedly vital in Type 1 diabetes and early onset Type 2 diabetes, for these 
patients face a lifetime with diabetes and there are cumulative risks of exposure to 
high levels of blood glucose. Yet pharmacological therapies are associated with 
reductions in quality of life and carry significant risks of their own. Older patients, 
who also constitute the largest group of diabetes patients, face reduced quality of 
life but will not live long enough to experience health gain from intensive glucose 
control and may be put at risk (Yudkin et al., 2010: 2084; see also Richter et al., 
2011; Yudkin et al., 2011).  
 
Campaigners refer to these arguments in making a case for holistic interventions, 
for these are not associated with the harmful side-effects of pharmacological 
therapies and may be particularly relevant for older patients, who often have 
comorbidities and thus may have to take multiple drugs, increasing health risks 
further (Collis, 2014). Furthermore, as discussed above, advocates of more holistic 
interventions argue that dominant forms of health technology appraisal do not 
capture the full benefits of lifestyle interventions or the full costs of 
pharmacological therapies. As in public health, there may be a case to relax strict 
positivist criteria over what constitutes good quality evidence in this area. But even 
here the evidence underpinning intensive glucose control is contested on its own 
terms. It would appear that the evidence overstates the capacity of intensive 
glucose control to promote health gain in the restrictive, quantitative sense 
associated with the ‘medical’ frame (see box 5).  
 
Box 5 – Appraising the Evidence on the Intensive Glucose Control 
                                                           
93 GP, 13/09/2014 
94 GP, 13/09/2014 
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The UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) was critical in establishing the link 
between glucose control and health outcomes, purporting to demonstrate that 
blood glucose control reduces the likelihood of diabetes-related complications: 
for every one percent that HbA1c increases, the risk of a macrovascular 
complication increases by 15% and the risk of a microvascular complication 
increases by 37% (ADA, 2002). This, in turn, has informed the world-wide 
development of treatment plans and performance management protocols which 
operate on the assumption the “lower the better” (Boussageon et al., 2011).  
 
However, this assumption has proved controversial. One of the clinical 
researchers on the UKPDS trial who was interviewed for this project criticised the 
way the trial had been interpreted and applied in clinical guidelines and 
performance management protocols: 
 
There’re all sorts of interdigitating phenomena here. The concept of evidence-
base medicine has increasingly become the concept that if you get a significant 
statistical test in a randomised trial that’s evidence that something works and 
should be implemented regardless … But often it works on the basis of huge 
numbers of people being treated for minimal benefit95 
 
Chapter 1 identified two key questions for policy evaluation: Can/Does it work? 
And Is it worth it? The UKPDS trial appears to suggest that intensified glucose 
control can indeed work. But the question is whether it does work, i.e. whether 
interventions tested under scientific conditions will bring about the same level of 
health gain in actual general practice. A key issue to consider when appraising 
clinical trials is whether trial participants match the patients in general practice. 
The UKPDS study involved people in their 40s who were newly diagnosed with 
diabetes and had an average of HbA1c reading of 6-7% mmol. As diabetes 
populations go, this is a “relatively young and healthy population” (Wallace, 
1999). There is the possibility that the reported health gains will not arise in 
general practice, where diabetes patients are typically older, unhealthier and are 
likely to have damage to their blood vessels and nerve cells. The clinical 
researcher once more: 
 
The idea is that if you lower HbA1c by that amount, that ought to be fully 
reversible … It’s like saying that the ex-smoker’s lungs are the same as the non-
smoker’s lungs or that someone who has high blood pressure or high cholesterol 
for years, and their blood pressure and cholesterol is brought down, that their 
arteries are going to return to the pristine, virgin state that they were in twenty 
years ago. Nonsense96 
 
Indeed, in 2008, a clinical trial consisting of older patients with more severe 
diabetes had to be stopped halfway when a statistically significant higher death 
                                                           
95 Diabetes specialist, 04/12/2014 
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rate of 22% was recorded amongst the intensified blood glucose group (Cefalu 
and Watson, 2008: 1164). 
 
A further issue with the evidence is an absence of the patient perspective, which 
is significant given the suggestion above that blood glucose control can have 
significant negative effects on quality of life. In the appraisal of the evidence on 
screening, I noted criticisms of economic evaluations in diabetes care which do 
not take into account the disutilities attached to medical interventions. Huang 
and colleagues note a “striking … lack of accounting for the quality-of-life effects 
of treatments” (Huang et al., 2007: 2479). Given the questionable health benefit 
attached to pharmacological therapy, the failure to account for such disutility is 
significant because costs for at least some categories of patient may outweigh 
the benefits.  
 
Certainly, health gains associated with blood glucose control have to be set aside 
the potential harms of pharmacological therapies. Metformin is the “front-line” 
drug of choice, due to its low cost (a first generation drug, metformin is past its 
patent), capacity to control blood glucose and other positive benefits, such as 
wider improvements in stress management and body fat profiles (Rojas and 
Gomes, 2013). However, the drug does not always work and its effectiveness, like 
other oral glycaemic drugs, diminishes over time and therefore has to be 
replaced or complemented with others (UKPDS, 1998).  
 
There is also some concern regarding the quality of new drugs on the market. As 
in other areas of healthcare, diabetes drugs need only to demonstrate 
improvements across surrogate outcomes in clinical trials. Yet it is precisely the 
assumption that gains across surrogates translate into health gain which is 
increasingly challenged (Yudkin et al., 2011). A number of drugs have been 
withdrawn which, having been approved on the basis of their impact on 
surrogates in clinical trials, were subsequently shown to be harmful for patients 
on long-term health outcomes (Nissen and Wolski, 2007; Wieczorek et al., 2008). 
For this reason, Boussageon and colleagues argue that “(m)arketing new drugs 
based only on evidence that they decrease glucose or HbA1c plasma levels, or 
both, should not be allowed” (Boussageon et al., 2011: 4). 
 
 
3.7 The Control of Glucose and Stakeholder Interests  
 
This section has explored debates in diabetes at a policy level, where choices exist 
between different types and forms of care. There is considerable agreement with 
the Government’s strategy of greater investment in public health and primary care 
but disagreement over specific details of the strategy. There is debate about the 
appropriate balance between medical interventions and lifestyle interventions, 
which reflects a wider debate between the ‘holistic’ and ‘medical’ frames. However, 
even within the medical profession there is debate about the capacity of intensive 
blood glucose control to improve health. There is widespread concern that current 
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policy and governance arrangements are facilitating an overly medical and 
pharmacological approach to the problem of diabetes. 
 
The implications of this debate for governance are discussed in more detail in 
section 5. For now, it suffices to consider why medical forms of care appear to be 
oversupplied relative to holistic care. Part of the problem may be down to the 
complex nature of diabetes and thus reflect the epistemological challenge of 
governance. Certainly, the centrality of blood glucose fits with the requirement of 
performance management and economic and scientific appraisal for easily 
measurable performance indicators. But it may also be down to some of the 
interests present in the policy area. Some diabetes campaigners are critical of the 
role of pharmaceutical companies in the training of health professionals, arguing 
that ‘holistic’ options in primary care are not taken seriously enough: 
 
There is a very short window of opportunity before diet is deemed to have failed and 
pharmaceutical remedies are commenced. Much of the training of both medical 
staff and patient-centred diabetes education is conducted by drug companies – a 
clear conflict of interest97 
 
This contrasts with the view of GPs and specialists, who welcomed the role of 
pharmaceuticals in the training of NHS staff98.  
 
Yet the interests of professionals in complex diabetes treatments have also been 
raised as an issue. John S. Yudkin has argued that it is a confluence of commercial 
and professional interests which is to blame, resulting in a “glucocentric fervour of 
almost religious intensity … among diabetologists, the public health community, 
professional associations and industry” (Yudkin, 2012: 1). Specialists may have an 
interest in intensive glucose control because it complicates the treatment and 
management of the condition, making it necessary for specialist input. However, 
specialists did not all support the approach and some are critical of the overuse of 
pharmacological therapies99. 
 
Finally, there is a question mark over the interests of advocacy groups. As we saw, 
the American Diabetes Association, which advocates on behalf of people with 
diabetes in the US, broke with World Health Organisation to unilaterally establish 
new diagnostic criteria. Ever-increasing numbers, the critics argue, give the ADA 
more influence over policy in their advocacy role. In the UK, though Diabetes UK 
has not followed the ADA’s lead, there is nevertheless some concern over the 
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4.1 Organisational Reforms: Local Authorities and CCGs 
 
The central organisational reform of the Health and Social Care Act (2011) was the 
creation of CCGs, which purportedly place GPs at the heart of the commissioning of 
health services. This organisational reform, in combination with increased plurality 
of providers, is expected to improve the performance of the health service and 
facilitate the development of new models of care around primary care. Alongside 
the creation of CCGs, significant reforms have taken place in public health, with 
local authorities taking over the public health function. Additionally, a new 
organisation has been created, Public Health England, to lead on public health 
issues at a national level and to performance manage local authorities in 
accordance with the Public Health Outcomes Framework (PHOF).   
 
The purpose of this section is to explore the effectiveness of these reforms through 
an assessment of stakeholders’ frames of diabetes governance. I start with local 
authorities, for public health constitutes the broadest level of intervention; and end 
with CCGs. Stakeholders identify some areas where the reforms have improved the 
delivery of diabetes services and some areas where they have not, implying the 
presence of some significant ‘coordination problems’. 
 
4.2 Local Authorities  
 
As we saw, there is broad agreement that public health should be central to any 
diabetes strategy and the Government’s increased investment in this area is widely 
welcomed. Where there is disagreement is over the precise services that are 
required. This disagreement at a policy level extends to disagreement over the 
Government’s organisational reforms. Among health professionals, there is some 
scepticism over the new role for local councils in the health service:  
 
Local politics is coloured by the evidence of local public feeling rather than 
randomised trials. This makes it hard for local politicians to lead public opinion 
rather than follow it. And tougher still when the case for change is not well made 
and seems to be about saving money not lives. The culture of local accountability of 
councillors through elections is a source of mistrust and suspicion (Humphries, 2013) 
 
This reflects the ‘medical-professional’ frame, for the reforms may have unsettled 
the control over decision-making of the medical profession.  
 
Within public health, there is some concern that local authorities are not taking 
their new responsibilities seriously. The Government has placed a ring-fence on 
public health budgets to prevent local authorities from using the public health 
budget for other purposes. However, public health budgets are reportedly being 
“raided” and the public health dimensions of other council services, such as 
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education or adult social care, are being cut101. This was a major issue for a Public 
Health England civil servant who, while recognising the potential of linking up 
public health with local authorities, criticised the stance of many local authorities 
on public health and called for greater powers to intervene in poorly performing 
local authorities. Indeed, while the PHOF could usefully demonstrate poor 
performance, its performance management component is considered too weak to 
enforce local authorities to commission appropriate services:  
 
Local authorities are autonomous and can say ‘no’. Many do say ‘no’. They say ‘no’ 
when it’s not a mandated service102 
 
This call for greater centralisation combines aspects of the ‘medical-professional’ 
frame and the ‘managerialist’ frame: heightened performance management is 
required from the centre to incentivise local actors because of poor performance at 
a local level. 
 
However, some public health professionals now employed by local councils offer a 
far more positive appraisal of the shift. These positive appraisals exhibit elements 
of the ‘progressive’ frame, which seeks democratic reform of the health service and 
the greater involvement of citizens in decision-making. 
 
Indeed, in sharp contrast to wider concerns about local politics, a Director of Public 
Health welcomed the “lines of accountability” at the council, from the department 
management team, to the lead member, to corporate management, to cabinet and 
the council, which appear to improve both the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
policy. At the different stages, people make recommendations. The lead member 
has been particularly useful in this regard: 
 
He’s been around for many decades so it’s actually a useful sounding board. It’s 
been ‘you’re a local, what do you think?’103  
 
Furthermore, if decisions do go to cabinet or council in the case of the Annual 
Report, this is necessary to improve the legitimacy of policy:    
 
I’d much rather have that than basically the lack of transparency and accountability 
I would perceive, I used to see in reality, in the old PCT days. The board was a public 
meeting but nobody would turn up. I actually think the political process with the 
local authority, dare I say it, is something that the NHS could learn from104 
 
The new role for local authorities is also praised for opening up new possibilities in 
diabetes care and other areas of public health. Once again, the Director praised the 
                                                           
101 In one survey 53% of public health professionals believed that public health budgets were not ring-
fenced in practice and shortages of funds were impacting upon their ability to plan and deliver health 
improvement programmes (Royal Society for Public Health, 2014: 6). 
102 Deputy to regional director of Public Health England, 01/06/2015 
103 Director of public health, 13/05/2015 
104 Surveys of health professionals suggest this view is widespread (LGA, 2013) 
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reforms, highlighting a new capacity to engage in joined-up working with 
departments across the council: 
 
I’ve really enjoyed it. The ability to raise the profile of public health with the County 
Council and District County Councils in particular, to use that and embed models of 
prevention and really do a nice bit of service redesign if you like, joining up with 
children and family services, recognising the role we play with adults in communities 
and reducing the demand on adult social care, even the colleagues in the 
Environmental Transport who do cycle proficiency, training, safety, road safety stuff 
and food waste stuff ... To come in here daily, on a good day, it feels like a bit of a 
playground really. It’s ‘wow, I’ve never worked with you before’. That’s been really 
good. That’s the benefit of having public health in a local authority105 
 
A public health officer at the same council highlighted a joint programme with the 
council’s Environment and Transport Department, involving a bid for funding from 
the Department of Health. The Public Health Department helped write up the bid, 
providing expertise on what the scheme would mean for health outcomes. The bid 
was successful and once the infrastructure was upgraded, more funds were 
invested on health promotion to raise awareness of the initiative and ensure the 
new cycle lanes would be used. This purportedly resulted in a 40% increase in 
cycling activity (measured by roadside counters) and a 2% shift from cars to 
cycling106. 
 
This is significant because it suggests the reforms potentially facilitate the 
development and delivery of holistic forms of public health, viewed by many as 
critical to combating increases in both obesity and diabetes. In this way, the new 
relationship between public health and local councils may be facilitating the 
discovery of new solutions to diabetes which may have not have been apparent 
before or which may have been difficult to implement107.   
 
A further concern at a local level is the use of the PHOF for the purposes of 
performance management. A key issue is the actual purpose of the PHOF. As we 
saw, the advocates of heightened performance management in public health view 
the PHOF as a managerialist tool to improve the performance of poorly performing 
councils. Yet local public health professionals noted a number of different benefits 
attached to the initiative. It can facilitate joint-up working by providing a “talking 
point” about mutual interests of different departments and public services. 
Furthermore, the PHOF’s quarterly updates are reported in local media and are the 
topic of conversations with council members and the wider public about local 
public health services, serving to facilitate local democratic processes and 
accountability.  
 
                                                           
105 Surveys of health professionals suggest this view is widespread (LGA, 2013) 
106 Public health professional, 13/05/2015 
107 Case study research carried out by the Local Government Association and Public Health England 
reveals a number of examples of service redesigns which were purportedly made possible by the 
reorganisation (LGA, 2013) 
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The arguments again exhibit the ‘progressive’ frame, highlighting both the value of 
local democratic processes and the potential of the reforms to contribute to them. 
Furthermore, local actors disagree that PFOF can effectively be used as a 
performance management tool. The broad nature of many of the indicators within 
PHOF, such as rates of child poverty and homelessness, are said to be useful 
precisely because they provide a “talking point” with other departments. Yet they 
are also affected by multiple factors that are beyond the control of councils, such as 
economic growth or migration. It therefore makes little sense to use these 
indicators in performance management because the reported performance does 
not necessarily reflect upon the quality of local services108.  
 
Furthermore, were Public Health England to take on a more interventionist 
performance management role, this could compromise efforts to work with other 
departments. Recent Public Health England initiatives have purportedly been 
unhelpful at a local council level because council departments did not respond to 
the medical language:  
 
My one fear is centralisation. If you look at the PHOF, it says ‘We’re going to do 
something about obesity. We’re going to do something diabetes’ and so on. From a 
public health perspective, I can understand what they are getting at but from a local 
authority perspective we do it in a different way. If I walk around here and say ‘let’s 
do something about obesity, let’s do something about diabetes’, the response is, 
‘well that’s the NHS’. You need to find the language and then have an outcome, 
rather than just have an outcome and say “what are you doing about it?” That for 
me is the tension between how some of the national things are expressed and the 
local stuff109 
 
4.3 CCGs and the Shift of Diabetes Services into Primary Care 
 
As with the Government’s reforms of public health, the creation of CCGs received 
mixed appraisals among stakeholders. There is widespread agreement that primary 
care should be central to any diabetes strategy, yet some concern, among health 
professionals, regarding the quality of CCG commissioning and the ongoing 
development of the market system. In this section, I explore stakeholder frames of 
these different aspects of the reforms, beginning with the perspective of CCG 
members before going onto explore the different professional perspectives. I 




Among CCG members and advocates of the reforms, the creation of CCGs stands to 
improve the performance of the health service across a range of criteria. Their 
appraisals of the reforms exhibit aspects of the ‘market’ frame, emphasising the 
importance of patient choice and responsiveness, as well as the potential of 
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markets to create efficiency savings. On the one hand, patients purportedly favour 
primary care because it is closer to home and delivered by their GP, whom they 
have better relationships with than specialists in hospital settings. Furthermore, it is 
said to be necessary to develop primary and community care because hospitals are 
“dangerous places” and patients should only be referred to hospitals if absolutely 
necessary110.  
 
On the other hand, CCGs are better placed than PCTs, the organisations they 
replace, to drive through efficiency savings. An advocate of the reforms highlighted 
the closer connection between financial and medical decision-making as a key 
factor:  
 
I think the only way the NHS would survive is if the financial and the medical 
decisions are together. Because doctors can be in the literal sense of the word 
irresponsible if they believe there is no financial constraints. Given that there are 
financial constraints then acting is if there is not is unhelpful for the safety and 
efficiency of the system … Imagine if I run a CCG and you’re a doctor, you’re 
prescribing very expensive drugs. I have a peer-to-peer discussion with you. It’s 
much better with financial pressures. You can only divorce the financial and the 
medical if you have limitless money. And some doctors like to believe that in the real 
world there isn’t111 
 
The development of primary care may be particularly appropriate for diabetes care. 
A Co-Chair of a CCG and local GP argued that hospitals absorb too much in terms of 
resources and most diabetes services could be provided “in the community”. The 
management of diabetes does not involve expensive hospital equipment and care 
could potentially be provided in any setting, whether a hospital, a GP practice or 
the home. The creation of CCGs has the potential of improving the quality and 
efficiency of care:  
 
The quality of diabetes care is gradually improving. We can finally move care out of 
hospitals112 
 
In the future, primary care is expected to provide the bulk of diabetes care, 
supported by mobile diabetes specialist teams, while more complex surgical 
procedures provided in smaller concentrations of specialist centres. Indeed, the 
very distinction between primary and secondary care is said to be outdated:  
 
This divide between primary and secondary care is an artificial one. What you really 
need to be thinking about who can provide the right level of care and then where 
can they provide it. Certainly for some diabetes services, you need specialist input. 
But it doesn’t have to be in a hospital setting113 
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113 Co-chair of CCG and local GP, 24/12/2014 
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In some areas of the country, integrated models of care have developed which span 
the secondary and primary care divide and which are widely regarded as successful 
(Diabetes UK, 2014b). This is clearly significant, as the reforms appear to have 
provided the impetus for the discovery and development of new models of 
diabetes services.  
 
Furthermore, though some patient representatives were critical of the reforms, 
others welcomed them. One LINK patient representative and executive of a local 
equalities charity praised their CCG for its community outreach schemes and 
provision of translation services in primary care. The local area has a significant 
ethnic and recent immigrant population and the CCG has been working to connect 
these communities up with health services. The CCG’s work on health inequalities 
purportedly far outstrips that of the previous PCT114.  
 
Similarly, a further LINK patient representative and resident of a rural town praised 
the attempt to develop primary care. The town is 22 miles from the nearest major 
hospital and transport to and from the hospital is difficult. The development of 
primary care has enabled local residents to access services far easier than before115. 
This is important because it demonstrates that not only are patient-centred criteria, 
such as assess and responsiveness, important to patients, but the reforms appear 
to have enhanced the performance of the health service in this regard.   
 
However, there are some significant criticisms of both the performance of CCGs 
and the attempt to develop primary care. In keeping with the ‘medical-professional’ 
frame, public health professionals, GPs and specialists raised concerns mainly over 
the quality of care. However, health professionals, particularly GPs and specialists, 
also drew upon patient-centred criteria in their appraisals and some patient 
representatives were also highly critical of the reforms.  
 
Public Health Perspectives  
 
A major concern of public health professionals is that the status of public health has 
been downgraded in the health service, reinforcing a ‘medical’ model of healthcare. 
With public health no longer situated in the same organisation as commissioners of 
healthcare, it is increasingly difficult to influence the commissioning of healthcare: 
 
I think our ability to influence wider policy and local authorities has gone up. But our 
ability to influence CCGs and the medical component of public health has gone 
down116 
 
This downgrading of public health in the health service is resulting in the 
inadequate commissioning of preventative medical care. Indeed, while the term 
‘prevention’ is often used to refer to interventions delivered outside of medical 
settings, medical care also has a preventative component, whether delivered in 
                                                           
114LINK patient representative, 29/02/14  
115 LINK patient representative, 28/02/2014  
116 Public health professional, 27/04/2014  
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primary care or secondary care (Finkel, 2012). This includes lifestyle interventions 
which require a referral, for example for people with obesity or complex diabetes 
who require specialist advice on diets and healthy eating. Yet, while this form of 
care is vital in keeping people out of hospital, it is not being adequately 
commissioned. Following the dissolution of PCTs and with local authorities having 
taken on the public health function, CCGs do not have the knowledge and expertise 
to commission this aspect of healthcare. Many CCGs are said to have neglected it, 
claiming local authorities were responsible for prevention when this is preventative 
medical care: 
 
There’s a feeling in some CCGs that ‘public health and prevention is not something 
we do now, that’s gone to local authorities’. That’s something I’ve been told before 
in meetings. Most of their work on prevention, and I’ve looked at plans of all 19 
CCGs in xxxxxxxxxx, it’s minimal. Its ‘local authorities do x, y and z’. Well the job of 
the local authority is to keep well, people well. It’s the job of the NHS to make 
unwell people well117 
 
This is clearly significant because it highlights a potentially significant failure of local 
decision-making. Preventative medical care is widely considered as vital to keep 
people out of hospital and a failure to commission it is likely to result in adverse 
health outcomes and ultimately costly hospital admissions (Finkel, 2012). The new 
organisational structures appear to be failing to effectively utilise the existing 
knowledge and expertise of public health professionals. The issue may well be a 
problem of incentives, with CCGs imposing costs on others in the form of an 
externality. However, CCGs will themselves suffer the costs of inadequate 
preventative services, suggesting the problem could simply be the case of a lack of 
resources. Indeed, one public health professional argued that CCGs simply did not 
have the requisite resources to commission adequate care:  
 
…to be fair CCGs are short on capacity so they are struggling to meet all their bases 
as well118 
 
Indeed, CCGs have smaller budgets relative to PCTs, which means they focus only 
on the “big contracts with the large providers”119.  
 
The decline in the quality of CCG commissioning appears to reflect a problem of the 
Government’s reforms. Because PCTs combined the commissioning of public health 
and healthcare, it may have been easier for public health professionals to influence 
the commissioning of healthcare. A Director of Public Health argued that, while it 
would not be impossible to commission fully joined-up pathways under the new 
arrangements, it would nevertheless be “bureaucratic”:  
 
It is just more difficult to put in place an end-to-end joined up weight management 
pathway … Simple things like getting everyone in a room together to thrash it out, 
                                                           
117 Deputy to regional director of Public Health England, 01/06/2015 
118 Director of public health, 13/05/2015 
119 Deputy to regional director of Public Health England, 01/06/2015 
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let alone the potential for individual organisational commissioning decisions to be 
made that aren’t aware of what others are doing, particularly when capacity is 
short. If everyone had the cash and the capacity to work together it would be 
bureaucratic but not unsortable120 
 
In this way, the reforms appear to have increased transactions costs, necessitating 
greater effort and resources on behalf of local actors to ensure that effective 
services are commissioned.  
 
From a public perspective, therefore, the reforms have had a mixed impact on the 
quality of care. The new links with local authorities present new opportunities to 
deliver new and local forms of public health. Yet public health professionals no 
longer have influence over the commissioning of healthcare, which may result in 
the inadequate commissioning of preventative care. Indeed, the separation of 
public health and the commissioning of healthcare raise questions about the 
effectiveness of current arrangements to utilise existing knowledge and 
expertise121. As discussed below, specialists make similar criticisms of CCGs, 
suggesting the exclusion of specialists from commissioning also results in the 
inadequate commissioning of specialist healthcare. 
 
GP and Patient perspectives  
 
GP appraisals of the changing reforms differed to a great extent. A GP who sat on a 
CCG board was firmly in favour of the reforms, viewing them as crucial to the 
development of good quality care. Yet other GPs raised some concerns. Among all 
GPs, there was broad agreement that primary care can take on more diabetes 
services but concern that the requisite resources will not be available. Given 
increased demand for diabetes services, this constitutes a possible “crises point” for 
the health service as primary care takes on more cases, delivers more complex 
services but does not have the resources to maintain quality122.  
 
A further issue for local GPs is performance management. The Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) has already been discussed above. At a local level, 
there is some recognition of the importance of the QOF but also concern that it 
contains too many indicators and the indicators often change, which was confusing 
both for GPs and patients. Furthermore, local performance management on 
prescriptions and referrals has purportedly intensified following the introduction of 
CCGs. One GP complains of “constant churn and directions to change what you 
prescribe”. In diabetes, the type of Proton Pump Inhibitors (a drug which reduces 
gastric acid, a possible side-effect of oral glycaemic drugs) frequently changes, 
which is frustrating for patients:  
 
                                                           
120 Director of public health, 13/05/2015 
121 Although local authorities and CCGs have obligations to work with each other through the Health 
and Wellbeing Boards, much of the current emphasis of such joint-working is adult social care rather 
than prevention.  
122 GP and practice lead for diabetes, 30/09/2014  
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Your patient is like, ‘well I don’t like this pill. I don’t like the red pills; I like the blue 
pills’. And they don’t understand the new treatment they’re on123 
 
Another GP complained about the performance management of hospital referrals, 
which did not “appear to be very rational”, as the vast majority of cases received 
medical attention, implying that a referral had been warranted: 
 
You get this phone call and you know it’s the CCG about referrals124  
 
While a stated aim of the Government was to make GPs central to decision-making 
and enhance the performance of the service across a range of patient-centred 
criteria, it would appear that many treatment decisions are not decided by either 
GPs or their patients. This was true of treatment plans and targets, which are set 
out in the QOF; but it also appears true of decisions over prescriptions and 
referrals. Indeed, though GPs were mainly concerned with the quality of care, their 
appraisals were also informed by a concern for their patients and did clearly include 
patient-centred criteria. Some suggested that the heightened use of economic 
incentives in primary care was adversely affecting the doctor-patient relationship:  
 
Patients come in and say ‘You’re probably going to strike me off the list now 
because I’ve got all of these problems’. Or they’re on expensive drugs and don’t 
believe they’ll continue to receive treatment, no matter if it’s not true. So there’s 
this pressure on the doctor-patient relationship125 
 
This was also noted by patient representatives in their appraisals of the reforms. 
One LINK Representative, who also had diabetes, spoke of their distrust in their GP. 
A retired teacher, they had witnessed the “erosion of professionalism” in teaching 
due to market reform and sensed this was happening in healthcare today. Though 
they hadn’t experienced issues with their diabetes care, this was explained by the 
national attention on diabetes. The quality of care may have deteriorated for other 
conditions, where there is not such attention:  
 
Every time I see my GP I see the pound signs flash in their eyes126 
 
Another argued the reforms had transformed the role of the GP from a patient 
advocate to a rationer of care:   
 
I want my GP to be my advocate, not weigh my health problems up with Mrs So-
and-So127  
 
                                                           
123 GP, 23/09/2014  
124 GP and practice lead for diabetes, 30/09/2014  
125 GP, 23/09/2014  
126 LINK patient representative, 28/02/2014  
127 Public health professional, 27/04/2015 
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This is significant because it suggests not all patient-centred criteria are realisable 
under the current arrangements. There appears to be a tension between the role of 
CCGs in driving through efficiency savings and certain patient-centred criteria. 
 
Specialist and Patient Perspectives  
 
Though recognising the importance of primary care and the centrality of GPs to 
diabetes care, specialists were the group most critical of current attempts to 
develop primary care and of the role of CCGs in that regard. Specialists emphasise 
the importance of professional skills and expertise in the management of diabetes. 
Though diabetes has the appearance of a simple condition and does not typically 
involve expensive hospital equipment and care, it nevertheless requires specialist 
input, for otherwise early warning signs are missed and complications arise at a 
later stage, requiring intrusive and expensive surgical procedures.  
 
On this basis, many specialists criticise the quality of care provided by new private 
providers and argue there are limits to the extent that primary care can take on 
complex diabetes services. However, quality of care is not the only criteria which 
specialists draw upon in their appraisals of policy and governance. For it is also 
argued that patients are reluctant to receive complex diabetes services in primary 
care.  
 
A diabetes specialist nurse described various opening evenings at which patients of 
a specialist centre raised concerns over a local initiative which sought to develop 
primary care: 
 
That was the biggest thing they raised, it was ‘my GP doesn’t know how to look 
after my diabetes. Do I have a say in where I want to go?’ Obviously the politically 
correct answer is ‘of course you do, you can go wherever you want’. Whereas in 
reality what we see is quite different128 
 
This issue was also noted by diabetes campaigners and patient representatives. A 
Diabetes Voice representative, who also had diabetes, criticised efforts to move 
care in the “community” because the quality of care was “rubbish” and they require 
access to specialist care, which is increasingly difficult to attain129. Another criticised 
the actions of some CCGs:  
 
There is this heroic CCG that is putting all of its Type 1 services out into general 
practice. That’s pretty catastrophic for someone who may have been looked after 
for twenty years, who are now told they have to see their GP who knows bugger all 
about Type 1, probably less than the patient does130 
 
This is clearly significant because it provides further examples of constraints on 
patient-centred criteria.  
                                                           
128 Diabetes specialist nurse, 07/02/2014  
129 Diabetes voice representative, 12/06/2015  




Developing Integrated Diabetes Services Across Primary and Secondary Care  
 
Disagreement between specialists and CCG members touches upon wider issues 
regarding the organisation of the health service and the payment mechanisms 
through which resources are distributed within it. Indeed, CCG members and 
specialists, most of whom are employed by NHS Hospitals, represent the different 
sides of the purchaser/provider split. Both raise objections to New Labour’s 
marketised system of payment called Payment-by-Results (PbR), which reimburses 
providers for their activities. PbR is currently being extended to cover most health 
services and is purportedly a driver of efficiency because it embeds a financial 
incentive into the provision of care and facilitates the market, for individual 
activities are costed and can potentially be outsourced to any provider, whether an 
NHS provider, a GP practice or a private provider. However, there are concerns that 
PbR is not appropriate for complex conditions such as diabetes which can involve 
multiple providers and patients are often in and out of hospital (Diabetes UK, 
2014b).  
 
While PbR is criticised by both CCG members and specialists, it is for different 
reasons. CCG members are concerned that PbR creates a perverse incentive for 
NHS Hospitals to hold onto work and not support initiatives in primary care and the 
community. Also, specialists are accused of failing to provide enough support to 
GPs because it isn’t in their professional interests to do so. A CCG Manager 
identified two major barriers to developing initiatives in primary care: 
 
The biggest major barrier is funding, namely that you can pull services out of 
hospital but it’s very difficult to get the money to follow. Hospitals are reluctant to 
down size. They are paid on a tariff basis so they’re reluctant to release work. There 
are issues with how we get the resources out, not just the work but the resources. 
The second barrier is professional barriers. There is still some resistance around 
releasing work to generalists or coming out into the community131 
 
However, specialists argue that PbR has contributed to the inadequate 
commissioning of diabetes services and in particular specialist diabetes services. 
Part of the problem is that outsourcing of individual activities, facilitated by PbR, 
serves to fragment pathways. This potentially compromises the quality of care 
because specialists no longer oversee the different aspects of the pathway. In 
diabetes, the Government identified podiatry services as candidates for outsourcing 
under the Any-Qualified-Provider initiative but changed its position following a 
campaign led by Diabetes UK and health professionals called ‘Putting Feet First’. 
Podiatry services are said to be particularly unsuitable for marketisation because 
early detection is important to avoid ulcers and amputations (Diabetes UK, 2012b): 
 
It’s about specialism. You could be a really highly trained general podiatrist but 
you’re not going to be a specialist diabetic podiatrist. The foot thing is so delicate. 
                                                           
131 Co-chair of CCG and local GP, 24/12/2014 
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It’s often the first thing that alerts people to the diagnosis … You could get lots of 
recreational toe nail cutting going on132 
 
PbR also increases the costs of specialist care. Whereas prior to PbR, payment for 
specialist diabetes services was tied up in block contracts for NHS hospitals, 
specialist services are now assigned a price like any other service. There is a clear 
incentive for CCGs to not use specialist services because it is cheaper for them to 
keep patients in primary care, creating a disincentive for CCGs and GPs to refer 
onto specialists. Some CCGs have disassembled specialist services altogether. An 
example repeatedly highlighted by specialists is the case of diabetes care in 
Southampton, where the local CCG withdrew funding and sought to develop 
primary care, only for admissions to hospitals to increase. For the Professor of 
Medicine and Consultant Physician Roy Taylor, the CCG’s actions resulted in the 
“complete disintegration of specialist care to a disgraceful degree” (NAO, 2012). 
 
There is also concern that the increasing tight performance management of GP 
referral patterns (see above) has meant that patients are kept in primary care for 
too long, resulting in adverse health outcomes and costly surgery in the long-
term133. One diabetes specialist spoke of the “referral police”: CCGs who put great 
pressure on GPs who were seen to be referring on too much. The issue is 
exacerbated by the uncertainties surrounding diabetes management, which makes 
it unclear exactly when a referral is necessary:  
 
The complications side of things is easy. So if someone has gone into renal failure 
it’s quite easy to say, ‘yes, your kidney has really dropped off so we’ll refer you to 
the diabetes clinic’. It’s a kind of a no brainer and is easy to work out. But if 
someone’s glucose levels are just rising year on year, do you try different therapy, 
try different therapy, try different therapy, before you refer them back? I’m guessing 
they probably will134 
 
This is significant because it identifies further examples of failures of local decision-
making. In some areas, the development of primary care has clearly been managed 
poorly, resulting in adverse health outcomes and ultimately costs in the long-run.   
A further consequence of PbR and the shift of care into primary care is that many 
hospitals are cutting back on their specialist posts because no longer can these 
posts be subsidised with profits from more basic services. Some Trusts are now 
without a multidisciplinary diabetes team135. Yet specialists not only provide care 
                                                           
132 Senior representative of advocacy organisation, 22/03/2013 
133 Inadequate referrals have been linked to diabetes-related complications and inefficiency, as 
expensive treatments and surgical procedures are required in later years The NAO estimate that a 
reduction in late referrals for foot ulcers by up to 50 percent would save £34 million a year by 
decreasing the amount of major amputation 
134 Diabetes specialist nurse, 07/02/2014  
135 The main data source on inpatient diabetes care – the National Diabetes Inpatient Audit (NaDIA) – 
found that specialist support was unavailable in a number of sites: in 2011 30.9 percent of providers 
did not have an inpatient diabetes specialist nurse, rising to 32.2 percent in 2012 (Health and Social 
Centre, 2013). The Diabetes Specialist Nurse Workforce Audits suggest that specialist nursing 
positions are being frozen or not replaced as vacancies are on the rise (Diabetes UK, 2011) and the 
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directly to patients but also train staff in the management of diabetes. There is 
concern that recent cases of insulin prescription errors, hypoglycaemia episodes 
and foot problems in hospitals may increase if the decline of specialist services is to 
continue136. While this problem relates to wider trends in policy regarding the 
outsourcing of basic and more profitable forms of care to the private sector and the 
development of primary care, it may also constitute a failure of local decision-
making. For there is evidence to suggest that diabetes specialist teams save 
hospitals money because they decrease patient stays and hospitals are paid on a 
per-patient basis (Kerr, 2011):  
 
It’s a completely inappropriate allocation of resources. Hospitals all get the same 
resource under the tariff system for the patients that they see and they’re just 
choosing not to invest in an in-patient specialist team. The evidence is 
overwhelming that they’re cost-effective137 
 
Nevertheless, where there are clear examples of inefficiencies at a local level, in 
some areas the Government’s reforms have facilitated the development of new 
models of care which span the divide between primary care and secondary care, 
involving collaboration between CCGs and Foundation Trusts and which have 
support from a range of stakeholders (Diabetes UK, 2014b). For example, in 
Leicester and Leicestershire, the 3 CCGs in the surrounding area have collaborated 
with specialists employed by the local Trust to design and commission a diabetes 
pathway which spans secondary and primary care. Diabetes specialists will provide 
complex treatment and surgical procedures in secondary care, where there has 
been significant investment. Furthermore, a mobile specialist team consisting of 
diabetes-specialist nurses will provide support for primary care. GP practices, 
meanwhile, have gradually taken on more complex diabetes cases, with the best 
practices taking on a set of “Enhanced Services” and others practices free to refer 
complex patients onto specialists or other GP practices in the surrounding area.  
 
The model is widely vaunted among stakeholders and specifically takes into 
account the perverse incentives in primary care and secondary care, the variable 
quality of general practice and the destabilisation of NHS Hospitals. Though 
contractual negotiations are on-going (after three years of negotiations, starting in 
April 2012), there are plans for providers to be paid through ‘block’ contracts rather 
than PbR, removing the incentive for them to hold onto patients, while patients 
have a ‘seamless’ pathway between different services and in and out of hospital. 
Yet the purported benefits of the model have to be set aside the significant 
administrative burdens involved in setting up the pathway. Both CCG members and 
specialists highlight significant transactions costs involved in working across 
organisational boundaries and negotiating the financial arrangements for the 
project: 
                                                           
annual Consultant Workforce Audit suggests that over the past four years there has been an overall 
downward trend in the appointment of Consultant Diabetologists (Diabetes UK, 2012). 
136 The NAO estimate that a reduction in insulin errors alone by 50% could save £3.35 million 
annually  




The system doesn’t create those natural collaborations. They (CCGs and Foundation 
Trusts) are almost set up to compete with each other, not to collaborate with each 
other … I think negotiating the money and I think the organisational barriers have 
been the major challenges in setting this up138   
 
Current arrangements, characterised as they are by the purchaser-provider split 
and PbR, appear to work against efforts to collaborate across organisational 
boundaries and facilitate the development of primary care in a way that realises 
widely shared goals of the health service.  
  
                                                           
138 Academic and diabetes specialist, 17/03/2014 
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5.1 Evaluating Diabetes Governance and Policy 
 
Section 2 set out the Conservative/Coalition Government’s diabetes strategy. As we 
saw, a central feature of the Government’s diabetes strategy is its revised approach 
to performance management through the Outcomes Frameworks. The strategy 
represents an attempt to ‘steer’ local actors to the attainment of policy objectives, 
with less disease-specific guidance in order to scope for local actors to fashion local 
solutions to health problems. Additionally, through the creation of CCGs and local 
authorities, the Government’s reforms seek to promote more patient-centred care 
and holistic forms of public health.  
 
Yet Diabetes UK has consistently campaigned for a nationwide response to solve 
the problems posed by diabetes. As the NAO and the PAC have shown, diabetes 
services perform poorly across a variety of measures, including poor 
implementation of the 9 key care processes, a rise of diabetes-related 
complications and widespread failure to implement the NHS Health Check, all of 
which are said to contribute to “excess deaths” of up to 24,000 people a year (PAC, 
2012). In keeping with the ‘managerialist’ frame, some argue that greater 
centralisation is required, involving diabetes-specific clinical governance.  
 
This section draws out some of the implications of the preceding frame analysis for 
this debate. I summarise the main issues where it appears that governance and 
policy is resulting in ‘coordination problems’ and identify alternatives strategies 
where appropriate. In the process, I address evaluative questions of governance 
concerning the appropriateness of different forms of centralisation and 
decentralisation, as well as the use of markets in provision of health services.  
 
5.2 Decentralisation or Centralisation?   
 
The case for greater centralisation hinges upon evidence of poor quality care at a 
local level. Above, the frame analysis did indeed identify examples of poor local 
decision-making which suggest that governance is failing to provide local actors 
with both the knowledge and the incentive required to act on diabetes. Public 
health professionals highlight examples where CCGs have commissioned 
inadequate preventative medical care, which may result in complications in the 
long-term. Specialists highlight examples where CCGs and hospitals have 
commissioned inadequate specialist services, resulting in a direct increase in 
diabetes complications and hospital admissions. In Southampton, funding was 
withdrawn from specialist services altogether, only for investment to return once 
the rise in complications was apparent. There is also concern about pressures on GP 
referrals, which may lead to patients being kept too long in primary care, again 
resulting in complications and unnecessary costs.  
 
Of course, these accounts may well reflect the interests of public health 
professionals and specialist in reporting them, but they corroborate with the 
concerns of patient representatives, Diabetes UK, the NAO and the PAC. Greater 
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centralisation, in the form of diabetes-specific clinical governance, may be required 
to improve decisions and actions at a local level. 
 
However, since the publication of the NAO and PAC reports, comparative 
international evidence has come to light which suggests the UK has “significantly 
lower” rates of early death due to diabetes than the European average, faring 
better than most other countries (Murray et al., 2013). This is clearly significant 
because if NHS diabetes services perform well relative to other countries, then 
reports of poor quality of diabetes services may be overstating the problem. 
Indeed, some health professionals defend the NHS’ record, claiming that negative 
performance data merely reflects the enormity of the problem of diabetes and the 
fact the NHS has developed systems of data collection in diabetes which other 
health systems do not have139.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis above suggests that existing diabetes-specific 
governance, including targets for the delivery of the NHS Health Check and blood 
glucose control, does not encapsulate dispersed values and knowledge. Among 
health professionals, there is significant debate over the appropriateness of the 
centrality of blood glucose in diabetes care. I identified two understandings of the 
condition and how it might be solved. Where adherents of the ‘holistic’ frame 
understand Type 2 diabetes as a social problem linked to unhealthy lifestyles, 
adherents of the ‘medical’ frame understand it as a medical problem and one that 
is linked specifically to blood glucose. These frames share a commitment to health 
gain in a broad sense, although holistic care is associated with qualitative values of 
autonomy, wellbeing empowerment. Nevertheless, by exploring the content of 
health professional frames and analysing the evidence, I identified uncertainties 
over the capacity of medical care to promote health even in a restrictive, 
quantitative sense. 
 
One implication of this is that, the NHS Health Check and blood glucose control 
aside, the Government’s attempt to shift away from disease-specific governance to 
a focus on long-term and cardiovascular conditions is warranted. Similarly, the 
development of public health and primary care also appears to be warranted.  
In public health, the new role of local authorities in public health is perhaps the 
most promising aspect of the Government’s reforms. As we saw, the framings of 
local public health exhibited aspects of the ‘progressive’ frame, emphasising the 
importance of democratic values and accountability. These local perspectives 
provided warnings of excessive centralisation and performance management. Some 
local stakeholders viewed the NHS Health Check to be both inefficient and 
inappropriate. Decentralisation over this decision would enable local actors to 
fashion their own solutions to diabetes. Additionally, local perspectives provide a 
counterview to the argument that local councils are performing poorly and require 
greater performance management. While some councils may indeed be genuinely 
poorly performing, poor performance could also reflect wider financial pressures on 
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local authorities and greater performance management may undermine 
collaboration across local council departments. 
 
Plans to cut local councils further and recent cuts to public health budgets highlight 
the scale of the challenges which local councils and public health departments face 
(Cooper, 2015). Though there is clear potential for the development of holistic 
forms of public health, more resources are required if health problems are to be 
solved in this manner. There is a sense that the medical route to prevention, 
involving screening initiatives and pharmacological therapy, is easier and cheaper.   
 
In primary care, performance management is viewed more favourably. Specifically 
in diabetes, the QOF is widely held to have improved the quality of care, providing 
“organisation”140. There is broad agreement that the process indicators within the 
QOF are vital in the provision of care. Some health professionals are concerned 
over plans to decentralise performance management by reducing the significance 
of the QOF as a proportion of practice income and allowing CCGs to set 
performance indicators at a local level. The issue is particularly significant given the 
entrance into the market of private providers, which have a poor record in the 
provision of care and data collection (Pollock and Macfarlane, 2014). 
 
However, whereas the process indicators within the QOF are widely regarded as 
essential to catch complications at an early stage, the use of targeted glucose 
control is more controversial. The strategy closes down the scope for treatment 
plans and goals to be tailored to individual needs and preferences, which conflicts 
with patient-centred care, may put some patients at risk (Vijan et al., 2014) and 
closes off the possibility of holistic solutions to diabetes. There have been calls to 
decentralise decisions over treatment plans and goals. 
 
Victor Montori, an American academic and diabetes specialist, has developed what 
he calls “minimally disruptive medicine”: medicine which is patient-centred and 
involves the use of individualised treatment plans, set in collaboration between 
patients and physicians. Patients are provided with information on the benefits and 
costs of different treatment options and are asked to prioritise upon different 
criteria. On the basis of discussions with their physician, patients select treatment 
plans that are conducive to their preferences and values (Montori and Fernández-
Balsells, 2009).  
 
“Minimally disruptive medicine” does not favour ‘holistic’ or ‘medical’ interventions 
but seeks to ensure that choices are made by patients in collaboration with their 
physicians. Shared decision-making in this way purportedly improves health and 
economic outcomes. Because treatments do not proceed on universalised targets, 
there is no pressure on GPs or patients to achieve a certain goal, improving the 
doctor-patient relationship. Furthermore, patients with complex diabetes, who may 
find it difficult to meet treatment targets, are more likely to stay engaged with the 
treatment plan because it is tailored to their needs and preferences. In this way, 
                                                           
140 Diabetes specialist, 23/04/2015 
192 
 
shared decision-making has the potential to overcome the motivational problem of 
the compliance of patients. While the approach would improve patient-centred 
criteria, it may also improve health and economic outcomes because patients with 
complex diabetes remain engaged (Montori and Fernández-Balsells, 2009)141.  
 
This provides strong grounds to decentralise decision-making in this area, which 
would allow physicians and patients to decide upon appropriate strategies at a local 
level. Nevertheless, there remains significant debate over the Government’s wider 
organisational reforms, with stakeholders raising concerns across a range of 
criteria, including the quality of care and certain patient-centred criteria.  
 
5.3 CCGs and the Development of the Market System   
 
If the new role of local authorities in public health appears to be the most 
promising aspect of the reforms, the creation of CCGs is by far the most 
controversial. In some areas, the creation of CCGs appears to have provided the 
impetus for the development of new and responsive forms of care that are 
supported by patients, GPs and specialists alike. However, as we saw, there are 
significant areas of concern. While one option to improve the quality of CCG 
commissioning is indeed heightened performance management and diabetes-
specific clinical governance, the problem may reflect more fundamental issues 
regarding the design and remit of the organisations. Here, it is useful to revisit 
wider debates about the appropriate organisation of health services.  
 
As we saw in chapter 7 and 8, adherents of the ‘political’ frame argue that direct 
public administration is uniquely capable of achieving both equity and efficiency via 
planning, integration and reductions in transaction costs. Market health systems, 
which include multiple commissioner and provider units, may well produce more 
efficient organisations, but this comes at the expense of the overall efficiency of the 
system, as ever greater resources are expended on management, administration 
and marketing. A significant trade-off appears to be apparent because the need to 
create efficiency savings in market systems comes at the expense of universal and 
comprehensive coverage (Ali and Pollock, 2015).  
 
In diabetes, there was some widespread recognition of the overall inefficiency of 
the system. Where PCTs were larger and combined the commissioning of health 
services and public health, decentralisation through the creation of CCGs has 
coincided with the creation of NHS England and Public Health England, which sit 
between them and the Department of Health (see chapter 7). For the 
Government’s critics, this constitutes layers of unnecessary bureaucracy:  
 
                                                           
141 The economic case for patient-centred care in diabetes stems from studies that suggest the doctor-
patient relationship and trust is critical to diabetes outcomes (Lee and Lin, 2009) and in particular that 
perceptions of treatment burden is related to compliance, which in turn impacts upon the incidence of 
diabetes-related complications and mortality rates (Ho et al., 2006; Vijan et al., 2005). 
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They got rid of the middle men and replaced them with more expensive middle 
men142  
 
Furthermore, while access to services remains free-at-the-point-of-use, people with 
complex diabetes face increasingly restrained access to specialist services.  
While this would question the capacity of marketisation to realise efficiency and 
equity, a further issue concerns the quality of care. Adherents of the ‘political’ 
frame argue that only direct public administration can achieve public health goals 
because the planning of services is carried out by regional organisations which 
integrate public health, primary care and specialist care (Talbot-Smith et al., 2004). 
The on-going developing of the market system may compromise the commissioning 
and delivery of good quality care.   
 
Indeed, the Government’s reforms further consolidate the purchaser-provider split. 
In diabetes, this split appears to frustrate the development of integrated care 
pathways. Both CCG members and specialists report difficulties in working across 
organisational boundaries to develop such models. The significant challenges 
involved in designing care pathways and in particular arranging the financial 
arrangements for the system may have contributed to the collapse of some 
specialist diabetes services, as the costs of working across organisational 
boundaries were too great to attempt a reconfiguration of services. 
 
Similarly, while closer linkages between public health and local authorities are 
undoubtedly beneficial, the organisational divide between CCGs and local 
authorities, as well as the smaller budgets which CCGs have at their disposal, 
appears to frustrate the commissioning of preventative medical care.  
For these reasons, there is a strong case for larger, regional organisations which 
have greater resources at their disposal and combine aspects of commissioning and 
provisioning, on the basis of efficiency and quality of care143.  
 
Yet perhaps a more surprising finding of the analysis above is the questionable 
impact of marketisation on patient-centred criteria. There appears to be a tension 
between the role of CCGs in driving through efficiency savings and at least certain 
patient-centred criteria. The use of economic incentives in primary care may be 
linked to a decline in patient trust and has intensified the performance 
management of prescriptions and referral patterns at a local level, moving decision-
making further away from patients and GPs. 
 
Indeed, direct public administration may have a claim to realise certain patient-
centred criteria, for financial decisions are taken at a broader level than in market 
systems. Health risks are shared between citizens in national health systems rather 
                                                           
142 Public health professional, diabetes lead for a local council, 27/04/2015 
143 This is consistent with efforts to develop primary care. Colin Leys argues that integration between 
primary and secondary care can be facilitated through the integration of GP practices (which have 
never been publicly owned) into the existing NHS architecture, thus ending the administrative and 




than between members of insurance schemes, as in the case in CCGs. Of course, 
public health systems of direct public administration do not facilitate choice of 
provider, for there is only one provider. But, at least in theory, physicians have a 
larger pool of resources to draw upon and more scope to tailor treatment plans to 
individual needs and preferences, suggesting both efficiency and at least some 
patient-centred care are potentially reconcilable. Patients have choice over health 
professional (GP or specialist), location of care (primary care or secondary care), 
treatment plans, prescriptions and referrals; indeed, arguably a more qualitative 
sense of patient-centeredness than implied by market choice. This concept of 
choice may be particularly appropriate in diabetes care, where patients lack 
knowledge and require the support of professionals. One diabetes campaigner 
criticised the inappropriateness of market conceptions of choice in diabetes care: 
 
I think something as complex as healthcare and particularly healthcare for 
conditions that last a life time, healthcare as shopping, the model doesn’t work for 
me. Quite often people who are seeking care and need support throughout their life, 
are older, they’ve got multiple conditions, they’re not very well: the idea that they’re 
going to assemble a package of care around themselves by exercising choice and 
shopping around, and choosing the best quality, it’s pie in the sky. They’ve got to be 
helped to get the right packages, they’ve got to be provided and integrated on their 
behalf, not by them having to do it because they’ll just not be able to144 
 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
 
This case study has applied the evaluative approach set out in chapter 6. It adopted 
a qualitative, postpositivist approach which has potential to complement the 
quantitative research that is prominent in diabetes policy. Indeed, in chapter 2, I 
argued that quantitative evaluations only provide a partial account of performance 
and often prompt more questions than they answer. In diabetes research, the 
central quantitative metric is blood glucose. This metric informs the calculation of 
prevalence rates at the population level and is used to evaluate treatments in 
clinical trials. It is also used in medical practice, in the diagnosis and the 
management of diabetes in primary care. What is more, the metric provides an 
easily measurable indicator for performance management, linked as it is to the 
health of most patients and the behaviour of physicians.  
 
By adopting a qualitative, postpositivist perspective, I have been able to explore the 
complexities and uncertainties involved in the delivery of policy, revealing 
significant issues with the use of diabetes strategies geared towards the control of 
blood glucose at the level of policy. Additionally, by examining decision-making at 
different levels of governance, I have been able to evaluate the extent that 
coordination is occurring across these different levels. In particular, by exploring 
and comparing the values and knowledge contained within stakeholder frames, it 
has been possible to identify various ‘coordination problems’ and to propose 
alternatives where appropriate.  
                                                           




In diabetes, stakeholders at all levels of policy appear to agree upon certain core 
values, such as a commitment to the overarching principle of universal healthcare, 
the quality of care, efficiency, access to care and patient-centredness. This is not to 
downplay the level of contestation which exists in diabetes and health policy in 
general; for some stakeholders doubt the Government’s commitment to universal 
healthcare. Nevertheless, the debate is over the effectiveness of different 
strategies and organisational forms to realise stated policy objectives, rather than a 
more fundamental debate about the appropriateness of diabetes services provided 
free-at-the-point-of-use. As such, problems identified by stakeholders are problems 
of coordination, whereby governance and policy is frustrating the realisation of 
what appear to be shared values. 
 
By examining the knowledge content of stakeholder frames, it has been possible to 
both identify and explore these ‘coordination problems’. Some stakeholders have 
different understandings of the nature of the problem of diabetes and favour 
certain services and forms of care, in accordance with the distinction between the 
‘medical’ and ‘holistic’ frames. Some possessed knowledge which others lacked 
about the effectiveness of the different options available at this level. By bringing 
this knowledge to the fore, it was possible to demonstrate the uncertainties which 
underpin current strategies to diabetes in public health and primary care.  
It has also been possible to bring to the fore knowledge of detrimental effects of 
governance. Examples of ineffectual decision-making were identified at different 
levels of governance, such as poorly defined targets at the national level and 
failures to commission adequate healthcare at a local level. Some of these failures 
appear to be caused by poor understandings of diabetes at a local level; some to 
misaligned incentives; some to the transaction costs attached to organisational 
divides; and some simply to a lack of resources.   
 
Following the identification of these issues, I proposed some alternative policy and 
governance arrangements which have the potential to more effectively realise the 
values revealed in the analysis. In primary care and public health, there is a strong 
case to decentralise decision-making over the NHS Health Check and targeted blood 
glucose control. Shared decision-making in primary care would enable patients and 
physicians to decide upon treatment plans and goals at a local level. Additionally, 
while there have been calls for greater performance management due to the poor 
quality of CCG commissioning, an alternative would be to create larger, regional 
organisations, based on previous models of NHS organisation. While it is beyond 
the scope of this project to provide an outline of what these organisations would 
look like, larger organisations would have a greater pool of skills and resources at 
their disposal and enable the commissioning of fully integrated care.  
 
These proposals resonate with different aspects of the theoretical framework. 
While Friedrich Hayek provided the inspiration for the focus on coordination, the 
research revealed clear limitations to what centralised forms of decision-making 
can achieve in healthcare, as might be expected from his work. This is most clearly 
apparent in the use of targets for blood glucose control in primary care, which had 
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to be revised once it came known that the initial target increased the risk of 
mortality in some patients (Boussageon et al., 2011; Hemmingsen et al., 2011). 
 
However, as we saw in chapter 7, there are different approaches to 
decentralisation in healthcare, with decentralisation claimed by both the 
‘progressive’ and the ‘medical-professional’ frames. Both of these approaches to 
decentralisation are relevant in diabetes today. In public health, the Public Health 
Outcomes Framework (PHOF) serves a useful role as a talking point between local 
council departments and indeed local communities. But its potential as a 
performance management tool is questionable.  
 
In primary care, there is undoubtedly some role for performance management. The 
Quality and Outcomes Framework is generally viewed positively among 
stakeholders and there is widespread agreement that the process measures 
contained within it are crucial for diabetes care. However, performance 
management of treatment goals and other aspects of care, such as decisions over 
prescriptions and referrals, resemble Taylorist management practices, which 
involve the capture of employee knowledge in performance management protocols 
and the standardisation of work and its products. In healthcare, the development of 
Taylorist forms of delivery is aided by Evidence-Based Medicine. Indeed, Stephen 
Harrison and colleagues claim that Evidence-Based Medicine and performance 
management in contemporary health governance have combined to create a 
complex of “scientific-bureaucratic medicine” (Harrison et al., 2002). Yet there are 
limitations to the extent that professional judgement and expertise can be side-
lined in the process of care. The health and economic case for shared decision-
making in primary care suggests that more scope for professional autonomy and 
discretion is required than is allowed by current policy and governance 
arrangements (Montori, 2014). 
 
A further economic framework that is clearly relevant to debates on the 
governance of the health service is Transaction Cost Economics. The complexity of 
healthcare is such that services are intangible and not clearly defined prior to their 
delivery, while it is difficult to measure outcomes. This poses problems for 
performance management but also for markets, because complex and 
heterogeneous services like health care, which involve highly specific assets (see 
chapter 4), can result in high transaction costs when delivered through markets. 
The complexity of healthcare ensures that each clinical encounter between GP and 
patient is unique, while patients can go to and from a number of organisations, 
with input from a range of professional groups. While larger, regional organisations 
would enable the pooling of skills and resources in the commissioning and delivery 
of care, it would also improve efficiency through reductions in the administrative 
and contractual costs involved in setting up and administering care pathways.  
 
Finally, there is some basis for the argument that the health service has the 
characteristics of a ‘gift economy’ and as such very different motivations are 
present within it. One unintended consequence of the reforms uncovered by the 
research is their detrimental effect on patient trust and the doctor-patient 
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relationship. The critical importance of trust and the doctor-patient relationship for 
securing patient compliance and the successful treatment of complex cases would 
suggest that markets are fundamentally inappropriate in this policy area. 
Additionally, while it is difficult to explore the genuine intentions and motivations 
of actors, health professionals frequently use patient-centred criteria to evaluate 
and criticise the reforms. Many of their concerns were shared by patient 
representatives, suggesting that the relationships between producers and 
consumers are not antagonistic. 
 
This is potentially significant because, as we saw in chapter 1, New Left and New 
Right ideologies problematise the role of professionals in  the welfare state in 
general and healthcare in particular. In diabetes today, New Left criticisms of 
‘industrialised medicine’ made by the likes of Ivan Illich resonate with concerns 
regarding the overuse of pharmacological therapies for glucose control. Some 
stakeholders highlight a perverse specialist interest in intensified glucose control. 
However, specialists disagree on the effectiveness of the strategy and it was 
precisely the knowledge of some specialists which exposed some of its 
uncertainties. Furthermore, for people with complex diabetes, restricted access to 
specialists is a major area of concern. It would appear that it is the combination of 
market and managerialist mechanisms in the health service which poses greater 




Chapter 10: Conclusion – Evaluating the Coordinative 
Capacity of Governance 
  
This PhD has developed and applied a postpositivist approach to the evaluation of 
policy and governance, applying it in a case study of diabetes. The PhD was 
structured in three main stages. Chapters 1 and 2 introduced the topic of public 
sector governance and policy evaluation, highlighting issues with dominant 
evaluation methodologies; chapter 3 through to chapter 5 started the process of 
developing an alternative approach to evaluation, concluding in chapter 6 with an 
outline of the proposed approach. Chapter 7, 8 and 9 then explored debates on the 
NHS and evidence-based policymaking in health before, finally, presenting a case 
study of diabetes, where the methodology was applied.  
 
1.1 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
The primary contribution to knowledge is the proposed methodological approach, 
which was developed through an extensive literature review of existing evaluation 
methodologies. In chapter 2 and 3, I criticised the influence of positivism over EBP. 
EBP, in its current form, prioritises the Randomised-Control Trial (RCT) in 
evaluation, viewing the method as superior over all other forms of evaluation. 
Drawing upon postpositivism, I argued that knowledge claims are always value-
laded, indeterminate and equivocal. Stakeholders are likely to have different 
interpretations of facts and evidence, particularly where a problem is complex or 
there is contestation over its meaning.  
 
Indeed, postpositivist policy analysis is fundamental to my proposed 
methodological approach. A particularly important insight of ‘frame analysis’ is that 
policy debates are frequently characterised by competing interpretations, or 
‘framings’, among stakeholders, informed by potentially conflicting values and 
particular knowledge. However, the bulk of policy analysis does not specifically seek 
to evaluate policy outcomes but to elucidate the nature of policy debate and in 
particular to explore the extent of moral disagreement between actors. It was 
therefore necessary to adapt postpositivist policy analysis to focus on stakeholders’ 
framings of the precise detail of policy and the choices and trade-offs involved in 
deciding between different policy options and strategies.     
 
Furthermore, postpositivist policy analysis tends not to address evaluative 
questions of governance. At the level of governance, there is a burgeoning 
literature on network evaluation which does recognise the inadequacy of positivist 
forms of evaluation: networks bring together stakeholders of different values and 
interests. Stakeholder values are also mutable, adapting as network processes 
unfold. Hence, is it is difficult to define objective criteria at the outset which might 




For this reason, evaluation methodologies developed for networks, or “interactive 
governance”, typically adopt a process-orientation which seeks to inform the 
management of network processes. Trust and communication are used as proxies 
for the performance of networks. However, while this approach provides useful 
guidance in network management, it remains incomplete as a form of governance 
evaluation. Process evaluation is problematic on its own because well-managed 
processes, characterised by high levels of trust and communication, could still fail to 
improve policy outcomes. Furthermore, process evaluation provides little guidance 
regarding choices between different governance modes, including the use of 
hierarchical tools and market mechanisms. There is a need to develop evaluative 
methodologies in order to inform decision-making at this level, where decision-
makers shape the overall governance arrangements in order to influence the 
delivery of policy.  
 
To that end, I argued that postpositivist policy analysis should be complemented 
with political economy, in particular heterodox political economy. This combines an 
appreciation of the indeterminate and contested nature of knowledge and the 
often qualitatively distinct, incommensurable nature of values which motivate 
stakeholders, with an analysis of the institutional environment through which 
knowledge is put to use and values are realised in practice.  
 
The concept of coordination, popularised by the heterodox economist Friedrich 
Hayek, can be used as a criterion to evaluate governance. Coordination is, for 
Hayek, a process through which actors seek out and act upon knowledge, in which 
consumers come to understand their ends in light of available consumer items and 
producers identify the most valued use of resources and utilise their own 
knowledge and expertise in the creation of consumer items. Developing this 
conception of coordination provides an opportunity to overcome issues with 
existing literatures on policy and network evaluation discussed above: 
 
Evaluating governance in terms of its coordinative capacity is consistent with a 
postpositivist perspective because it is morally neutral: the focus is not on 
evaluating actors’ ends but whether actors are enabled or constrained in the 
pursuit of their objectives, whatever they might be and however diverse they are. 
Furthermore, coordination usefully brings to the fore the knowledge dimension of 
public policy. Indeed, Hayek shares with network theorists the concept that 
governance must utilise and develop dispersed knowledge. Governance must be 
evaluated in terms of its capacity to utilise existing knowledge and facilitate 
learning and innovation.  
 
Additionally, Hayek’s concept of coordination implies the importance of taking into 
account both processes and outcomes; for ultimately he praises the market process 
for its capacity to realise the ends of its participants. This highlights again the 
weakness of literature on networks, discussed above, which focuses on process 
alone. Governance can only be fully evaluated if we take into account the views of 
stakeholders of the effectiveness of the process. Finally, coordination is consistent 
with a move beyond policy to governance. It orientates evaluation to the complex 
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and interconnected webs of means-ends relationships across different tiers and 
layers of governance.  
 
1.2 The Methodological Approach  
 
How, then, do we evaluate governance in terms of its coordinative capacity? It 
suffices to provide a brief summary of the methodological approach here, because 
chapter 6 presents it in detail. A central part of the evaluation must be to identify 
and compare the values present in stakeholders’ appraisals of policy and 
governance. Through this, it is possible to establish the extent of agreement 
between national policymakers and other stakeholders over the political priorities 
that are to be addressed. It might be that the problem is truly wicked and 
stakeholders do not agree over political priorities. The role of evaluation, in this 
instance, is to elucidate the nature of the disagreement, as in the case of typical 
postpositivist policy analysis. Yet shared values may also be present that would 
provide a basis for outcome evaluation. Evaluations can then examine stakeholder 
appraisals of the precise detail of policy and the governance arrangements in place, 
hence providing insight into the effectiveness of policy and governance to realise 
seemingly shared values.  
 
To that end, the evaluation must proceed from an exploration of values to the 
knowledge content of stakeholder frames across two levels: stakeholders’ 
knowledge of the policy problem and possible solutions on the one hand, and their 
knowledge of the effects of the wider governance arrangements on the other. Both 
are equally as important because without the former it would be impossible to 
establish whether governance contributes to solving the policy problem; and 
without the latter, the evaluation would not address evaluative questions of 
governance.   
 
By exploring stakeholders’ understandings of policy problems and possible 
solutions, it is possible to ascertain the level of complexity which decision-makers 
face and the uncertainties which surrounds different policy options and strategies. 
Stakeholders might also possess and share knowledge of the wider governance 
arrangements in place. It is at the wider level of governance where political 
economy is relevant, because it concerns issues of the scale of decision-making, the 
use of economic incentives and transaction costs: all of which are explored in detail 
in chapters 4 and 5. Where seemingly shared values are present and stakeholders 
identify problems related to these issues, there are grounds to question the 
coordinative capacity of governance. The evaluation can then proceed to make 
proposals that would improve the effectiveness of governance. Hence, it is possible 
to combine the insights of postpositivism and heterodox economics to evaluate 
governance through a focus on coordination.   
 




The proposed methodological approach was further developed in chapter 8, which 
provided a detailed critical analysis of existing evaluation methodologies in health 
policy. As in other policy sectors, evaluations in health are predominantly positivist. 
On the one hand, at the level of policy, ‘health technology research’ typically 
involves the use of RCTs and forms of Cost-Benefit Analysis to evaluate health 
interventions, such as surgical procedures, pharmacological therapies and screening 
devises, in terms of health outcomes and cost; on the other hand, ‘health services 
research’ typically involves observational studies which evaluate changes to 
governance by tracking the performance of health organisations over time, in terms 
of performance data on activities and processes.  
 
In some sense, these two forms of evaluation are complementary: where the 
former evaluates health interventions across a range of health and economic 
criteria, the latter explores the efficiency of health services to produce those very 
interventions. Yet ‘health technology research’, like postpositivist policy evaluation 
in other sectors, downplays the complexity and uncertainties confronting decision-
makers when they develop policy. This was most shockingly apparent in the case 
study of diabetes, where targets for glycemic control were extrapolated from large, 
high quality clinical trials, only to be revised when subsequent studies 
demonstrated they increase the risk of mortality in some patients. Yet the focus of 
health services research on implementation and efficiency alone will be blind to 
distortions like this at the level of policy. There is the possibility that governance is 
deemed effective when it could actually be harmful to patients. Hence, there is a 
need for in-depth, postpositivist research to explore actors’ appraisals of both 
policy and governance in order to provide greater insight into the effectiveness of 
decision-making across the two levels.  
 
2.1 Application, Findings and Political Implications  
 
The different perspectives, or ‘framings’, of health policy and governance were 
identified in chapter 7. The case study then provided the opportunity to explore 
these different frames through detailed empirical research and, crucially, test out 
the claims made by their adherents. While the end of chapter 9 provides a detailed 
summary of the case study research, it suffices here to note the main issues 
identified in the research and to draw out some political implications.  
 
The Conservative/Coalition government’s Health and Social Care Act (2012) sought 
to develop the roles of local authorities in public health and GPs in medical care. 
Clinical-Commissioning Groups, the main organisation reform of the Act, are 
designed to facilitate the shift from specialist-led hospital services in secondary care 
to GP-led services in primary care, where a developing market of providers should 
facilitate efficiency, choice and responsiveness to patients.  
 
In diabetes, stakeholders generally shared the values expressed by policymakers 
such that debates centred more on the effectiveness of policy strategies and 
governance arrangements in place rather than the fundamental objectives of the 
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health service. The new role for local authorities in the health service and the 
enhanced role for GPs were widely viewed as positive developments, because they 
open up the potential to develop and deliver improved diabetes policy. In 
particular, local authorities are uniquely placed to develop broad based public 
health to improve the health of local populations, such as healthy eating campaigns 
and the redesign of areas to encourage exercise. Additionally, GPs are uniquely 
placed to provide patient-centred care because they deliver care closer to home, 
see patients more frequently and have a broader range of knowledge than 
specialists. However, there was some concern over other aspects of current 
diabetes services which highlight problems with particular forms of governance, in 
particular the use of market and managerialist mechanisms.  
 
The creation of CCGs, which are now the main commissioning organisations in the 
health service, was particularly controversial. By prioritising the role of the GP, 
CCGs lessen the influence of public health professionals and specialists over the 
commissioning of health services. Perhaps unsurprisingly, public health 
professionals questioned the quality of CCG commissioning when it comes to 
preventative medical care. Additionally, specialists criticised the commissioning of 
diabetes specialist services. In some areas of the country, diabetes specialist 
services based in hospitals have been disassembled in attempts to unilaterally 
develop primary care. However, this has led to increases in diabetes complications 
and emergency hospital admissions, as GPs have not had the requisite investment 
and support to deliver complex diabetes services. Furthermore, while developing 
primary care stands to improve the responsiveness of services to many patients, 
this is not the case for people with complex needs because access to specialists is 
increasingly constrained.    
 
Failures of CCGs commissioning are perhaps down to inadequate resources at a 
time when the health service and public services more generally are struggling to 
maintain existing services when budgets are constrained and demand is increasing. 
However, another possibility is that ineffective commissioning is caused by the 
marketisation of the health service. Indeed, the divide between CCGs, GPs and 
primary care – on the one hand – and NHS hospitals and specialists – on the other – 
is the most recent incarnation of the purchaser/provider split, a key market reform 
introduced by the Conservatives towards the end of the late 1980s. While in some 
areas of the country, integrated pathways of care have been developed which span 
the purchaser/provider split, these are a minority. Furthermore, the creation of 
ever smaller organisations in order to facilitate market competition increases the 
transaction costs of the overall system. In diabetes, increased transaction costs 
were apparent because actors now have to work across organisational boundaries 
in order to develop integrated pathways of care. 
 
Additionally, though in many respects the creation of ever smaller organisations is a 
decentralising measure, the reform of the health service has been characterised by 
heightened managerialism. In diabetes, centralised forms of decision-making 
associated with managerialism were sharply criticised. Indeed, while the 
government’s reforms certainly open up the possibility to develop broad based 
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public health and patient-centred GP services, key targets in these areas close down 
that possibility. In particular, targets for the delivery of the NHS Health Check and 
glycemic control have significant criticisms at a local level.  
 
These findings have significant political implications. Problems with marketisation 
suggest that proponents of outright public ownership in health services are correct 
when they argue that public health systems have a unique capacity to deliver 
efficient, comprehensive and universal healthcare services. Public health systems 
facilitate significant efficiencies from savings on administration, contractual 
activities and marketing. In a wider context of austerity, the inefficiency of market 
mechanisms contributes to pressures on resources and makes it likely that 
increasing numbers of services, particularly specialist services, are no longer 
available on the NHS. This is clearly significant because it suggests that a major 
trade-off exists at the level of governance when society decides between a public 
health system and a quasi-market health system.  
 
The limitations of managerialism in healthcare also have significant political 
implications. Since the 1970s, the New Left and New Right have been sceptical of 
the potential of public sector employees to deliver efficient and effective public 
services. My analysis suggests this scepticism should be revised and that 
professional judgement is crucial to the delivery of effective public services. 
 
Controversy over targets for blood glucose control in diabetes is testament to the 
on-going importance of professional judgement. Indeed, much of professional 
knowledge is ‘tacit’ and acquired through years of practice; hence it cannot be 
centralised into clinical guidance or a performance management protocol. Yet 
professionals, in this case doctors, do not make decisions alone and patients play a 
vital role in the clinical encounter. Patients possess highly specific information 
about their condition, values, life situation and the effects of treatment. Shared 
decision-making between professionals and patients is therefore vital. This is 
important politically because the combination of markets and managerialism 
appears to be constraining the ability of health professionals to develop patient-
centred care plans with patients who have complex heath needs. The development 
of truly efficient, effective and responsive health services therefore requires a 
significant change in direction away from the market-managerialist model which is 
currently en vogue.  
 
3.1 Limitations and Future Research Agendas 
 
Like any piece of research, this PhD has limitations that are vitally important to 
consider. One issue is the use of the case study method. For example, I have made 
some evaluative claims about the governance of the health service as a whole. A 
possible rejoinder is that the findings are only relevant to diabetes and not to other 
areas of healthcare. Still, it is important to note here that diabetes is one of the 
most significant public health problems of the age. Issues in diabetes policy and 
governance are therefore important to address whether or not similar issues arise 
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in other disease areas. Neverthless, more research is required to establish whether 
similar issues do arise in other areas. To that end, the proposed methodological 
approach would be suited to evaluating policy and governance for other complex 
conditions like cancer, stroke care and mental health.  
 
A further issue is the size of the sample for the interviews. Indeed, I opted for in-
depth, semi-structured interviews over surveys because qualitative research is most 
suited to researching complexity. Hence, the sample size was quite small, including 
four public health professionals, four GPs and four diabetes specialists. This enabled 
me to explore in detail each individual’s appraisal of policy and governance, and 
identify often subtle differences between them. Yet a problem with this approach is 
that participants might not be representative of their respective groups. This 
tension between quality and quantity strikes at the heart of methodological debate 
in the social sciences. And, while for reasons of time and resources I have been 
unable to do so, future applications of the method could combine qualitative 
interviews with surveys to establish to what extent the views of participants are 
indeed representative of their respective groups.  
 
Going forward, the proposed methodological approach could be developed in a 
number of directions. As we saw, Evidence-Based Policy in health is highly positivist 
and there is further scope to apply postpositivist insights to the field. Chronic 
conditions like diabetes, specifically Type 2 diabetes, have a range of causes and 
interventions can seek to ameliorate a range of possible risk factors, from 
socioeconomic factors like poverty and inequality to behavioural risks factors and 
finally biomedical risk factors. Yet scientific and economic methods, like the RCT, 
are more suited to biomedical care and the evaluation of medical treatments. As 
such, these forms of evaluation should not be the sole determinant of decision-
making.  
 
A future research project could seek to create a framework to contribute to both 
public debate and policymaking when it comes to developing policy strategies for 
complex conditions. This could take a condition like diabetes, establish a hierarchy 
of causes of the condition and complications related to it, and identify the full range 
of possible interventions and the evidence-base underpinning them. Qualitative 
interviews could then be undertaken with researchers, professionals and other 
actors about the choices and options available at this level and to ascertain their 
appraisals of the evidence-base. Such a framework would improve understanding 
of the fundamental causes of conditions, which are often political and economic. 
But also provide easily accessible information on policy interventions, the strength 
of the evidence underpinning them and also the strengths and weaknesses of 
dominant research methods, such as epidemiological research, RCTs and 
observational studies. This would provide greater clarity as to both the potential 
and limitations of health interventions and the ‘positivist’ research which underpins 
them.  
 
The proposed methodological approach could also be developed where it relates to 
governance and coordination. My approach to the study of coordination was to 
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take the entire diabetes pathway and interview stakeholders both at a national 
level and at a local level, along the pathway. At a local level, some operated in the 
same health economy, while others operated in different health economies. This 
was important because my aim was to specifically evaluate national governance. 
Restricting my focus to one geographical area alone would have confined my 
research findings to that area, making it difficult to evaluate national governance 
because national governance affects different areas.  
 
I have already discussed how this approach could be combined with survey 
research to establish the extent that stakeholders’ views are representative. But 
the approach could also be narrowed down to focus on one local economy or 
indeed one organisation. In particular, the creation of CCGs is undoubtedly the 
most controversial organisational reform of recent years. Gaining entry to a CCG 
and undertaking in-depth ethnographic research, including participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews, would provide insight into policymaking within 
CCGs as members go about attempting to facilitate coordination. It would provide 
insight, for example, into the causes of the problems discussed above, regarding 
the inadequate commissioning of preventative medical care and specialist care: 
whether these problems are caused by a lack of knowledge and expertise on behalf 
of CCGs; inadequate or perverse incentives so that CCGs can impose costs on other 
actors; or simply insufficient resources to commission effective healthcare.  
 
In-depth qualitative research of this sort would provide firmer grounds for my claim 
at the end of chapter 9 that CCGs are too small and larger organisations are 
required that combine commissioning and provisioning functions and have greater 
resources at their disposal. In any case, the dominance of positivism in policy 
evaluation ensures that there is a range of options to develop postpositivist 
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LINK patient representative  28/02/2014 Telephone interview 
LINK patient representative  29/02/2014 Telephone interview 






GP 23/09/2014 Telephone interview 
GP and practice lead for diabetes  30/09/2014 Telephone interview 
Diabetes specialist 04/12/2014 In person 
Co-chair of CCG and local GP 24/12/2014 GP practice 





Via email (emails 
received on dates 
shown) 
Diabetes specialist  23/04/2015 Telephone interview 
NHS mental health worker  24/04/2015 In person 
Director of public health  13/05/2015 In person 
Public health professional  13/05/2015 In person 
A deputy to regional director of Public 
Health England 
01/06/2015 Telephone interview 
CCG senior management assistant  12/06/2015 In person 
Diabetes voice representative 12/06/2015 In person 
GP 12/06/2015 In person 
 
